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Conflicting objectives and political interference are recognized as the main reasons 
for SOEs’ inability to exhibit performance levels that are comparable to those of 
their private counterparts. Political interference within SOEs is a side effect of 
politicians’ objectives to maintain the power and enjoy the associated perquisites. 
This thesis explores the relationship between three distinct political interference 
mechanisms and SOE performance/behaviour in six countries of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). We use hand-collected dataset 
with board membership and financial information about 200 SOEs over the period 
2010-2014. Fixed effects and instrumental variable estimators are used in our 
analysis.  
Our findings imply that board member changes for SOEs, unlike for private 
enterprises, are politically motivated rather than performance induced. The 
politically motivated board member changes negatively influence SOEs’ 
profitability and productivity levels. Performance of SOEs governed by 
independent government body is not influenced by politically induced board 
member changes. Aside from initiating board member changes in election years, 
we find that politicians engage in election-related manipulation of SOEs’ corporate 
decisions. The increase of SOEs’ employment and indebtedness is observed in pre-
election and election years, while upsurge in investments happens in election and 
postelection years. In election periods, SOEs with politically dominated boards and 
those governed by central governments suffer from greater increase in the number 
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of employees. Furthermore, we reveal that influence over board structure is another 
political interference mechanism. The presence of academics on SOE boards is 
positively associated with performance of SOEs, while government representatives 
have negative association with operating performance. In addition, these 
associations become more profound when the intertwined effect of board members’ 
professional backgrounds and political connections is considered. We also find 
positive relationship between private sector representatives and operational 
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1.1 Background and literature overview 
 
The 2007 global economic crisis and its constraining consequences restarted the 
debate about state ownership. This happened for two contrasting reasons. Firstly, 
governments of certain countries (e.g., United States of America, United Kingdom) 
reversed the process of privatisation, thus increasing the level of state ownership 
worldwide (Florio, 2014; Nanto, 2009; Stan, Peng, & Bruton, 2013). Secondly, high 
levels of public debt and staggered economic activity reconfirmed that governments 
can no longer subsidize poor performing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Hence, 
the question of whether SOEs should be profitable returned to the centre of the 
public attention.   
The economic slowdown, caused by the crisis, showed that a shift towards 
profitable orientation of SOEs is required. For decades SOEs were considered to be 
a main government tool for pursuing social policy goals (Aharoni, 1986; Bai & Xu, 
2005; Shapiro & Willing, 1990). However, attainment of these goals incurs costs 
14 
 
thus, negatively impacting the overall SOE performance (Bozec, Breton, & Cote, 
2002). Furthermore, governments realised that social objectives, being non-
profitable at the same time, create financial burden for state budgets, while SOE 
profit orientation strengthens economies (Musacchio, 2013). In addition, 
readjustment of SOEs’ objectives in accordance with private enterprises’ profit 
orientation was triggered by pro-market forces and a need for economic recovery 
(Bozec et al., 2002; Brown, 1995; Cuervo-Cazzura, Inkpen, Musacchio, & 
Ramaswamy, 2014). OECD (2015) even suggests that SOEs’ economic activities 
should be expected to obtain rates of return that are in the long run comparable to 
those of competing private counterparts.  
The comparison of SOE performance with those of private enterprises is performed 
by many researchers providing evidence for superior performance of private 
enterprises (e.g., Boardman & Vining, 1989; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001; Reeves 
& Ryan, 1998; Caves, Christensen, & Diewert, 1982; De Alessi, 1977). The 
empirical studies suggest that specific underlying factors create weaknesses in SOE 
operational activities, thus causing their inferior performance. The literature 
denotes that inefficiencies creating a performance gap between private and state-
owned enterprises originate mainly from the existence of political interference 
within SOEs and a third agency problem (OECD, 2018).  
Political theory of state ownership asserts that politicians interfere within SOEs as 
to fulfil their personal and/or political interests which are not in line with enterprise 
value maximization objectives (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
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2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994, 1997). Thus, political interference is more common 
and more profound in SOEs than in private enterprises (Jones, 1985; Lioukas, 
Bourantas, & Papadakis, 1993; Shleifer, 1998). Jones (1985) argues that politicians 
will be exposed to lower costs if they transfer certain benefits to politically-like 
minded groups through SOEs. Transfer of subsidies or approving favours is far 
more transparent and obvious process than interventions within SOEs. Therefore, 
SOEs are exposed to political interference as they are closely connected to 
governments which often don’t act as value maximizing shareholders (Aharoni, 
1986; Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Such government behaviour creates costs negatively 
impacting SOE performance. But why is political interference far more present 
among SOEs?   
The agency theory implies that separation of ownership and control will result in 
several governance issues for both, state-owned and private enterprises (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, challenges within SOEs are a 
little different because of the third agency problem (Christiansen, 2013). The third 
agency problem implies that within SOEs we have three instead of two layers of 
governance: (1) citizens who are the ultimate owners, (2) the government who has 
a fiduciary duty vis-a-vis its citizens, and finally (3) the board of directors which 
governs the enterprise (Capobiano & Christiansen, 2011; Musacchio, Pineda 
Ayerbe, & Garcia, 2015b). The government can be viewed as “the fiduciary agent”, 
while the board, that is appointed by the government, is “the direct agent”. The 
citizens as principals and ultimate owners lack the knowledge and resources to 
competently supervise their direct agents and, thus, they have to rely on the 
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government in this respect. The problem arises when decisions of agents are 
misaligned with the best interest of principals usually because of a certain political 
agenda.  
In line with the above stated, corporate finance literature in recent years started 
pointing out that in conglomerate enterprises increase of investment inefficiencies 
arises from agency problem. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) explain that cross-
subsidies within conglomerates take a “socialist” form since strong divisions end 
up subsidizing weak ones. The reasoning behind it, cannot be related to a 
CEO/board decision to derive their private benefits only from the weak divisions. 
It is showed that division managers engage in rent-seeking activities and that for 
managers of weaker divisions opportunity cost of this engagement is much lower.  
The model of Scharfstein and Stein (2000) incorporates three layers of agents: 
division managers, a CEO and outside investors. The allocation of investments 
depends on the power of rent-seeking managers and discretionary decision of a 
CEO. However, the aim of both agents is to derive private benefits from the assets 
under their control, thus creating inefficiencies for the outside investors. The 
research of Scharfstein (1998) also discovers that ‘socialism’ stems from 
misaligned interests of top managers and outside investors since top managers have 
weak incentives to focus on value maximization. If we were going to apply this 
model to SOEs, that are in a certain way conglomerates, the division managers 
being SOE boards and CEOs being governments would use SOEs for pursuance of 
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certain private benefits. Hence, SOE boards seem to be the key governance 
mechanism that enables political interference.  
The literature suggests that SOE boards play a central role in the governance of 
SOEs through balancing government objectives with market success (Schedler & 
Finger, 2008). The role includes development of the strategy that is in line with the 
objectives set by the government, while at the same time bearing the ultimate 
responsibility for the SOE performance (OECD, 2018). Additionally, SOE boards 
should monitor management behaviour and implementation of the agreed strategy, 
have the power to appoint and remove the CEO, approve major expenditures, 
review annual budgets/business plans and perform their duty in the best interest of 
the ultimate owners (OECD, 2015). Therefore, in theory, the only difference 
between responsibilities of SOE and private enterprise boards is the presence of 
government that influences the course of SOEs (Frederick, 2011).  
In practice, however, SOE boards usually have just the nominal power without 
clearly assigned responsibilities and government taking over the roles that should 
be in the competency of the board (World Bank, 2014a). This occurs since SOE 
boards tend to be dominated by middle-level civil servants and politically connected 
individuals that lack required experience, competencies and technical or finance 
expertise (Vagliasindi, 2008a). Moreover, the empirical research of Schedler and 
Finger (2008) implies that government representatives on boards are still a major 
factor of political control. Hence, SOE board composition determines whether 
board accountability is undermined, whether SOE performance is in the focus of 
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the board’s decision-making process and whether political interference is present 
(Cornforth, 2003).     
Governments are usually tempted to appoint bureaucrats or political cronies to SOE 
boards since these individuals do not question adoption of inefficient decisions 
(Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996). Lack of autonomous, independent and 
powerful boards results in undue hands-on government interference when it comes 
to SOE strategic and operational decisions (World Bank, 2014a). Such behaviour 
of politicians blurs the lines of board responsibilities and leaves boards with 
conflicting and inconsistent objectives (OECD, 2015). This leads to poorly run 
SOEs with negative performance.  
Motivated by the implications of the literature and the need for improvements in 
SOEs’ performance, this thesis examines how different forms of political 
interference affect SOEs’ behaviour. Firstly, we analyse the nature and drivers of 
SOEs’ board turnover and how board member changes might serve as political 
interference mechanism with negative performance consequences. Secondly, we 
look at whether politicians manipulate SOEs’ corporate decisions as to increase the 
likelihood of their re-election, thus representing another channel of political 
interference. Thirdly, we investigate whether board members’ professional 
backgrounds affect SOE performance and whether intertwined effect of the SOE 




1.2 Research context and data 
 
The relationships between political interference and SOE performance mentioned 
above are examined in six countries of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. We chose these countries because of 
similarities/dissimilarities that exist among them and that provide us with a unique 
research set-up.  
1.2.1 Historical and institutional background 
The path followed by the former SFRY's countries, before declaration of their 
independence, was alike (Horvat, 1971). The highest legal entity in the country was 
the Federal Parliament, constituted from parliament representatives of each 
republic. Republic parliaments could propose laws and policies to the Federal 
Parliament and only when adopted at the federal level the laws/policies would be 
implemented by each republic. Hence, the legal framework that shaped the 
economy of individual republics was rather similar with small discretionary rights 
in certain areas (Woodward, 1995).  
Tensions between republics of the SFRY started in 1970s and intensified towards 
the end of 1990s (Jovic, 2009). Differences in ideology and the raise of nationalism 
led to creation of movements in Slovenia and Croatia that supported decentralized 
federation. Furthermore, a widening gap between developed and underdeveloped 
regions led to deterioration of unity among republics (Jovic, 2009). Beginning of 
nineties brought about the fall of economic activity and industrial production, high 
20 
 
levels of unemployment, severe decrease of GDP and hyperinflation. For those 
reasons, the dissolution was started with the Slovenian and Croatian declaration of 
independence since citizens of both countries thought that they will better off in 
their own countries. This triggered a war that ended with a peace truth after which 
each of the countries gained its own independence (Leslie, 2004).  
The dissolution and independence led to major political changes in each of the 
countries with adoption of new constitutional laws and establishment of new 
political order. Because of the war and newly established political regimes certain 
countries were unable to pick up the transition pace (e.g., Milosevic’s regime in 
Serbia). The economic transformation and adoption of the new legal frameworks in 
certain countries went through several iterations. For those reasons, within our 
sample we have two EU member countries (Slovenia and Croatia), two that are in 
advanced transition (Serbia and Montenegro) and two slow-adjusting transition 
economies (Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia). Despite dissimilarities 
with regards to transitional pace, the similarities regarding political dynamics are 
present. During the observed five years, four out of six countries went twice through 
the election cycles. Furthermore, in four out of six countries the ruling political 
party changed. Even the political stability indicator shows similar levels of 
government instability among the observed countries (World Bank, 2014b).  
1.2.2 State enterprise sector 
The state enterprise sectors in the former SFRY's countries were almost analogous 
and they were keystones for economic development (Horvat, 1971). The countries 
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had similar legal and governance frameworks for state ownership, their enterprises 
were faced with same market conditions and most of their SOEs were monopolies. 
Coherent patterns could be depicted by looking at the level of state ownership, their 
number and sectors in which they operate (Bicanic, 2010). Notwithstanding, SOEs 
poor performance led to adoption of the Federal Ownership Transformation Act in 
1989 which triggered large privatization waves (Jocic, 1997). The first privatization 
wave was initiated in the beginning of 1990s and was followed by the second one, 
ten years later, but even today the privatization process in still ongoing.  
Despite these privatization efforts, the degree of state ownership in these countries 
is still pretty high. The total number of SOEs ranges from 15 in Montenegro to at 
least 80 in Slovenia. Even though absolute numbers of SOEs in each of these 
countries might indicate that the degree of state ownership is quite distinctive, when 
we take into account the total number of enterprises and employment percentage 
for which SOEs are accountable, similarities become apparent. For example, level 
of state ownership in Slovenia is one of the highest among OECD countries. In 2012 
SOE sector in Slovenia accounted for 11% of the total employment which is three 
times higher than the OECD average (OECD, 2014). Moreover, in the same year 
SOEs in Serbia and Croatia employed 7% and 6.3% of the total employment 
respectively (Arsic, 2012; Croatia Bureau of Statistics, 2012; DUUDI, 2013). 
Governments have a majority state ownership in strategically important SOEs (e.g., 
energy, transport, telecommunication, utilities) which contribute to the overall 
functioning of their economies.  
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1.2.3 Governance of state ownership 
Up until the SFRY’s dissolution governance and legal framework around the state 
ownership in each of the countries was the same. Reform and privatization efforts, 
after the independence, created different frameworks for governance of state 
ownership. The aim of governments was to increase efficiency of SOEs as to 
decrease their dependency on the state financial help and increase their 
attractiveness for the investors. Similarly, as with all the other reforms, 
governments tried to adopt the best practices that exist in EU and OECD member 
states. However, depending on the transition pace of each country the laws and 
governing models adopted differentiate to a certain extent. 
First area of governance where dissimilarities can be depicted is board of directors. 
The best practice implies that SOEs should have two-tier boards with supervisory 
board being responsible for setting up the strategy, management oversight and the 
overall performance, while management board is responsible for strategy 
implementation and every day business operations (OECD, 2015). However, SOEs 
can also have one-tier boards with or without the presence of managing directors. 
The vast majority of SOEs within our sample has two-tier boards. In Montenegro, 
all SOEs have one-tier boards due to legal stipulation, while in FYR Macedonia 
SOEs can have one-tier or two-tier board systems depending on category of SOEs 
to which they belong.  
The second area where dissimilarities arise is related to governing models of state 
ownership. In Slovenia governance of SOEs is in the hands of Slovenian Sovereign 
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Holding (SSH), while its parallel in Croatia is DUUDI. Personal commission within 
SSH carries out recruitment process for board membership and sends proposals to 
shareholders assembly for confirmation (SSH, 2011). All conditions for supervisory 
board membership are explained in detail in SSH's Rules on supervisory board 
member selection and other regulatory documents (e.g., level of education, work 
experience, postulates about non-political involvement etc). In Croatia, the 
procedure for appointment of supervisory board members is initiated by line 
ministry, but DUUDI conducts public call. Criteria for board membership is 
determined by government through adoption of the official decision in which 
position requirements are defined such as educational level, expertise etc (Narodne 
novine, 2012). After public call DUUDI creates proposal with justification for each 
candidate and this proposal is then forwarded to government for adoption.  
Contrary to those nomination practices, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYR 
Macedonia line ministries are responsible for monitoring and exercising ownership 
rights. SOEs are governed in accordance with provisions of the relevant SOEs 
legislation.1 Line ministries are creating proposals of decisions on appointment of 
board members. In Bosnia and Herzegovina this decision is sent to shareholders 
assembly for confirmation, while in FYR Macedonia it is sent to the government. 
Aside from the general provisions within the laws detailed criteria for board 
                                                          
1  In Bosnia and Herzegovina details regarding nomination and appointment of board members within state-
owned enterprises are stipulated in the Law on state-owned enterprises in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official 
Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012). Law on public enterprises in Macedonia stipulates 
procedures and criteria for nomination of board members (Official Gazette of the FYR Macedonia, 2013). 
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membership is not stated and they are usually created by line ministries for each 
public call.  
For Serbia and Montenegro government plays the key role in SOEs governance. 
SOEs in Serbia are governed by provisions of Law on SOEs, while in Montenegro 
individual laws provide provisions for governance of SOEs. Criteria for 
appointment of board members such as education, work experience, level of 
expertise that board members need to possess are stated in legal provisions in 
Serbia, while in Montenegro it is only stated that the board members cannot work 
for SOEs' auditor, perform duty of executive director or be convicted for any crime. 
The specificity of this model is that line ministry only prepares call for appointment 
of board members which is then taken over by committee or office for appointments 
within government. This office announces the process, governs the procedure and 
decides on candidates which will be proposed. The final decision on appointment 
of board members is made by government and sent to shareholders assembly for 
confirmation.  
1.2.4 Why six countries of the former SFRY? 
Several reasons stem behind our decision to investigate former SFRY’s countries. 
First, the vast majority of prior empirical studies on political interference are related 
to OECD and BRICS countries while none of them, to the best of our knowledge, 
was related to these six countries. Second, each of these countries had similar 
market conditions and legal rules prior to the breakup of the SFRY (Horvat, 1971). 
Even after declaration of independence and privatization processes, SOEs in these 
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countries remain quite significant in terms of their size and sectors to which they 
belong (Bicanic, 2010).  
Third, SOEs in these countries are exposed to analogous levels of political pressures 
with political control being widespread in the state enterprise sector (Transparency 
International, 2016). Fourth, enhancement of SOEs’ performance is one of the main 
priorities for governments of these countries due to serious budget deficits and high 
levels of public debt. Moreover, discussion about importance of SOEs’ board 
member professionalisation is present on the governmental level of these countries 
for several years now. Appointments of knowledgeable and experienced individuals 
at board level is a precondition for SOE successful performance (Petrovic & Sonje, 
2016).  
The last reason is related to the fact that countries within our sample might provide 
useful insights about political interference–SOEs relationship that are present at 
different stages of transition. Slovenia and Croatia finished their transition with 
both being EU member states. Serbia and Montenegro are considered to be 
advanced transition economies that are expected to finish negotiations for EU 
accession in next couple of years. FYR Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
rather slow-adjusting transition economies with numerous reforms being on hold.  
Despite all the differences in governing models of state ownership and board 
nomination/appointment procedures, our data shows quite a few similarities among 
the observed countries. Comparable number of board member changes enables us 
to investigate nature and drivers of SOEs’ board turnover and its relationship with 
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performance. Rather alike fluctuations of SOE’s employment, investment and 
indebtedness levels around election years in addition to politician’s influence in all 
economic spheres provides us with the opportunity to examine political influence 
over SOE corporate decisions. Similarities of board members’ professional 
backgrounds and board structure allow us to question whether professional 
background can influence SOE performance. Therefore, we believe that six 
countries of the former SFRY provide a unique set-up for analysis of the impact 
that political mechanisms might have on SOEs’ behaviour and performance. 
1.2.5 Data 
The analysis in this thesis is performed on the hand-collected dataset of 200 SOEs 
from six countries of the former SFRY for the period 2010-2014. We build a sample 
through extraction of financial data from Amadeus database. Moreover, we hand-
collect board member information (e.g., names, dates of appointment and 
resignation), their demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, nationality) and 
information about their educational/professional backgrounds (e.g., graduation 
year, highest degree obtained, area of study, expertise, previous/current employer). 
In the vast majority of the cases two sources of information are used as to increase 
data reliability. The final sample used in this thesis contains data on 2,120 board 
members with 1,000 enterprise-year observations.  
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1.3 Motivations, research questions and chapter summary 
For vast majority of government representatives, attainment and exploitation of 
power is the ultimate goal (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). Hence, politicians are 
frequently enticed to use SOEs as mechanisms through which they can effectuate 
some political or personal objectives. Lawson (1994) even suggests that SOE 
behaviour is a consequence of various political processes. However, as noted by 
Sun, Mellahi, Wright, and Xu (2015) the prior research fails to recognize a possible 
existence of the informal linkages between business people and politicians. 
Furthermore, research on relationship between different types of political 
interference and SOE performance is rather limited. The three empirical chapters 
within this thesis try to address several literature gaps in an attempt to recognize 
political interference mechanisms that influence SOE performance/behaviour.  
Chapter 2 – Politically Induced Board Turnover, Ownership Arrangements and 
Performance of SOEs 
The first empirical chapter investigates the impact of elections on board member 
changes and its relationship with profit-oriented performance of SOEs, thus 
providing new insights on political tie heterogeneity. Board positions within SOEs 
are reserved for bureaucrats and politically like-minded individuals (Boycko et al., 
1996; World Bank, 2006) who are appointed on the basis of their political 
allegiance. Such appointment practices are considered to be one of the most 
profound forms of political interference (Barberis, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; 
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Greene, 2014). For that reason, prior empirical studies examined personal level 
political ties as political interference proxies.  
Percentage of politicians/government officials on boards (e.g., Menozzi, Gutierrez 
Urtiaga, & Vannoni, 2011; Okhmatovskiy, 2010), political connections of CEOs 
(e.g., Wu, Wu, Zhou, & Wu, 2012), or unlawful discharge of a board chairman or 
CEO (e.g., Ding, Jia, Wu, & Zhang, 2014) are most frequently used measures for 
determining the level and consequences of political interference. However, these 
measures neglect the fact that government officials and political appointees are 
replaced whenever new government representative or ruling political party is 
elected (Kernaghan, 1986). In that way governments beholden boards to ensure that 
they fulfil their interests even when these interests might cause negative 
performance results (World Bank, 2014a).  
Following literature implications, we analyse whether board turnover for SOEs, 
unlike for private enterprises, complies with political pressures rather than 
performance results (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). In that way we try to trace signs of 
possible informal channels for political interference. The political embeddedness 
perspective suggests that political interference via boards can bring benefits as well 
as costs. Hence, we question whether politically induced board member changes 
create negative effects on SOE performance. Change of board members in the 
absence of perfect substitution, disrupts the efficient decision-making processes 
causing organizational inefficiencies and adversely affecting SOE performance 
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(Sharma, 1985). Furthermore, we recognize that magnitude of these effects could 
be influenced by SOE’s political importance or government ownership models. 
For examination of election–board member changes relationship we use panel data 
fixed effects. Since board member changes cannot influence the occurrence of 
elections, no reverse causality is assumed. However, poor performance results 
might lead to change of board members, thus implying the possibility of reverse 
causality. Hence, panel data instrumental variable (IV) estimator is used for analysis 
of board member changes–performance relationship. We look at operating and 
financial performance of SOEs and we employ three different variables of board 
member changes as to grasp distinct levels of board dynamics. 
Our findings suggest that board member changes within SOEs are politically 
motivated rather than performance induced. Hence, we uncover that board member 
changes represent an informal channel of political interference. We also reveal that 
SOEs with higher levels of board member changes encounter lower productivity 
and profitability levels. These findings suggest that political interference via board 
member changes causes organizational inefficiencies and poor SOE performance. 
Moreover, the results show that board member changes are insignificant for 
performance of large SOEs and SOEs governed by independent government body. 
This empirical chapter has several important contributions. First, it provides 
analysis and empirical evidence which fills in the gap about the nature and drivers 
of SOEs’ board turnover (Grosman, Okhmatovskiy, & Wright, 2016). Previous 
empirical efforts were mainly streamlined towards examination of political ties and 
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board composition, while the answers regarding SOE board turnover remained 
neglected and overlooked. Moreover, we show empirical evidence which confirms 
theoretical standing that board turnover within SOEs complies with political rather 
than market forces (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). Second, we contribute to a more 
nuanced picture of political tie heterogeneity. We reveal that politically induced 
board member changes represent an indirect channel of political interference which 
goes beyond personal political ties. Third, this empirical chapter is the first to link 
political interference and SOE performance through introduction of election cycles 
into the board member changes–performance relationship. Hence, we complement 
the research studies on political embeddedness perspective (e.g., Michelson, 2007) 
and political view of state ownership (e.g., Krueger, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). Additionally, our findings provide important implications for policymakers 
who are interested in enhancement of SOEs’ performance. Criteria for appointment 
of board members should be defined so that knowledge, skills, and competences 
represent the main conditions for board membership. Furthermore, adoption of 
centralized ownership model shields SOEs from political interference. 
Chapter 3 – Election driven corporate decisions of SOEs 
The second empirical chapter examines the election related manipulation of SOEs’ 
corporate decisions on employment, indebtedness and investment. With the 
formulation of the opportunistic political business cycles, Nordhaus (1975) is the 
first to recognize that politicians might engage in pre-election manipulation of 
macroeconomic outcomes (e.g., economic growth, employment, inflation). The 
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criticism of this theory led to development of rational political cycles which shifts 
the focus towards pre-election manipulation of monetary and fiscal policies 
(Cukierman & Meltzer, 1986; Rogoff, 1990; Rogoff & Sibert, 1988). Even though 
these theories received limited support from empirical studies, the fact that voters 
keep politicians accountable for economic conditions does not change (Carlsen, 
2000; Fidrmuc, 2000; Gelineau, 2013; Lewis-Beck & Whitten, 2013). Therefore, 
we suggest that previous research failed to recognize some informal mechanisms 
that enable politicians to influence economic conditions in election periods. 
Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar and Thesmar (2007) suggest that aside from altering 
public policies, politicians might use their power to influence corporate decisions 
of certain enterprises. 
The incumbents are tempted by the national elections to use SOEs’ corporate 
decisions as a transfer mechanism which provides their voters with certain 
perquisites (Shleifer, 1998). Hence, SOEs’ decisions represent a perfect lever to 
garner voters support. With voters’ preferences being highly dependent on the level 
of employment and economic growth (Schultz, 1995) politicians have a limited 
leeway to ensure their re-election chances. News about job creation and 
introduction of investment projects increases probability of their reappointment 
(Bertrand et al., 2007; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Wolfers, 2002). Thus, 
politicians are enticed to engage in pre-election manipulation of decisions which 
would generate such news. Since adoption of political decisions depends on SOE 
boards it is expected to observe greater level of manipulation amongst SOEs with 
politically dominated boards (Hu & Leung, 2012). Furthermore, SOEs governed by 
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local self-governments might encounter higher pressures to alter decisions (Li & 
Zhou, 2005).  
Panel data fixed effects estimator is used since we do not have to be concerned 
about endogeneity and reverse causality problems. Elections are exogenous as well 
as exempted from any individual enterprise influence since their occurrence is in 
line with constitution or with some extraordinary circumstances in case of the early 
elections. Employment, indebtedness and investment represent our dependent 
variables. Furthermore, we use a three-dummy approach (i.e., pre-election, election, 
postelection) in an attempt to alleviate any doubt regarding the timing and the 
reasons stemming behind SOE corporate decision alterations. 
The results of this empirical chapter reveal that incumbents’ interventions in pre-
election and election years lead to increase in SOEs’ employment and indebtedness. 
Conversely, the change of investment levels happens in election and postelection 
years. Moreover, the results imply that the increase of leverage and number of 
employees in election periods is more pronounced for SOEs with politically 
dominated boards. Our findings also suggest that SOEs governed by central 
governments suffer from election related manipulation of employment levels in pre-
election and election years. In contrast, for SOEs governed by local self-
governments we observe a significant change of indebtedness in pre-election and 




With the analysis from this empirical chapter we contribute to the literature in 
several important aspects. First, we complement the literature on political business 
cycles through offering a detailed analysis which shows that politicians manipulate 
SOE corporate decisions. The researchers so far observed manipulation of 
macroeconomic variables as the main option for increase of incumbents’ 
reappointment chances (e.g., Alesina, Cohen, & Roubini, 1993; Hibbs, 1977; 
Nordhaus, 1975). However, we shift that focus towards the existence of enterprise 
level political business cycles. Second, our findings show that alteration of SOE 
corporate decisions is closely related to provision of election favours to politicians, 
thus improving our understanding of political embededdness theory (e.g., 
Okhmatovskiy, 2010).  
This chapter also provides some important practical implications on how 
governance of SOEs could be amended and improved. As to avoid pre-election 
manipulation of SOEs’ corporate decisions a four-year plan regarding employment, 
indebtedness and investment should be adopted. Amendments or deviations from 
these four-year plans should be allowed only under special and unpredictable 
circumstances (e.g., major economic crisis). Moreover, governance of SOEs by 
independent government body would impede political interference (e.g., 
Musacchio et al., 2015b; OECD, 2015) and ensure implementation of these four-




Chapter 4 – Importance of board members’ professional background for 
performance of SOEs 
The third empirical chapter explores implications of upper echelons theory 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) by observing how board member idiosyncratic 
professional experiences might influence SOE performance. Smith et al. (1994) 
explain that professional thinking and views of individual board members stem 
from work-related experiences. Moreover, diverse and heterogeneous boards 
escape group-thinking (Doz & Kosonen, 2007), while their decision making is 
efficient (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011).  
Prior empirical studies on board characteristics and heterogeneity are primarily 
related to gender (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009), tenure (e.g., Hambrick, 
Geletkanycz, & Frederickson, 1993), age (e.g., Golden & Zajac, 2001; Post, 
Rahman, & Rubow, 2011), independence (e.g., Devos, Prevost, & Puthenpurackal, 
2009; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988) and foreign directors (e.g., Masulis, Wang, & 
Xie, 2012). Additionally, the vast majority of studies on occupational diversity is 
related to private enterprises and specific professions impact. For example, Sisli-
Ciamarra (2012) show that bankers are associated with greater leverage, while Kor 
and Sundaramurthy (2009) find that board members specific industry knowledge 
leads to sales growth. With this empirical chapter we try to fill in the literature gap 
on whether occupational diversity of SOE board members is important.  
The capability of board members to effectively perform their duties is dependent 
upon their professional backgrounds (Bazerman & Schoorman, 1983). Therefore, 
we try to depict how SOE board members who work as professors, in the private 
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sector or in the government affect SOE performance. Recognizing that political 
connectedness of these individuals might play a significant role we perform several 
additional analyses. We look whether the intertwined effect of board members’ 
professional background and political connections on SOE performance differs 
from the sole effect of professional backgrounds. Furthermore, we examine the 
effects of board and political capital in an attempt to determine whether knowledge 
and expertise provide greater performance benefits. 
We use panel data fixed effects estimator for examination of the effects that board 
members’ professional backgrounds have on ROE, sales per employee and 
operating costs. Our results show that presence of professors on SOE boards is 
positively associated with both, financial and operating performance of SOEs. 
Contrary to that, board members coming from private enterprises increase operating 
costs probably because they require higher levels of compensation. Furthermore, 
negative relationship between government representatives and SOE operational 
efficiency is observed. This result supports literature implication that government 
officials usually lack competencies and knowledge for successful performance of 
board duties. The magnitude and significance of these associations increases with 
board members being politically connected. Private sector representatives and 
professors are positively related to operational performance of SOEs with minority 
private ownership. Lastly, we find that board capital and political capital positively 
influence SOE financial performance. 
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This chapter provides few important contributions for the literature. First, our 
findings enriching understanding of the upper echelons theory by providing 
evidence that board members’ professional background influences performance 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Second, we complement the prior empirical research 
on the relationship between individual board member characteristics and 
performance. The results within this chapter show that board–performance 
relationship is influenced by individual board member experience, level of 
education and political connections.  
Aside from literature contributions stated above, the analysis performed within this 
chapter provides important implications for government policies. Our findings 
reveal what kind of board criteria should be adopted by governments as to ensure 
that combination of individuals on SOE boards is the optimal one. More 
specifically, our findings suggest that professors and private enterprise 
representatives possess the skills-set and expertise which could enhance SOE 
performance. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of four further chapters. Chapter 2 examines the relationship 
between election cycles and board member changes and conducts detailed analysis 
on how that relationship impacts the performance of SOEs. Chapter 3 explores pre-
election manipulation of SOE corporate decisions on employment, indebtedness 
and investments. Chapter 4 investigates the effects of board members’ professional 
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backgrounds on SOE performance. Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings of the 
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The political view of state ownership asserts that political ties are established 
through appointments of politically like-minded individuals or bureaucrats that 
follow certain political interests (Boycko et al., 1996). The primary goal of these 
appointees is fulfilment of their personal and/or political interests that are not in line 
with the enterprise value maximization objective (La Porta et al., 2002; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994, 1997). Moreover, these appointees might lack the appropriate 
knowledge, competences and experience for carrying out board responsibilities 
(Vagliasindi, 2008a; World Bank, 2014a). In that way, governments constitute SOE 
boards to ensure that they fulfil their interests even when this may cause negative 
                                                          
2 This chapter, without certain parts, is published in journal Corporate Governance: An International 





 performance (World Bank, 2014a). The main focus of the past empirical research 
on this topic is related to personal level political ties and government ownership ties 
within SOEs. Researchers use political connections of CEOs (e.g., Wu et al., 2012), 
percentage of politicians/government officials on boards (e.g., Menozzi et al., 2011; 
Okhmatovskiy, 2010), or unlawful discharge of a board chairman or CEO (e.g., 
Ding et al., 2014) as political interference proxies. These proxies neglect the 
existence of political ties heterogeneity. Sun et al. (2015) explain that the past 
research has failed to recognize the informal linkages that might exist between 
business people and politicians. Therefore, the main question in this chapter is 
whether political interference goes beyond the establishment of formal political ties 
and, if so, what kind of informal channels might exist. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) suggest that for SOEs, board member changes comply 
with political rather than market forces. Government officials and political 
appointees are replaced whenever a new government representative or ruling 
political party is elected (Kernaghan, 1986). In that way, political establishments 
distance themselves from individuals connected to the previous political 
administration (Sun et al., 2015), who are unlikely to show loyalty and impartiality 
for the new political party in power (Kernaghan, 1986). Consequently, board 
member changes are triggered by election cycles, which thus represent an informal 
channel for political interference. In addition, board members without direct 
political ties could suffer from “guilt by association”. This refers to punishment of 
individuals or organizations because of their prior relationship with illegitimate, 
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disadvantaged, or undesirable individuals or networks (Labianca & Brass, 2006). 
Hence, even non-politically connected board members might be replaced. 
Politically induced board member changes might indicate that the likelihood of 
board member discharge due to poor performance is much lower for SOEs. 
Nevertheless, political interference via board member changes may lead to 
operational inefficiencies and poor SOE performance. The nonexistence of perfect 
substitution for individual board members creates a time lag before an efficient 
decision-making process is re-established (Sharma, 1985). Moreover, new board 
members need time to adapt in order to be able to positively contribute to the 
decision-making processes (Smith et al., 1994). Recognizing that performance 
depends on board decisions, politically motivated board member changes might 
have negative effects on SOE performance. The magnitude of these effects could 
be influenced by the interplay of the SOE’s political importance and the 
government ownership ties. 
In this chapter we examine the relationship between election cycles and board 
member changes and we analyse how that relationship impacts the performance of 
SOEs in six countries of the former SFRY. Our hand-collected dataset has financial 
and board member information for 200 SOEs from 2010 to 2014. We examine 
election–board member changes and board member changes–performance 
relationship using panel data fixed effects and a panel data instrumental variable 
(IV) estimator, respectively.  
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The decision to investigate SOEs in countries of the former SFRY is based on 
several reasons. First, these countries had similar legal frameworks, market rules 
and ways in which they govern state ownership (Horvat, 1971). Coherent patterns 
could be depicted by looking at the level of state ownership, their number, and the 
sectors in which they operate (Bicanic, 2010). Even though each of these countries 
chose its own path after achieving independence, all of them still face similar 
problems (e.g., level of indebtedness, staggered economic activity, and political 
instability). Second, despite privatization efforts during the past 20 to 30 years, the 
degree of state ownership in these countries is still high. The absolute number of 
SOEs in each of these countries might indicate that the degree of state ownership is 
quite distinctive, but when we take into account the employment percentage for 
which SOEs are accountable, similarities become apparent. Third, our data reveal 
that countries within our sample have analogous levels of board member changes. 
Therefore, the six countries of the former SFRY provide a unique set-up for 
examining the influence of board member changes on performance of SOEs.  
In addition to the above stated, the motivation to focus on the board member 
changes is related to the increase of the public pressures when it comes to the way 
in which individuals obtain/lose SOE board membership. Journalists of daily 
newspapers started investigating the ways in which SOEs are governed. The 
headlines and the stories behind them mainly investigated why responsibility of the 
boards for the poor performance of SOEs is non-existent and who provides the 
support for questionable board decisions and board memberships. For example, the 
article from March 2010 published in Blic states that Serbia kept the practice of 
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appointing political party members to SOE boards because of the certain political 
interests (Spasic, 2010). Moreover, in the aftermath of the Serbia’s 2012 elections 
political party negotiations about government constitution encompassed 
negotiations about SOE board memberships (Valtner, 2012). Exactly in that year 
the ruling political party changed as well as the majority of SOE board members. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina politicians appoint their family and political party 
members to SOE boards as found by Karabeg (2014). Croatian Vijesti also show 
that political parties control SOEs through their board members (Cigoj, 2013). 
Furthermore, the article also revealed that a year and a half after the elections most 
of the board members that belonged to the previous political regime were replaced. 
Similar headlines and behaviour of political leaders in other countries from our 
sample can also be found. However, when questioned, political leaders from these 
countries explain that there is no evidence of political board member changes or 
negative consequences of such practices even if they exist. Hence, our research tries 
to provide empirical evidence for such practices that could lead to policy changes.  
The results show that board member changes within SOEs are politically motivated 
rather than performance induced. We also uncover the informal channel of political 
interference via board member changes. Furthermore, we find a negative and 
significant relationship between politically induced board member changes and 
performance of SOEs. The relationship is stronger for operating than for financial 
performance. Our estimates also indicate a greater presence of political interference 
in small and medium size SOEs. Additionally, we find that board member changes 
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are insignificant for the performance of SOEs governed by independent government 
body.  
This research contributes to the existing literature in several important aspects. 
First, we respond to a recent call by Grosman et al. (2016) to fill in the gap regarding 
the nature and drivers of board turnover within SOEs. We offer a detailed analysis 
and empirical evidence for Vickers and Yarrow’s (1988) theoretical standing that 
board member changes within SOEs comply with election cycles (political force) 
rather than poor performance results (market force). Second, we introduce 
politically induced board member changes as a new proxy for political interference 
within SOEs. With this proxy we recognize that political interference goes beyond 
personal political ties of CEOs, board chairmen, or a portion of board members and 
takes into account the dynamics of the entire board. Third, we complement research 
studies on the political view of state ownership (e.g., Krueger, 1990; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997) and the political embeddedness perspective (e.g., Michelson, 2007) 
with our novel empirical approach to political interference. More specifically, we 
investigate the link between political interference and performance of SOEs by 
introducing the election cycles into the board–performance relationship. Fourth, we 
contribute to the literature which investigates the factors that influence SOE 
performance. We show that political interference via unstable board membership 
engenders poor performance. Frequent board member changes disrupt board 
dynamics, thus creating numerous operational inefficiencies (Sharma, 1985).  
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Aside from the contributions stated above, our research might have important 
government policy implications. First, we acknowledge that adoption of a certain 
ownership model can lead to improvement or deterioration of SOE performance. 
Our findings suggest that adoption of the centralized ownership model lowers the 
level of political interference within SOEs. Secondly, through policy changes 
governments could create new board appointment procedures for SOEs. The 
procedures would be formulated so that knowledge, skills and business acumen 
represent key qualities that induvial needs to possess in order to be considered for 
SOE board membership.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the literature review and 
hypotheses on politically induced board member changes and its relationship with 
profit-oriented performance of SOEs. Section 2.3 describes data and explains 
methodology used in this chapter. Empirical results are presented and discussed in 
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 summarizes the main conclusions and provides 
implications for future research. 
2.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.2.1 Politically induced board member changes  
 
The primary goal of politicians is attainment, exploitation and maintenance of 
power (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). In order to accomplish that, politicians use 
SOEs for personal or political gains that are not in line with the profit maximization 
objective as implied by the political view of state ownership (Chong & Lopez-de-
Silanes, 2005; Krueger, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Consequently, board 
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positions are reserved for politically loyal and obedient individuals (World Bank, 
2006) or bureaucrats who are ready to pursue certain political interests (Boycko et 
al., 1996). The practice of appointing board members on the basis of their political 
allegiance and not qualifications and business acumen is one of the most profound 
forms of political interference (Barberis et al., 1998; Greene, 2014; Wong, 2004).  
Politically construed board appointments enable politicians to influence and control 
the decision-making processes within SOEs. For that reason, government officials 
do not have an incentive to appoint the best candidates for board membership as 
these decisions need to have a political justification (Hu & Leung, 2012). Opper, 
Nee, and Brehm (2015) argue that political connections and political evaluations 
are the only parameters for selection of government officials and managers. They 
explain that political leaders tend to allocate key positions to like-minded 
individuals with whom they can associate their interests. Furthermore, politicians 
and individuals with alike interests dominate SOE boards (Yoshikawa, Zhu, & 
Wang, 2014). Hence, the shift of political power or even substitution of political 
leaders triggers replacements of government officials and political appointees 
(Kernaghan, 1986).  
Along those lines, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) argue that within SOEs, board 
turnover complies with political rather than market forces. They suggest that board 
member changes within SOEs are caused by political disagreement/lack of political 
obedience/election cycles rather than poor performance results. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) find that Greek elections won by an opposing party result in the overturn of 
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top managers within SOEs. With board member changes, politicians want to avert 
any likelihood that their power might be destabilized and ensure a network of loyal 
individuals in key positions (Dittmer & Wu, 1995; Li & Bachman, 1989). 
Consequently, change of politically connected board members due to election 
cycles can be observed as an informal channel for political interference. To gain 
additional insights, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Board member changes within SOEs are politically motivated rather 
than performance induced. 
2.2.2 Performance and political interference via board member changes 
 
Political interference via boards and political connections can create both, benefits 
and costs, as suggested by the political embeddedness perspective. On the one hand, 
political ties are considered to be a relational asset that provides enterprises with 
access to valuable governmental resources, thus leading to a better enterprise 
performance (Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2012; Faccio, 2006; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Several studies demonstrate that enterprises benefit from political 
connections through preferential access to financing (e.g., Chen, Shen, & Lin, 2014; 
Dinc, 2005; Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013; Khwaja & Mian, 2005), 
increased probability for getting government contracts (e.g., Goldman, Rocholl, & 
So, 2009; Goldman, So, & Rocholl, 2013) or subsidies (e.g., Wu & Cheng, 2011), 
payment of lower taxes (e.g., Adhikari, Derashid, & Zhang, 2006), lower regulatory 
enforcement (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001), possibilities for influencing 
regulatory policies (e.g., Hillman, 2005), and provision of bail-out for financially 
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troubled enterprises (e.g., Faccio, 2006). On the other hand, political ties enable 
government representatives to manipulate SOEs’ resources to promote political or 
personal interests with negative consequences on SOE performance (Krueger, 
1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Political ties in those cases cause excessive 
employment levels (e.g., Menozzi et al., 2011), distorted investment efficiency, and 
lower capital allocation efficiency (e.g., Chen, Sun, Tang, & Wu, 2011). The costs 
of political ties might outweigh the benefits with presence of government officials 
on boards (Okhmatovskiy, 2010).  
Unlike for private enterprises, governance of SOEs is in the hands of three different 
interest groups: citizens as principals and ultimate owners, governments as 
fiduciary agents, and boards as direct agents (Capobianco & Christiansen, 2011; 
Musacchio et al., 2015b). The agency theory asserts that fiduciary and direct agents 
may choose to pursue some private benefits at the expense of wealth maximization 
for principals (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Fear of dismissal 
is one of the main tools for alignment of interests of agents and principals, which 
ensures that managers work in the best interest of the owners (Holstrom, 1979; 
Ross, 1973).  
The presence of politically motivated board member changes implies that the fear 
of dismissal might not be effectuated in the case of SOEs. Several authors explain 
that SOE boards lack the managerial incentives for pursuance of efficiency and 
profitability objectives (Boardman & Vining, 1989; Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 
2008; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). This is due to political interference, which lowers 
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the likelihood of discharge because of poor performance results. Therefore, the 
question in the case of SOEs is whether politically induced board member changes 
might cause a negative effect on their performance. Sharma (1985) argues that 
frequent board member changes cause inconsistent decision-making processes that 
result in organizational inefficiencies and poor performance. An enterprise’s 
performance depends on board decisions, while board decisions rely on collective 
judgment and deliberation, which alters with board member changes. Hence, 
decisions are kept in a state of flux and away from real implementation, which in 
the end impinges on the enterprise’s performance (Sharma, 1985). Crutchley, 
Garner, and Marshall (2002) find that greater board stability is associated with 
enhanced enterprise performance. We therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Politically induced board member changes are negatively associated 
with SOE performance. 
In addition to what is noted above, the literature indicates that politicians might use 
the economic power of large enterprises to improve the likelihood of their re-
election (Bertrand et al., 2007). Moreover, they might influence the corporate 
decisions of large SOEs in order to preserve their political power (Bertrand et al., 
2007). For those reasons, large SOEs are considered to be one of the essential 
trophies in the aftermath of elections. The previous research studies suggest that 
politically connected directors are prevalent in large enterprises (Faccio, 2006; Su 
& Fung, 2013). The greater number of politically connected directors is found 
within large SOEs, due to their political importance (Menozzi et al., 2011). 
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Contrary to that, small and medium SOEs are less important because of their limited 
market power and curtailed influence on the re-election outcome. Considering that 
politicians appoint like-minded individuals to key positions (Opper et al., 2015) and 
that political appointees are replaced after elections (Kernaghan, 1986), greater 
numbers of board member changes are expected among large SOEs. Consequently, 
unstable boards of large SOEs might endanger their performance as a result of a 
considerable number of short-term decisions beneficial for politicians. However, as 
media are more likely to investigate large SOEs (O’Connell, 1995), politicians 
might opt to interfere with boards of small and medium size SOEs. In order to 
investigate these implications of the literature, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3a. Politically induced board member changes are negatively 
associated with the performance of large SOEs.  
Hypothesis 3b. Politically induced board member changes are less negatively 
associated with the performance of small and medium SOEs than of large SOEs. 
2.2.3 Government ownership ties and political interference via ownership 
models 
 
The research studies on government ownership ties analyse how state ownership 
affects performance (e.g., Ding et al., 2014), how government-business networks 
operate in cases of minority state ownership (e.g., Inoue et al., 2013; Wang, Hong, 
Kafouros, & Wright, 2012), and whether interaction of personal and ownership ties 
produces some differentiating effects (e.g., Sun et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
researchers recognize that political connections to local and central governments 
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can have distinct effects on enterprise performance (e.g., Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 
2007; Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 2015). Zheng et al. (2015) found that political ties 
to local governments improve enterprise performance because of the closer 
alignment between SOEs’ and politicians’ interests.  
Governments can exercise their political or personal interests via interference of 
ownership entities in day-to-day operations of SOEs and/or board nomination 
procedures (World Bank, 2006). The property-rights theory explains that non-
transferability of SOEs’ ownership leads to the lack of incentives for government 
entities to perform their monitoring function comprehensively (De Alessi, 1969, 
1973). Furthermore, Wong (2004) argues that politicians and bureaucrats who sit 
on these governmental bodies are poor overseers of state ownership. Therefore, the 
level of political interference depends on the ownership model adopted by 
governments as well as its structure.  
Governments can choose between three different ownership models. They can opt 
for a decentralized model where line ministries are accountable for SOEs 
(Musacchio et al., 2015b; OECD, 2012). As the second option they have a dual 
model in which line ministry and “central” ministry (usually Ministry of Finance) 
jointly exercise ownership rights (Vagliasindi, 2008b). Governments can also 
decide to adopt a centralized model where an independent government body is 
responsible for ownership function over all or a vast majority of SOEs (PwC, 2015; 
World Bank, 2014a). Table 2.1 reveals that countries within our sample have 
distinctive governing models for state ownership. In Slovenia and Croatia, an 
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independent government body governs SOEs, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
FYR Macedonia line ministries bear the responsibility of managing state 
ownership. The government de facto plays the key role in governing SOEs in Serbia 
and Montenegro (government ownership model), despite the fact that this 
responsibility is de jure in hands of line ministries.  
The theory and literature clearly indicate that a centralized model should be adopted 
by governments as it curtails opportunities for political interference (World Bank, 
2014a). Contrary to that, several government bodies in decentralized and dual 
models can compete for influence over SOEs, creating contradictory and conflicting 
goals that can undermine their performance (Musacchio et al., 2015b; World Bank, 
2006). Furthermore, board member nomination and appointment procedures within 
centralized ownership models are insulated from political pressures since they are 
based on professional criteria - expertise and knowledge of individuals (World 
Bank, 2014a). For all other ownership models, ministry cabinets interfere in these 
processes, thus enabling appointments of politically connected individuals. The 
nomination procedures as well as criteria for board membership outlined in Table 
2.1 imply that politicians in Slovenia and Croatia have a rather limited space for 
interference. The independent government body conducts public calls for board 
members on the basis of predetermined criteria. Serbia and Montenegro follow 
completely opposite procedures within their quasi decentralized model. The 
nomination procedure in these countries is led by the governmental committee or 
office for appointments, which enables direct political interference. Therefore, 
SOEs in countries with centralized ownership models should experience a lower 
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level of political interference, and thus a limited effect on their performance. In 
accordance with the previous literature and implications regarding different models 
adopted by countries within our sample, we introduce our last hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4. The performance of SOEs in countries with government ownership 
models suffers more from politically induced board member changes than does the 
performance of SOEs in countries with centralized ownership models. 
 
[Insert Table 2.1 about here] 
 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
 
Our sample contains financial and board membership data about 200 SOEs from 
six countries of the former SFRY for the period 2010-2014. We construct our 
sample through extraction of data from the Amadeus database on the basis of two 
criteria. The first criterion is that the enterprise operates in one of the six former 
SFRY’s countries. The second criterion is that the ultimate owner of the enterprise 
is public authority, state, or government with a minimum 50.01% of direct or 
indirect ownership. We use this cut-off point for three main reasons. First, OECD 
(2015) in its guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs, defines a SOE as an 
enterprise with 100% or majority state ownership. Second, this cut-off point 
conveys effective government control. Third, prior empirical research demonstrates 
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that enterprises with minority state ownership have a lower number of political 
connections, thus implying a lower level of political interference (e.g., Wu et al., 
2012). 
Based on the country and ownership criteria, 556 enterprises are identified as state-
owned. From that sample we exclude all enterprises that declared bankruptcy, as 
their real performance could not be observed. Moreover, we delimit our sample by 
removing enterprises from the financial sector (e.g., banks, insurance enterprises), 
since they have distinct financial reporting and higher levels of corporate 
governance due to legal requirements (e.g., Goldeng, Grunfeld, & Benito, 2004; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). In addition, we remove all providers of health, social, 
and cultural services since they are established in order to achieve some non-
commercial objectives (e.g., Bozec et al., 2002). Lastly, we exclude enterprises for 
which data are not available (e.g., Faccio, 2010). After applying all of these 
restrictions, our final sample encompasses 200 SOEs.  
We download standardized balance sheet and profit and loss items, ownership data, 
industry code, date of incorporation, number of employees, and board membership 
information from the database. We fill in any missing financial data from SOE 
annual reports. For enterprises that do not report their financial data in EUR we 
make a conversion using exchange rates applied by Amadeus to ensure data 
standardization. Furthermore, all financial data used in our research is in constant 
2009 EUR.  
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Due to limited availability of board member data in the database, we hand-collect 
data on numerous board member characteristics (e.g., names, dates of appointment 
and resignation, political connectedness, level of education, previous/current 
position, subsequent position) to complement the missing data. The collection of 
board level data is based on the predetermined definition of boards. As already 
noted, SOEs can have two-tier boards (supervisory and management board) or one-
tier boards with or without the presence of managing directors. In our research we 
follow the definition of OECD (2015) and World Bank (2014a), and we define 
“board” as an enterprise body that monitors management and governs enterprise. 
Table 2.2 shows that the vast majority of SOEs within our sample have two-tier 
boards. In Montenegro, all SOEs follow a one-tier board system due to legal 
stipulations, while in FYR Macedonia SOEs can have one-tier or two-tier board 
systems depending on the category of SOEs to which they belong. 
 
[Insert Table 2.2 about here] 
 
For the extraction of the board-level missing data we use official financial and 
annual reports of enterprises, databases of official enterprise registry agencies, data 
published on stock exchanges, and individual decisions of shareholder assemblies 
on the appointment and resignation of board members. Overall, we have data on 




Even though it may be argued that our sample is small, several facts need to be 
considered. First, we exclude SOEs whose inclusion might lead to misleading 
results following the implications of previous research studies mentioned above. 
Second, availability of data for SOEs worldwide is rather scarce, and we include all 
SOEs for which data are available. Third, our sample is larger or comparable to the 
sample sizes of similar studies (e.g., Menozzi et al. (2011) employ a sample of 114 
Italian SOEs).  
Notwithstanding, we acknowledge that usage of annual data and a short sample 
period might suggest that our estimates are more influenced by short-term effects. 
Unavailability of the data for the period that is longer than five years enables us 
only to observe the effects of ten parliamentary and ten local elections. In cases 
where elections happened in the first observed year (i.e., 2010) or the last one (i.e., 
2014) we cannot determine the trend of any board member changes or SOE 
behaviour changes (this is only in terms of comparison with pre-election or 
postelection periods). 
The short sample period also limits our ability to investigate whether board member 
changes happen only due to a ruling political party change. In four out of six 
observed countries the change of political party happened during parliamentary 
elections, but this is far from enough observations for a solid empirical analysis. 
We also take into account that certain board member changes happen due to 
retirement or the death of individual board members. However, we lack the data on 
whether certain board members resigned for some personal reasons (voluntarily) in 
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election years or it was a forced resignation imposed by the government. 
Additionally, due to the short sample size and frequency of election cycles we are 
not able to determine whether instability of board membership would be observed 
in the longer periods with no elections.  
2.3.2 Variables and Measures 
 
In our study we employ two performance measures, following the approach taken 
in previous research studies (e.g., Boardman & Vining, 1989; Boubakri et al., 2008; 
Bozec et al., 2002; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001; Ding et al., 2014; Hu & Leung, 
2012; Menozzi et al., 2011; O’Connell & Cramer, 2010). We use return on equity 
(ROE) as a profitability measure and Sales per employee as an operating and 
productivity measure. ROE, which is a proxy of return on shareholders’ 
investments, is computed as the ratio of net income to average total equity. Sales 
per employee is the natural logarithm of the sales over the total number of 
employees. It is a well-established fact that accounting-based measures may suffer 
from financial manipulations. However, employment of standardized audited 
financial data provides sufficient reliability of these performance measures 
(Goldeng et al., 2004; O’Connell & Cramer, 2010). Despite some limitations of 
accounting measures, evidence from previous research studies implies that they are 
adequate proxies of economic rates of return (Vining & Boardman, 1992). In 
addition, we do not use any stock market measures since the vast majority of SOEs 
from our sample are not listed on stock exchanges, while the level of liquidity of 
traded stocks is not sufficient for valid estimations (e.g., Okhmatovskiy (2010) 
recognizes the same problem for investigation of SOE performance and political 
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ties in Russia). Moreover, Ding et al. (2014) explain that usage of market 
performance measures is not well suited for investigation of political interference. 
Due to efficient markets, political interference would be immediately reflected in 
stock prices. Thus, market measures might not grasp its effect. 
We also employ three different measures of board member changes. Board turnover 
is the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who 
left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board (e.g., Franks 
& Mayer, 2001). Board political turnover is the percentage of the total number of 
board members in the observed year who are politically connected and who left at 
the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board intermediary 
shows the number of board members who left in the observed year with tenures 
shorter than one year. This measure is employed to grasp the within-year board 
dynamics. In order to grasp board dynamics not captured by Board intermediary, 
we employ variables that show the number of board members who left the board 
within one year (Board leavers) and the number of board members appointed in the 
same period (Board appointments). With employment of these measures, we take 
into account political connectedness of all board members, thus creating a new 
proxy for political interference.  
Our definition of politically connected board members takes into consideration 
definitions of political connectedness from previous literature (e.g., Faccio, 2006, 
2010; Menozzi et al., 2011; Zheng et al., 2015). Hence, within the scope of our 
study we define politically connected board members as: (1) those who hold or held 
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position in central or local government, parliament, or some other governmental 
body; (2) those who are members of the political party; (3) those who participated 
in election cycles as citizen representatives; (4) those who have close relationships 
(e.g., relatives, friends) with current/past, government/parliament officials or 
political party representatives. 
Bearing in mind the political view of state ownership and standing of Vickers and 
Yarrow (1988), who suggest that board member changes within SOEs are a result 
of political rather than market forces, we employ two variables that represent 
political force. Parliamentary and Local elections are dummy variables that take 
value one in the year of elections and zero for other years.3 In addition, we use these 
variables as instruments for the board member changes–performance relationship 
due to potential endogeneity issues.  
In our models we introduce several other board characteristics as suggested in the 
previous research. Board members with short tenures cannot adapt and contribute 
positively to the board decision-making processes (Smith et al., 1994). This can 
create a time lag (Sharma, 1985) with negative performance consequences. 
However, board members with long tenures are more likely to be replaced, thus 
increasing board member changes. Hence, we employ Board tenure, which is 
                                                          
3 The dummy variable for parliamentary elections takes value one for the following years and countries: 
2010-Bosnia and Herzegovina; 2011-Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Slovenia; 2012-Serbia, Montenegro; 2014-
Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia. Following the same approach, the dummy variable 
for local elections takes value one in: 2010-Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Slovenia; 2012-Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia; 2013-Croatia, FYR Macedonia; 2014-Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia. Both of these 




calculated as the average time that board members spent on the board (e.g., Ding et 
al., 2014; McIntyre, Murphy, & Mitchell, 2007). Board size is computed as the total 
number of board members, and as such appears in previous research models related 
to political connections (e.g., Ding et al., 2014; Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Furthermore, 
Yermack (1996) suggests that board size has a negative effect on performance since 
a greater number of board members leaves room for greater political interference. 
Male-dominated boards tend to make consensus decisions without appropriate 
evaluation of alternatives since such board homogeneity leads to group thinking 
(Janis, 1972). We therefore employ Board male as the percentage of men on board.  
Since SOEs differentiate among themselves, we employ several enterprise-level 
controls. SOEs are sometimes used for employment purposes, so it is often argued 
that an increase in the number of employees leads to lower performance results (Fan 
et al., 2007). Therefore, we employ Size, which is calculated as the natural logarithm 
of the total number of employees, to control for absolute availability of resources 
(e.g., Hu & Leung, 2012; Menozzi et al., 2011; Vining & Boardman, 1992; Zheng 
et al., 2015). Hannan and Freeman (1989) explain that dissolution risk is associated 
with years of existence. Hence, we control for the period of SOEs’ Existence, which 
is computed as the natural logarithm of the difference between years under 
investigation and year of SOE incorporation (e.g., Goldeng et al., 2004; Sun et al., 
2015; Tian & Lau, 2001). Additionally, Gilson (1990) indicates that board member 
changes are common among financially distressed enterprises. We therefore control 
for Leverage as the measure of long-term debt over shareholders’ equity (e.g., 
Faccio, 2010). Furthermore, recognizing that differences across countries might 
61 
 
impact our results and following prior literature (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2012), we 
employ GDP, which represents the logarithm value of the gross domestic product 
at purchasing power parity (GDP PPP). We obtain data on GDP PPP from the 
World Bank online database. Definitions for all variables employed within this 
chapter are provided in Table 2.3. 
 




Empirical studies that examine the relationship between political interference and 
performance of enterprises use mainly five different methods. The methods are: (i) 
event study; (ii) logistic regression; (iii) regression analysis using OLS; (iv) panel 
data fixed-effects; (v) instrumental variable approach. The first type of methods is 
applied in the seminal paper of Sun et al. (2015) for investigation of 
interconnectedness of political ties and enterprise cumulative abnormal returns in 
the presence of an adverse high-profile event in China. Within our research context 
we don’t have an event happening in all countries at the same point in time. 
Furthermore, stock market data in unavailable for our sample and elections do not 
represent a sudden, unpredictable, exogenous event. Therefore, this research 
method is not suggested for our research. The second method is applied in the 
examination of sensitivity of top management turnover to accounting measures of 
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enterprise performance (e.g., Hu and Leung, 2012). This method envisages that the 
dependent variable is binary and since that is not the case for our dependent variable 
we cannot apply this method. 
The third method is used by Menozzi et al. (2011) in their investigation of 
relationship between political connections and SOE performance in Italy. The OLS 
estimator is not efficient as it ignores the panel structure of the data and is thus, not 
applicable in the context of our research. Even Menozzi et al. (2011) note that there 
is a problem in applying OLS when one of the independent variables is 
endogeneous to the fixed effect error term, thus violating assumption of OLS 
consistency and creating a “dynamic panel bias”. Thus, they also use the fourth 
method in their research study. 
The fourth and fifth methods are the most commonly used in research studies of 
political interference effect on performance (e.g., Menozzi et al., 2011; Su & Fung, 
2013; Xu, Zhu, & Lin, 2002; Zeng et al., 2015). With the panel data fixed-effects 
we mitigate the risk of some unobserved enterprise characteristics and we control 
for any differences that might exist among countries.4 Moreover, Su and Fung 
(2013) explain that usage of fixed-effects model lowers the probability of the 
omitted variable problem.  
Endogeneity appears whenever the expected value of the error term is not equal 
zero and when there is a correlation between independent variable and the error 
                                                          
4 Prior to our decision to employ fixed-effects, we run Durbin-Wu-Hausman test that shows better 
performance of fixed-effects model than random-effects model.  
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term. This can be caused by one of the following: (1) omitted variable - a variable 
that is relevant cannot be measured and proper proxy cannot be found; (2) 
measurement error in regressor; and (3) reverse causality. Research papers that 
investigate the political interference-performance relationship independently from 
the econometric methodology and measure of political interference that they 
employ all acknowledge possible presence of endogeneity within their estimations 
(e.g., Menozzi et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2002). Therefore, we use instrumental variable 
approach as to resolve the potential issue of reverse causality in our estimations. 
It is also important to mention that we have to be aware of predictive and causal 
power of the estimated results. The predictive power of estimated results enables us 
to assess the potential associations between variables without the direction of those 
associations. The causal power enables us to recognize causes to effects relationship 
that shows us what happens to the effect when cause changes.      
To identify whether board member changes are politically induced (Hypothesis 1), 
we run a following fixed effects model:  
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽3 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛽6𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡        (2.1) 
where i is the SOE id, t is the year effect, α is the intercept, and 𝑖,𝑡 denotes the error 
term. SOE specific fixed effects are captured by 𝑢𝑖, while time-fixed effects are 
depicted by 𝛿𝑡.  
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Board member changes is a dependent variable represented by three measures, 
namely Board turnover, Board intermediary, and Board political turnover. We run 
the regressions only with parliamentary elections as it is not possible to distinguish 
between the effects of local and parliamentary elections in years in which they occur 
simultaneously. Due to the greater importance of parliamentary elections, we 
believe that they create more profound effects on board member changes.  
Significant coefficient for variable Parliamentary might indicate that board 
member changes are politically motivated. We assume no reverse causality, since 
board member changes cannot influence the occurrence of elections. The 
occurrence of elections is prescribed by the constitution, while early elections are 
decided based on certain political or economic reasons and they are not announced 
because of the board member changes within SOEs. As it can be noted, variables 
Size and Performance are lagged, since these variables can have non-instantaneous 
association with board member changes. Performance is represented by ROE and 
Sales per employee. 
To investigate the relationship between politically motivated board member 
changes and SOE performance (Hypothesis 2), we estimate the following equation: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽7𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡    (2.2) 
where i is the state-owned enterprise id, t is the year effect, α is the intercept, and 
𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. Performance is a dependent variable that is represented by 
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ROE and Sales per employee. Board member changes is an independent variable of 
our main interest and is represented by Board turnover, Board intermediary, and 
Board political turnover.  
As mentioned above when determining the estimation technique, we take into 
account that every research study on performance and board characteristics can 
suffer from endogeneity. For our model, the literature implies a possibility of 
reverse causality: the poor performance of enterprises could lead to board member 
changes. In order to address endogeneity issues, we estimate our models using a 
panel data IV estimator, which can be implemented by ivreg2h.5 This approach 
provides instruments identification when external instruments are not available or 
when there is a need to supplement external instruments with generated ones as to 
improve IV estimator efficiency (Baum, Lewbel, Schaffer, & Talavera, 2012; 
Lewbel, 2012). 
The ivreg2h implements Lewbel’s (2012) generated instruments approach, which 
consists of two stages. In the first stage, each of the n endogenous variables 
(𝜑𝑖...𝜑𝑛) is regressed on exogenous variables (𝑥1...𝑥𝑘) using OLS. The generated 
predicted residuals (?̂?𝑖...?̂?𝑛) from this step are then multiplied by demeaned 
endogenous variables 𝑧𝑖 = (𝜑𝑖  - ?̅?𝑖)?̂?𝑖 as to construct instrument vector 𝑧1... 𝑧𝑛 for 
each i ϵ 1...n. Within the second stage, we run the two-step IV-GMM, where board 
member changes are treated as endogenous and are instrumented by the internally 
                                                          
5 ivreg2h is an instrumental variables estimation using heteroscedasticity based instruments and Stata 
command that was written by Baum and Schaffer (2012). ivreg2h uses a two-step GMM estimation. This 
technique was used by several researchers (e.g., Bremus & Buch, 2015; Mishra & Smyth, 2015). 
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generated instruments. In addition to those instruments, we create a vector of 
externally selected instruments that are likely to have a direct effect on board 
member changes but not performance of SOEs.  
The instruments include Parliamentary and Local elections as they might create a 
non-instantaneous impact on SOE performance via board member changes. 
Furthermore, the use of these two instrumental variables enables us to grasp and 
acknowledge their mutual effect. In addition, for estimations of Board turnover and 
Board political turnover, we use within-year board dynamics as an instrument.  
We first estimate model (2.2) for the whole sample and then we re-estimate it within 
two sets of sub-samples. To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we divide our sample on 
the basis of median value for the number of employees. In that way we can 
investigate whether differences in political importance of large, and small and 
medium SOEs are present. Additionally, we want to recognise whether there are 
any differences among SOEs that are governed by different ownership models 
(Hypothesis 4). For that reason, we depict SOEs that are governed by two distinct 
and completely opposite ownership models - independent centralized body 
(Slovenia and Croatia) and government governance (Serbia and Montenegro). In all 
estimations with Board intermediary, we employ two additional variables, Board 
leavers and Board appointments, to grasp additional layers of board dynamics. 
2.3.4 Sample and summary statistics  
Table 2.4 presents summary statistics for all variables in our estimations. In Panel 
A we report performance characteristics of SOEs. We can conclude that during the 
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observed period the average financial SOE performance is negative since the 
average value of ROE is -5%. The average Sales per employee is equal to €190.72 
($225.29). Based on Panel D we can see that SOEs within our sample exist for 28 
years on average and that they have on average 676 employees. The average 
Leverage is 33%, which is similar to findings of previous research studies (e.g., 
28.14% for politically connected enterprises (Faccio, 2010)). 
Panel B of Table 2.4 reports summary statistics for board characteristics. On 
average, boards of SOEs have five members, which is in line with good corporate 
governance practice suggested by OECD. Boards are male dominated since on 
average 81% of board members are men. The average Board tenure is 
approximately two years, while 0.33 board members spent less than one year on 
boards. The average turnover of all board members is 19%, which is almost 50% 
higher than what Franks and Mayer (2001) find for quoted German industrial and 
commercial enterprises. In addition, the average turnover of politically connected 
board members is 10%. On average, approximately 1.5 board members are 
appointed to boards each year, while 1.3 board members leave the board.  
 
[Insert Table 2.4 about here] 
 
Table 2.5 presents further analysis of board member changes by country in the 
period 2010-2014. Five out of six countries have average board turnover between 
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17% and 21%, while for other measures of board member changes analogous values 
are noted. Moreover, the proportion of the total board members who left the board 
in each of the countries is approximately 60%. Therefore, we can conclude that in 
countries within our sample, board member changes follow quite similar patterns, 
thus providing us with a unique set-up for investigation of political interference–
performance relationship within SOEs. 
 
[Insert Table 2.5 about here] 
 
The summary statistics regarding elections by countries and years are presented in 
Table 2.6. Countries from our sample went through ten parliamentary and ten local 
elections in the period 2010-2014. With the exception of Croatia and Montenegro 
all other countries went twice through the parliamentary election cycles, while 
exception from the two local election cycles is observed in Croatia and FYR 
Macedonia. The shift of the ruling party is observed in four countries during 
parliamentary elections, while in one country a change of the political party with 
the second biggest political influence is observed (Table 2.7). 
 




[Insert Table 2.7 about here] 
 
The Figure 2.1 depicts periods before and after parliamentary elections. The 
average before and after parliamentary elections is equal to 3 years, with shortest 
periods recorded for Slovenia (i.e., 1 year) and Serbia and FYR Macedonia (i.e., 2 
years). 
 
[Insert Figure 2.1 about here] 
 
Table 2.8 reports correlations among variables. The correlation coefficients do not 
raise any potential issues with multicollinearity. 
 
[Insert Table 2.8 about here] 
 
2.4 Empirical results and discussion 
2.4.1 Main results 
 
Figures 2.2 to 2.4 provide an overview of the proportion of board member changes 
by year and country, thus disclosing the link between board member changes and 
elections. They show that the proportion of board member changes increases in 
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most cases during election and postelection years.6 Figure 2.2 points out that the 
proportion of Board turnovers is higher in seven out of nine election years and in 
five out of six postelection years. Similarly, the proportion of Board intermediary 
rises in four out of nine election years and in three out of six postelection years 
(Figure 2.3). In election years, the proportion of Board political turnover increases 
in five out of nine cases and in postelection years in five out of six cases, as outlined 
in Figure 2.4. Therefore, similarities among all three measures in election and 
postelection years are observed, implying the existence of the link between the 
election cycles and board member changes within SOEs. 
 
[Insert Figure 2.2 about here] 
 
 
[Insert Figure 2.3 about here] 
 
[Insert Figure 2.4 about here] 
                                                          
6 For countries where elections happened at the beginning or end of the observed period, we are not able to 
observe prior or post levels of board member changes. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the elections took place in 
2010, so we cannot observe whether the level of board member changes increased due to the lack of data for 
2009. Therefore, we count out this election year when we calculate the number of years in which there was an 
increase of board member changes in an election year. We apply same reasoning for postelection years for 
which the data is not available, and we therefore discuss nine election years and six postelection years in Figures 
1, 2, and 3. Since these cases represent the minority, we do not have a reason to believe that they would 
significantly change our conclusions. 
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Table 2.9 shows the relationship between elections and board member changes. We 
find that board member changes are higher during election years. In parliamentary 
election years Board turnover, Board intermediary, and Board political turnover 
increase by approximately 9%, 23%, and 4% respectively. Moreover, previous year 
profitability (ROE) and productivity levels (Sales per employee) are insignificant. 
Hence, performance as a proxy of market force is not likely to induce board member 
changes within SOEs. These findings support our Hypothesis 1 and the contention 
of Vickers and Yarrow (1988) that board member changes within SOEs happen due 
to political rather than market forces. Moreover, these results validate the usage of 
election variables as instruments for board member changes. 
 
[Insert Table 2.9 about here] 
 
Table 2.9 reveals one more important finding. The impact of Parliamentary 
elections is much greater for changes of all board members (9%) than for changes 
of only politically connected board members (4%). Thus, our results suggest that 
non-politically connected board members suffer from social distancing and guilt by 
association syndrome (Labianca & Brass, 2006; Yoshikawa et al., 2014). 
Yoshikawa et al. (2014) explain that outside board members without political 
connections are likely to be faced with social distancing since a powerful owner can 
replace them. The newly elected politicians assume that non-politically connected 
board members are loyal to previous political regimes, and with their change 
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politicians want to avert any likelihood that their power might be destabilized 
(Dittmer & Wu, 1995). Therefore, our results imply that informal political ties 
might exist within SOEs and that they go beyond the establishment of personal 
political ties. A larger magnitude of the Board intermediary change in election years 
(23% vs. 9% and 4%) might indicate that politicians have the tendency to appoint 
temporary boards with up to three-month tenures. The temporary boards enable 
politicians to take over the control of certain SOEs right after the elections while 
deciding which individuals deserve these positions in the long run based on their 
political loyalty and obedience.  
Other results from Table 2.9 show that Board tenure has a significant positive effect 
on Board turnover and Board political turnover. The increase in the time spent on 
boards implies that board members will be replaced as the end of their mandate is 
approaching. Contrary to that, Board tenure has a negative effect on Board 
intermediary. With increase in time spent on boards, fewer board members with 
tenures shorter than one year are replaced. The percentage of men on boards seems 
to have an insignificant effect, while increase in Board size increases the number of 
board member changes. Moreover, an upsurge in number of employees results in a 
lower number of board member changes. Fan et al. (2007) argue that evaluation of 
SOE boards depends also on certain social responsibilities, such as an increase in 
employment levels. Hence, when employment levels are low there is a greater 
likelihood of a board member change. Within our estimations we employ variance 
inflation factors (VIF) and we find no evidence of multicollinearity. 
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Table 2.10 presents the IV results for the board member changes–performance 
relationship. We find that political interference via board member changes 
deteriorates SOE performance. The estimates show a significant negative 
relationship between Board turnover and SOEs’ financial and operating 
performance, thus supporting our Hypothesis 2. Moreover, Board intermediary is 
negatively associated with financial performance and is insignificant for operating 
performance of SOEs. The descriptive statistics in Table 2.4 show that SOEs in our 
sample have on average five board members with average Board turnover of 
approximately 20% (during one year one board member leaves the board). In terms 
of economic significance, the results from Table 2.10 imply that the change of one 
board member (Board turnover increase of 20 percentage points) results in a 3.2 
percentage points decrease in ROE and 16.6% decrease in Sales per employee. The 
change of one board member with less than a year tenure decreases ROE by 0.01 
percentage points. Contrary to that, we find that Board political turnover has 
negative but insignificant association with both financial and operating 
performance of SOEs. This might imply that non-politically connected board 
members represent a more valuable “asset” for SOEs. Previous studies point out 
that politically connected board members are appointed on the basis of their 
political loyalty and not their professional qualifications (Barberis et al., 1998). For 
that reason, their change might not influence performance of SOEs. However, we 
recognize that further analysis in this regard is needed as to be able to create a well-
based conclusion. In spite of insignificance, the negative sign supports our findings 




[Insert Table 2.10 about here] 
 
The negative association suggested by our results confirms findings of Crutchley et 
al. (2002) that greater stability of board membership enhances enterprise 
performance. Moreover, our results support Anderson and Chun (2014), who 
investigate the impact of board turnover on performance of the S&P 500 
enterprises. Their results show that the lowest levels of performance are observed 
for enterprises in which five or more board members were changed over three years. 
Essentially, frequent board member changes disrupt decision making, leaving 
procedures and implementation processes unattended (Sharma, 1985). The non-
existence of perfect substitution for individuals, as noted by Sharma (1985), 
postpones re-establishment of efficient working dynamics within boards. In 
addition, frequent board member changes contribute to the lack of long-term 
perspective and dedication of individuals who sit on boards, thus disrupting creation 
of sound strategic orientation. Consequently, performance that is dependent from 
board member deliberation and board decisions is negatively affected by unstable 
board memberships that are politically induced. 
Table 2.10 also shows significant positive relationship between Board size and SOE 
operating performance. This result is different from findings of Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) and Menozzi et al. (2011), but it seems to support resource 
dependence theory in this regard. The theory asserts that larger boards are able to 
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establish a greater number of external links, thus securing access to crucial 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Moreover, Board tenure is positively 
associated with performance of SOEs, since longer tenures imply greater familiarity 
of board members with business operations. We also find that board members 
leaving the board or being appointed to the board have negative effect on operating 
performance. This is related to the appearance of the time lag that represents the 
period of adjustment to the new board dynamics (Sharma, 1985). In addition, the 
presence of women on boards does not improve performance of SOEs.  
Results for control variables in Table 2.10 imply that larger SOEs have lower 
operating performance. Enterprise Existence indicates that older enterprises have 
higher levels of efficiency, probably due to better established procedures and 
prolonged market experience. Macroeconomic conditions (GDP) seem not to have 
an effect on performance, which is consistent with findings of previous research 
studies (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2012). Increase in Leverage has a negative effect on 
financial performance, as it creates higher levels of financial distress while at the 
same time creating positive effects on productivity levels, likely due to investments 
in fixed assets, which improve efficiency.  
The second step of our main analysis investigates whether the political importance 
of large SOEs alters the board member changes–performance relationship. Our 
results in Table 2.11 suggest a significant negative relation between board member 
changes and performance of small and medium SOEs and insignificant relation for 
large SOEs. These results are inconsistent with our Hypotheses 3a and 3b, and the 
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findings of Bertrand et al. (2007), which assert that politicians use large SOEs to 
improve the likelihood of their re-election. However, our results are in line with 
findings of Wu et al. (2012), who analyse the impact of political connections on 
SOE performance in China. They explain that due to the importance of central SOEs 
(which are at the same time large) for the normal functioning of private enterprises, 
governments tend not to use those enterprises for fulfilment of their political goals. 
Garrone, Grilli, and Rouseseau (2013) find that the effect of political interference 
on large utility SOEs in Italy is uncertain. In addition, large enterprises are usually 
under the eye of the media (O’Connell, 1995), and politicians may opt not to reveal 
themselves and jeopardize their position. 
Contrary to the above, small and medium SOEs are used by local officials for 
personal and political goals to secure their political power (Wu et al., 2012). Jin, 
Yingyi, and Weingast (2005) reveal that local officials are politically pressured to 
increase local employment and they do so through SOEs. In addition, several other 
reasons might provide explanation for our results. First, large SOEs have 
established procedures and systems that function despite board member changes, 
unlike small and medium size SOEs. Moreover, small and medium SOEs usually 
suffer from a lack of supervision and procedures, thus relying to a greater extent on 
board decision-making processes. Consequently, political interference via board 
member changes affects board deliberation, decision making, and performance of 
small and medium SOEs. The results for all other variables are consistent with the 




[Insert Table 2.11 about here] 
 
Within the last step of our main analysis we determine whether different governing 
models for state ownership create any dissimilarities in the board member changes–
performance relationship. Table 2.12 presents results for the centralized model in 
Panel A and results for the government model in Panel B. The results imply that for 
SOEs under the centralized model, politically induced board member changes are 
insignificant in terms of their performance. The insignificant result is in line with 
literature which suggests that independent body governing state ownership curtails 
opportunities for political interference within SOEs (Musacchio et al., 2015b). 
However, these results do not mean a complete absence of politically induced board 
member changes but rather that they are not prevailing and that even when present 
they do not create negative consequences for performance. Moreover, board 
nomination and appointment procedures within the centralized model are based on 
professional qualifications of individuals and not their political loyalty (World 
Bank, 2014a).  
The results in Panel B imply positive board member changes–performance 
relationship in countries with government model. This result could be in line with 
the efforts of the governments of Serbia and Montenegro to professionalise board 
membership. Due to this result and its implication we do not find the support for 
our Hypothesis 4. Other results in Table 2.12 are consistent with results for the 
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whole sample such as enterprise size, enterprise existence, etc. As it can be noted, 
GDP and Leverage are excluded from re-estimations in both subsamples. The 
reason for this is related to the significant drop in the number of observations, while 
the results of estimations with and without these variables are analogous.  
 
[Insert Table 2.12 about here] 
 
2.4.2 Robustness tests  
 
The robustness of previous results can be checked in several ways. In order to prove 
consistency of the results for election–board member changes relationship, we 
perform two re-estimations. First, we re-estimate the model (2.1) by controlling for 
leverage and the percentage of board members with PhD degrees. In Table 2.13, we 
observe consistent results regarding the effects of elections on board member 
changes, while SOE performance remains insignificant. These results strengthen 
the argument that board member changes are politically induced. Interestingly, the 
percentage of board members with PhD degrees has negative significance for Board 
intermediary. Board members with higher qualifications are expected to possess a 
greater level of expertise and knowledge, and as such they are less likely to be 
replaced in short periods of time.  
 
[Insert Table 2.13 about here] 
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Second, we check the possibility that the effect of Parliamentary elections is non-
instantaneous through employment of lagged Parliamentary in model (2.1). As 
seen in Table 2.14, we find negative significant coefficient for Board turnover, thus 
confirming the literature implication that politicians want to ensure position and 
power as soon as they are elected. The negative significance for Board intermediary 
supports the notion that politicians use temporary boards in election years. 
Moreover, we find insignificant coefficient for Board political turnover. As it can 
be seen the performance stays insignificant for board member changes. Hence, 
results of these robustness checks support our main finding that board member 
changes are politically motivated rather than performance induced.  
 
[Insert Table 2.14 about here] 
 
The robustness of results for board member changes–performance relationship is 
tested through re-estimation of the model (2.2). First, we rerun the model with 
different macroeconomic control variables (e.g., real GDP, inflation) and enterprise 
level controls (e.g., total debt/equity as leverage measure, growth opportunities). 
The results of these regressions suggest the negative association between Board 
turnover/Board intermediary and SOE performance, thus supporting the findings 
presented in Table 2.14. 
80 
 
Second, it is possible that our enterprise level and board level controls have the 
delayed effect on SOE performance. Therefore, we re-estimate the model (2.2) with 
lagged enterprise level controls and the results of this re-estimation are presented in 
Table 2.15. We find a significant negative relationship of Board turnover with both 
measures of performance. Board intermediary stays significant and negative for 
operating performance.  
 
[Insert Table 2.15 about here] 
 
Third, we re-run the model (2.2) with lagged enterprise and board level controls 
(Table 2.16). The significance of Board turnover in this estimation remains for 
financial performance, while Board intermediary loses its significance. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on Board political turnover becomes significant for 
financial performance. This result might imply that after controlling for certain 
delayed effects, the loss of certain political connections negatively affects SOE 
performance. The signs and significance for other variables in all robustness checks 
are quantitatively similar to the ones reported. 
 




Thirdly, the level of state ownership might influence the number of appointed 
individuals with political connections. Therefore, we introduce state ownership as 
one of the control variables in our model specification. However, since state 
ownership didn’t change in the observed period for the individual SOEs and it is 
time invariant, the variable is dropped from our model re-estimation results. 
In addition to all the above explained robustness tests, we also try to complement 
our analysis on endogeneity using the difference-in-differences (DID) approach 
with fixed-effects regression as shown in Table 2.17. One of the main concerns in 
corporate governance empirical research is related to the fact that certain 
regressions might fail to obtain causal inference due to omitted variable bias. The 
bias is partly addressed by the fixed-effects estimations which deal with unobserved 
individual characteristics, but not with unobserved confounders. The DID approach 
enables us to control for unobserved events/characteristics that might confound 
interpretation. This approach integrates fixed effects estimators with the causal 
inference analysis (Angrist & Pirschke, 2008). In simple words, the DID is used to 
estimate the effect of a specific exogeneous event (treatment) by comparing the 
change in outcomes between a group that was exposed to a treatment (treatment 
group) and a group that is not (control group). Hence, this approach removes biases 
that might be a consequence of some permanent differences between two groups, 
when comparisons of the observed groups are performed (Abadie, 2005). But how 
we can apply this to our research context? 
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One of the main goals of our research is to determine whether SOE board member 
changes happen due to certain political reasons and not due to poor SOE 
performance. In our context elections represent a specific event that does not 
happen at the same point in time in all countries within our sample. Therefore, we 
can construct a treatment group that encompasses SOEs in the country with 
elections in year t, which we match with a control group that encompasses SOEs in 
the country that do not have elections in the year t. With DID we can then determine 
whether a difference between board member changes within treatment and control 
group is higher or lower in election and postelection year.  
We start implementation of the DID approach through creation of the treatment and 
control group by using binary variable Treatment. This variable takes value 1 for 
enterprises in Serbia and Montenegro (treatment group) and 0 for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (control group). We also create the Election dummy variable, which 
takes value 1 for 2012 and 0 otherwise. This is due to the fact that in Serbia and 
Montenegro, parliamentary elections were held in 2012 and in the same year there 
were no parliamentary elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, we create 
a Postelection dummy variable which takes value 1 for 2013 and 0 otherwise. Both 
variables are employed within our estimation in order to control for time trends. We 
also create two interaction variables, Treatment*election and 
Treatment*postelection, to be able to detect differentiating effect of elections on 
the board member changes in the treatment group versus the control group. The 
following models are then estimated: 
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𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  
𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡     
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
+  𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡+ 
𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝑢𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡       
where i is the SOE id, t is the year effect, α is the intercept, and 𝑖,𝑡 denotes the error 
term. SOE specific fixed effects are captured by 𝑢𝑖, while time-fixed effects are 
depicted by 𝛿𝑡. Before estimating our models, we match enterprises in terms of size 
and industry.  
The intertwined effects of parliamentary and local elections limit our ability to 
clearly specify the treatment effect. Consequently, the significance of our results is 
absent. Considering that parliamentary and local elections happen in different years 
in different countries, it is quite difficult to depict the treatment and control groups 
in which board member changes are not influenced by effects of some post or pre-
election cycles. Therefore, differentiating effect of the treatment becomes 
insignificant due to the decrease in difference between board member changes 
within the treatment and control group. Notwithstanding, the positive sign for both 
interaction variables suggests that in countries with elections, board member 
changes are higher in election and postelection years than in countries with no 
elections. We tried re-estimating the model with different specification of the 
treatment and control groups. In all cases, the interaction variables have positive 
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sign but remain insignificant, which additionally confirms the interplay of post 
and/or pre-election effects. 
 




Prior literature recognizes the general contingency of personal-level political ties 
and their values/costs for performance of enterprises, but it neglects the 
examination and analysis of their heterogeneity. Previous research studies fell short 
in recognizing the informal channels through which politicians and businesspeople 
might influence each other (Sun et al., 2015). Considering that, our study examines 
whether election cycles rather than poor SOE performance results lead to board 
member changes as well as how these board member changes relate to the 
performance of 200 SOEs in six countries of the former SFRY.  
Overall, our results reveal that board member changes are politically motivated 
rather than performance induced. We also find that political interference via 
instable board membership is negatively associated with performance of SOEs. In 
addition, our findings imply that the significance and magnitude of this association 
depends on the SOE’s political importance and ownership models. The results show 
that politically induced board member changes are insignificant for performance of 
large SOEs and SOEs governed by an independent government body.  
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The empirical findings of this study have several important implications. They 
reveal a more nuanced picture of political tie heterogeneity and show another 
channel for political interference within SOEs. In that way, we extend the political 
embeddedness perspective by enabling multilevel investigation of political 
influence and its impact on the behaviour of SOEs. Unlike previous research 
studies, our study also acknowledges the importance of differentiation among 
government ownership ties on the basis of adopted ownership models. Our findings 
in this regard might have important implications for policymakers. In particular, the 
results show that policymakers should adopt a centralized ownership model to 
create a shield from political interference. Recognizing that a centralized ownership 
model might not be appropriate for all countries due to their specificities, 
policymakers can at least ensure that appointment of board members is based on 
knowledge, skills, and competences rather than political allegiance. 
Even though we have undertaken a careful analysis we acknowledge that our study 
has several limitations that suggest implications for future research. First, further 
examination of the characteristics of replaced board members (e.g., expertise, work 
experience) will enrich the understanding of why board member changes increase 
in years of elections. Second, in our study we do not take into account that board 
member changes might depend on distinct personal political ties. For example, 
board members working in private enterprises with political connections are less 
likely to be replaced than government officials with direct political ties. Such 
analysis would provide us with insights regarding the underlying mechanisms of 
politically induced board member changes. Third, as noted within the political 
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embeddedness perspective, political ties create certain benefits as well as costs. 
Therefore, empirical research that would disentangle benefits and costs of 
individual board replacements in years of elections would provide us with better 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Board and ownership characteristics 
 





















ONE TIER VS. TWO TIER 




Number of SOEs with 100% 
state ownership 
Number of SOEs with 
minority shareholders 
Number of SOEs with 
significant minority 
shareholder 
102 86 12 
 





Direct government control 
Indirect government control via local self-
government 




Definition of variables 
Variable name Variable definition 
Return on equity (ROE) The ratio of net income to average total equity 
Sales per employee The natural logarithm of the sales over the total number of 
employees 
Board turnover The percentage of the total number of board members in the 
observed year who left at the end of the year after spending at least 
one year on the board 
Board political turnover The percentage of the total number of board members in the 
observed year who are politically connected and who left at the 
end of the year after spending at least one year on the board 
Board intermediary The number of board members who left in the observed year with 
tenures shorter than one year 
Board leavers The number of board members who left the board within one year 
Board appointments The number of board members appointed to the board within one 
year 
Parliamentary The dummy variables that take value one in the year of 
parliamentary elections and zero for other years 
Local The dummy variables that take value one in the year of 
parliamentary elections and zero for other years 
Board tenure The average time that board members spent on the board 
Board size The total number of board members 
Board male The percentage of men on board 
Size The natural logarithm of the total number of employees 
Existence The natural logarithm of the difference between years under 
investigation and year of SOE incorporation 
Leverage The measure of long-term debt over shareholders’ equity 
GDP The logarithm value of the gross domestic product at purchasing 
power parity (GDP PPP) 














Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for key variables. The sample covers 200 state-owned enterprises from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia for the period 2010-2014. Please note that for 
the variables that are used in logarithm form within our estimations in this table we report non-logarithm values. Panel A 
reports the summary statistics for state-owned enterprise performance variables. ROE is the ratio of net income to average 
total equity. Sales per employee is the natural logarithm of sales over the total number of employees. In panel B the summary 
statistics for board level variables are reported. Board turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the 
observed year who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board intermediary shows the 
number of board members who left in the observed year with tenures shorter than one year. Board political turnover is the 
percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who are politically connected and who left at the end 
of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board size is the total number of board members. Board male is the 
percentage of men on board. Board tenure is the average time that board members spent on the board. Board appointments 
is the number of board members appointed to the board within one year. Board leavers is the number of board members that 
left the board within one year. Panel C reports the summary statistics for political interference variables. Parliamentary is a 
dummy variable which takes value 1 in years of parliamentary elections. Local is a dummy variable which takes value 1 in 
years of local elections. In Panel D the summary statistics for control variables are reported. Existence is the natural logarithm 
of the difference between years under investigation and year of SOE incorporation. Size is the natural logarithm of the total 










Variable Mean Median Std Obs 
Panel A: Performance measures 
ROE -0.05 -0.02 0.22 957 
Sales per employee 190.72 96.26 919.24 971 
Panel B: Board level measures 
Board turnover 0.19 0.13 0.27 1,000 
Board intermediary 0.33 0.00 1.12 1,000 
Board political turnover 0.10 0.11 0.18 1,000 
Board size 5.38 6.00 3.10 1,000 
Board male 0.81 0.83 0.19 919 
Board tenure 2.12 1.92 1.21 919 
Board appointments 1.53 1.00 2.19 1,000 
Board leavers 1.33 0.00 2.05 1,000 
Panel C: Political interference measures 
Parliamentary 0.34 0.00 0.47 1,000 
Local 0.28 0.00 0.45 1,000 
Panel D: Control variables 
Existence 28.12 21.00 23.99 977 
Size 675.53 488.00 1517.72 989 
Leverage 0.33 0.31 0.64 817 




Table 2.5  
Board member changes per country 













MEAN VALUES OF BOARD MEMBER CHANGES PER COUNTRY 





Montenegro Serbia Slovenia 
Board turnover 0.17 0.21 0.33 0.21 0.20 0.18 
Board intermediary 0.25 0.35 0.30 0.32 0.58 0.32 
Board political 
turnover 
0.09 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.07 







Montenegro Serbia Slovenia 
Total number of 
board members 
474 620 40 144 148 694 
Number of board 
members who left 
the board 
306 383 40 81 90 427 
Proportion of 
board members 
who left the 
board 




Years of parliamentary and local elections 
Notes: This table presents the years of parliamentary and local elections in each of the countries within our sample. 






Ruling party change 




Periods between elections 
 

















 Par. Loc. Par. Loc. Par. Loc. Par. Loc. Par. Loc. Par. Loc. 
2010 X *      *    * 
2011   X  X      X  
2012  *     X  X *   
2013    *  *       
2014 X    X   * X * X * 
Parliamentary elections 





Montenegro Serbia Slovenia 
2010 Change      
2011  Change No change   Change 
2012    No change Change  
2013       







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.2  


















Notes: Proportion of the total number of board members in the observed year who left at the end of the year after spending 
at least one year on the board. 
 
 
Figure 2.3  


















Notes: Proportion of the total number of board members who left in the observed year with tenures shorter than one year. 
 
 
Figure 2.4  
















Notes: Proportion of the total number of board members in the observed year who are politically connected and who left at the 




Table 2.9  
Effect of elections on board member changes 
Notes: The table presents the results for the relationship between board member changes and election cycles. Fixed 
effects panel data was used. First panel (columns (1) and (2)) show results for the board turnover-election relationship. 
Second panel (columns (3) and (4)) present results for the board intermediary-election relationship. Third panel (columns 
(5) and (6)) present results for the board political turnover-election relationship. In columns (1), (3) and (5) lagged ROE 
is performance measure. In columns (2), (4) and (6) lagged Sales per employee is performance measure. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant term is estimated but not reported. ***significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Board turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the 
observed year who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board intermediary shows the 
number of board members who left in the observed year with tenures shorter than one year. Board political turnover is 
the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who are politically connected and who left at 
the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Parliamentary is a dummy variable which takes value 
1 in years of parliamentary elections. Board size is the total number of board members. Board tenure is the average time 
that board members spent on the board. Board male is the percentage of men on board. Size is the natural logarithm of 
the total number of employees. ROE is the ratio of net income to average total equity. Sales per employee is the natural 

















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parliamentary         0.088*** 0.093***  0.233** 0.235** 0.040*** 0.043*** 
                (0.022) (0.023) (0.091) (0.091) (0.014) (0.015) 
Board size              0.081*** 0.081***  0.226*** 0.223*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
                (0.007) (0.007) (0.060) (0.059) (0.005) (0.005) 
Board tenure           0.048*** 0.049***  -0.177*** -0.182*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 
                (0.014) (0.015) (0.061) (0.059) (0.011) (0.011) 
Board male -0.045 -0.066 -0.227 -0.232 -0.063 -0.078 
                (0.121) (0.123) (0.311) (0.318) (0.077) (0.079) 
Size (t-1)          -0.072*** -0.073** -0.160 -0.108 -0.004 0.001 
                (0.025) (0.032) (0.142) (0.141) (0.014) (0.018) 
ROE (t-1) 0.000  0.023  -0.010  
                (0.073)  (0.218)  (0.048)  
Sales per employee 
(t-1)      
 0.016  0.123  0.024 
                 (0.033)  (0.105)  (0.028) 
       
No. of Obs.           722 732 722 732 722 732 
R2 Within 0.30 0.29 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.22 
Prob>F         0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.10 1.18 1.10 1.18 1.10 1.18 
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Table 2.10  
Effect of board member changes on SOE performance: Whole sample 
Notes: The table presents the results for estimation of board member changes and SOE performance. IV estimation 
using heteroskedasticity-based instruments (ivreg2h) was used. In columns (1) and (2) Board turnover is the measure 
of board member changes. In columns (3) and (4) Board political turnover is the measure of board member changes. 
In columns (5) and (6) Board intermediary is the measure of board member changes. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant term is estimated but not reported. ***significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. ROE is the ratio of net income to average total equity and is dependent variables 
in columns (1), (3) and (5). Sales per employee is the natural logarithm of sales over the total number of employees 
and is dependent variable in columns (2), (4) and (6). Board turnover is the percentage of the total number of board 
members in the observed year who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board 
political turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who are politically 
connected and who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board intermediary shows 
the number of board members who left in the observed year with tenures shorter than one year. Existence is the natural 
logarithm of the difference between years under investigation and year of SOE incorporation. Size is the natural 
logarithm of the total number of employees. Leverage is equal to long-term debt over shareholders’ equity. GDP is 
the logarithm of GDP PPP. Board size is the total number of board members. Board tenure is the average time that 
board members spent on the board. Board male is the percentage of men on board. Board leavers is the number of 
board members that left the board within one year. Board appointments is the number of board members appointed to 
the board within one year.  
 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Board turnover -0.158* -0.826*     
 (0.094) (0.426)     
Board political 
turnover     
  -0.205 -0.983   
                  (0.147) (0.685)   
Board intermediary     -0.010* 0.011 
     (0.018) 0.077 
Existence -0.036** 0.216*** -0.037** 0.213*** -0.027 0.213*** 
 (0.016) (0.069) (0.017) (0.073) (0.016) (0.066) 
Size           -0.010 -0.113** -0.008 -0.101** -0.003 -0.119*** 
                (0.009) (0.046) (0.009) (0.045) (0.010) (0.043) 
Leverage -0.096*** 0.175*** -0.100*** 0.157** -0.096*** 0.194*** 
 (0.031) (0.066) (0.031) (0.067) (0.030) (0.064) 
GDP 0.028 0.184 0.030 0.200 0.036 0.148 
 (0.027) (0.123) (0.027) (0.125) (0.027) (0.123) 
Board size       0.009* 0.171*** 0.009 0.164*** -0.001 0.249*** 
                (0.005) (0.026) (0.006) (0.028) (0.008) (0.032) 
Board tenure          0.020** 0.011 0.023*** 0.024 0.021** -0.049 
                (0.009) (0.047) (0.009) (0.046) (0.009) (0.052) 
Board male 0.123* -0.067 0.135** -0.004 0.136** -0.020 
                (0.068) (0.340) (0.067) (0.338) (0.063) (0.341) 
Board leavers     0.009 -0.100** 
                    (0.010) (0.040) 
Board appointments     -0.000 -0.101** 
     (0.008) (0.040) 
       
No. of Obs.           427 424   427 424 427 424 
Mean VIF 1.36 1.37 1.35 1.35 1.81 1.82 
       
Underidentification 
LM statistic P val 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen J statistic P 
val 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.13  
Robustness check of change of board members-election relationship 
Notes: The table presents the results for the robustness checks of the turnover-parliamentary elections. Fixed effects panel 
data was used. First panel (columns (1) and (2)) show results for the board turnover-election relationship. Second panel 
(columns (3) and (4)) present results for the board intermediary-election relationship. Third panel (columns (5) and (6)) 
present results for the board political turnover-election relationship. In columns (1), (3) and (5) lagged ROE is performance 
measure. In columns (2), (4) and (6) lagged Sales per employee is performance measure. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. In all regressions a constant term is estimated but not reported. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. Board turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who left at 
the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board intermediary shows the number of board members 
who left in the observed year with tenures shorter than one year. Board political turnover is the percentage of the total number 
of board members in the observed year who are politically connected and who left at the end of the year after spending at 
least one year on the board. Parliamentary is a dummy variable which takes value 1 in years of parliamentary elections. 
Board size is the total number of board members. Board tenure is the average time that board members spent on the board. 
Board male is the percentage of men on board. Size is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees. Leverage is 
equal to long-term debt over shareholders’ equity. Knowledge is measured by percentage of board members with PhD 
degrees. ROE is the ratio of net income to average total equity. Sales per employee is the natural logarithm of sales over the 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parliamentary         0.086***    0.086***   0.157**  0.149*  0.041**   0.041** 
                (0.028) (0.028) (0.077) (0.077) 0.017) (0.017) 
Board size           -0.073 -0.061 -0.007 0.169 -0.025 -0.020 
                (0.075) (0.081) (0.252) (0.272) (0.047) (0.047) 
Board tenure             0.062***    0.061***   -0.168***  -0.162***    0.040***    0.040*** 
                (0.018) (0.019) (0.057) (0.055) (0.013) (0.013) 
Board male -0.021 -0.030 0.194 0.240 -0.037 -0.044 
                (0.167) (0.167) (0.460) (0.460) (0.111) (0.111) 
Size (t-1)          0.082***    0.083***   0.217***   0.211***    0.047***    0.048*** 
                (0.007) (0.007) (0.062) (0.061) (0.005) (0.005) 
Leverage 0.000 0.002 0.018 0.056 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.017) (0.043) (0.001) (0.003) 
Knowledge 0.123 0.141 -1.491* -1.644* -0.105 -0.092 
 (0.188) (0.189) (0.882) (0.883) (0.128) (0.128) 
ROE (t-1) 0.014  0.349  -0.015  
                (0.104)  (0.294)  (0.063)  
Sales per employee 
(t-1)      
 0.023  0.136  0.028 
                 (0.037)  (0.107)  (0.030) 
       
No. of Obs.           587 585 587 585 587 585 
R2 Within 0.31 0.32 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.27 
Prob>F         0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.12 1.17 1.12 1.17 1.12 1.17 
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Table 2.14  
The effect of lagged elections on board member changes 
Notes: The table presents the results for the relationship between board member changes and election cycles. Fixed 
effects panel data was used. First panel (columns (1) and (2)) show results for the board turnover-election relationship. 
Second panel (columns (3) and (4)) present results for the board intermediary-election relationship. Third panel (columns 
(5) and (6)) present results for the board political turnover-election relationship. In columns (1), (3) and (5) lagged ROE 
is performance measure. In columns (2), (4) and (6) lagged Sales per employee is performance measure. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant term is estimated but not reported. ***significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Board turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the 
observed year who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board intermediary shows the 
number of board members who left in the observed year with tenures shorter than one year. Board political turnover is 
the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who are politically connected and who left at 
the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Parliamentary is a dummy variable which takes value 
1 in years of parliamentary elections. Board size is the total number of board members. Board tenure is the average time 
that board members spent on the board. Board male is the percentage of men on board. Size is the natural logarithm of 
the total number of employees. ROE is the ratio of net income to average total equity. Sales per employee is the natural 














 (1) (2) (3)       (4) (5) (6) 
Parliamentary  
(t-1)      
-0.028   -0.034*  -0.294*** -0.299*** -0.012 -0.014 
                (0.019)   (0.019)   (0.109)   (0.106)   (0.013) (0.012) 
Board size           0.080*** 0.079*** 0.228***  0.224*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
                (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.059)   (0.058)   (0.005) (0.005) 
Board tenure          0.052*** 0.051*** -0.195*** -0.203*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 
                (0.016)   (0.017)   (0.061)   (0.061)   (0.011) (0.012) 
Board male -0.040   -0.063   -0.228   -0.241   -0.061 -0.077 
                (0.126)   (0.129)   (0.315)   (0.323)   (0.080) (0.082) 
Size (t-1)       -0.064**  -0.063*  -0.146    -0.099   -0.000 0.005 
                (0.028)   (0.035)   (0.143)   (0.139)   (0.015) (0.019) 
ROE (t-1) -0.005             0.004            -0.012  
                (0.072)              (0.219)            (0.048)  
Sales per employee 
(t-1)      
          0.023            0.136    0.028 
                         (0.037)            (0.107)    (0.030) 
       
No. of Obs.           722 732 722 732 722 732 
R2 Within 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 
Prob>F         0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




 The effects of board member changes on SOE performance: Whole sample  
(lagged enterprise-level control variables) 
Notes: The table presents the results for estimation of board member changes and SOE performance with lagged 
enterprise-level control variables. IV estimation using heteroskedasticity-based instruments (ivreg2h) was used. In 
columns (1) and (2) Board turnover is the measure of board member changes. In columns (3) and (4) Board political 
turnover is the measure of board member changes. In columns (5) and (6) Board intermediary is the measure of board 
member changes. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant term is estimated 
but not reported. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. ROE is the ratio of net income to 
average total equity and is dependent variable in columns (1), (3) and (5). Sales per employee is the natural logarithm 
of sales over the total number of employees and is dependent variable in columns (2), (4) and (6). Board turnover is 
the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who left at the end of the year after spending 
at least one year on the board. Board political turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the 
observed year who are politically connected and who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the 
board. Board intermediary shows the number of board members who left in the observed year with tenures shorter 
than one year. Existence is the natural logarithm of the difference between years under investigation and year of SOE 
incorporation. Size is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees. Leverage is equal to long-term debt over 
shareholders’ equity. GDP is the logarithm of GDP PPP. Board size is the total number of board members. Board 
tenure is the average time that board members spent on the board. Board male is the percentage of men on board. 
Board leavers is the number of board members that left the board within one year. Board appointments is the number 












 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Board turnover -0.185* -0.951**     
 (0.106) (0.469)     
Board political 
turnover     
  -0.223 -0.696   
                  (0.166) (0.774)   
Board intermediary     -0.010* 0.011 
     (0.018) (0.077) 
Existence (t-1) -0.024 0.210*** -0.023 0.228*** -0.014 0.208*** 
 (0.017) (0.070) (0.018) (0.074) (0.017) (0.067) 
Size (t-1)          -0.009 -0.092** -0.008 -0.079* -0.004 -0.097** 
                (0.009) (0.045) (0.009) (0.047) (0.009) (0.044) 
Leverage (t-1) -0.076** 0.254*** -0.075** 0.261*** -0.071** 0.273*** 
 (0.035) (0.072) (0.035) (0.074) (0.033) (0.070) 
GDP 0.023 0.164 0.027 0.189 0.032 0.135 
 (0.028) (0.129) (0.028) (0.130) (0.028) (0.128) 
Board size       0.009 0.169*** 0.007 0.150*** -0.002 0.239*** 
                (0.006) (0.026) (0.006) (0.029) (0.008) (0.033) 
Board tenure          0.017** 0.010 0.020** 0.025 0.019** -0.048 
                (0.009) (0.050) (0.008) (0.047) (0.008) (0.054) 
Board male 0.069 -0.149 0.085 -0.046 0.096 -0.051 
                (0.069) (0.356) (0.067) (0.353) (0.062) (0.352) 
Board leavers     0.008 -0.088** 
                    (0.010) (0.041) 
Board appointments     -0.001 -0.106*** 
     (0.008) (0.040) 
       
No. of Obs.           416 412 416 412 416 412 
Mean VIF 1.26 1.26 1.25 1.25 1.69 1.70 
       
Underidentification 
LM statistic P val 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Hansen J statistic P 
val 
0.88 0.01 0.39 0.04 0.40 0.11 
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Table 2.16  
The effects of board member changes on SOE performance: Whole sample  
(lagged board, enterprise and macroeconomic control variables) 
Notes: The table presents the results for estimation of board member changes and SOE performance with lagged board, 
enterprise and macroeconomic control variables. IV estimation using heteroskedasticity-based instruments (ivreg2h) 
was used. In columns (1) and (2) Board turnover is the measure of board member changes. In columns (3) and (4) 
Board political turnover is the measure of board member changes. In columns (5) and (6) Board intermediary is the 
measure of board member changes. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant 
term is estimated but not reported. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. ROE is the ratio 
of net income to average total equity and is dependent variable in columns (1), (3) and (5). Sales per employee is the 
natural logarithm of sales over the total number of employees and is dependent variable in columns (2), (4) and (6). 
Board turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who left at the end of the 
year after spending at least one year on the board. Board political turnover is the percentage of the total number of 
board members in the observed year who are politically connected and who left at the end of the year after spending 
at least one year on the board. Board intermediary shows the number of board members who left in the observed year 
with tenures shorter than one year. Existence is the natural logarithm of the difference between years under 
investigation and year of SOE incorporation. Size is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees. Leverage 
is equal to long-term debt over shareholders’ equity. GDP is the logarithm of GDP PPP. Board size is the total number 
of board members. Board tenure is the average time that board members spent on the board. Board male is the 
percentage of men on board. Board leavers is the number of board members that left the board within one year. Board 
appointments is the number of board members appointed to the board within one year.  










 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Board turnover -0.208** -0.193     
 (0.103) (0.369)     
Board political 
turnover 
  -0.285* -0.282   
   (0.155) (0.572)   
Board intermediary     -0.016 0.035 
     (0.016) (0.064) 
Existence (t-1) -0.016 0.261*** -0.016 0.261*** -0.006 0.247*** 
 (0.018) (0.072) (0.018) (0.074) (0.017) (0.069) 
Size (t-1) -0.011 -0.067 -0.011 -0.068 -0.010 -0.078* 
 (0.009) (0.045) (0.009) (0.045) (0.009) (0.045) 
Leverage (t-1) -0.068* 0.290*** -0.069* 0.290*** -0.066* 0.302*** 
 (0.035) (0.070) (0.036) (0.070) (0.034) (0.069) 
GDP (t-1) 0.026 0.163 0.025 0.162 0.022 0.126 
 (0.028) (0.130) (0.029) (0.132) (0.027) (0.131) 
Board size (t-1) 0.003 0.152*** 0.004 0.153*** -0.001 0.227*** 
 (0.004) (0.023) (0.004) (0.023) (0.006) (0.031) 
Board tenure (t-1) 0.012 -0.019 0.014 -0.017 0.010 -0.055 
 (0.010) (0.051) (0.010) (0.051) (0.010) (0.056) 
Board male (t-1) 0.089 -0.053 0.107* -0.036 0.109* -0.072 
 (0.066) (0.350) (0.064) (0.345) (0.062) (0.347) 
Board leavers (t-1)     0.007 -0.103** 
     (0.009) (0.042) 
Board appointments 
(t-1) 
    0.002 -0.046 
     (0.007) (0.032) 
       
No. of Obs. 393 390   393 390 393 390 
Mean VIF 1.17 1.18 1.17 1.18 1.57 1.58 
       
Underidentification 
LM statistic P val 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.17 
Hansen J statistic P 
val 





Notes: The table reports fixed effects difference-in-difference using binary treatment. First panel (columns (1) and (2)) 
show results for board turnover-election relationship. Second panel (columns (3) and (4)) present results for board 
intermediary-election relationship. Third panel (columns (5) and (6)) present results for board political turnover-election 
relationship. In columns (1), (3) and (5) lagged ROE is performance measure. In columns (2), (4) and (6) lagged Sales 
per employee is performance measure. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant 
term is estimated but not reported. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. ROE is net income 
over average total equity. Sales per employee is natural logarithm of sales over number of employees. Board turnover is 
percentage of board members that changed at the end of the year and that spent at least one year on board. Board 
intermediary is number of board members that spent less than a year on the board. Board political turnover is the 
percentage of politically connected board members that changed at the end of the year and that spent at least one year on 
board. Board size is number of board members. Board male is percentage of men on board. Board tenure is average time 
that board members spent on board. Size is the natural logarithm of number of employees. Election year is dummy 
variable that takes value 1 for 2012 and 0 otherwise. Postelection year is dummy variable that takes value 1 for 2013 
and 0 otherwise. Treatment is binary variable that takes value 1 for enterprises in Serbia and Montenegro and value 0 for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Treatment*election year and Treatment*postelection year are interaction variables. 
 
 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Board size           0.094*** 0.095*** 0.245** 0.230** 0.051*** 0.053*** 
                (0.012) (0.013) (0.105) (0.105) (0.008) (0.009) 
Tenure          0.045* 0.054** -0.137 -0.139 0.022* 0.035** 
                (0.024) (0.027) (0.092) (0.090) (0.012) (0.016) 
Male board 0.055 0.027 -0.202 -0.223 -0.025 -0.047 
                (0.202) (0.217) (0.478) (0.517) (0.121) (0.132) 
Size (t-1)       -0.081 -0.045 -0.094 -0.041 -0.024 -0.001 
                (0.057) (0.090) (0.469) (0.626) (0.027) (0.057) 
ROE (t-1) 0.102  -0.106  0.039  
                (0.129)  (0.462)  (0.053)  
Sales per employee 
(t-1)      
 0.040  0.134  0.032 
                 (0.076)  (0.196)  (0.059) 
Election year -0.048  -0.176  -0.019  
 (0.044)  (0.136)  (0.027)  
Treatment*election 
year 
0.078  0.144  0.040  
 (0.058)  (0.243)  (0.039)  
Postelection year  -0.043  -0.062  -0.041 
  (0.044)  (0.081)  (0.033) 
Treatment* 
postelection year 
 0.048  0.143  0.041 
  (0.068)  (0.338)  (0.054) 
       
No. of Obs.           295 306 295 306 295 306 














Researchers agree that the state of economy influences election outcomes, but they 
hold differing opinions of whether pre-election manipulation can be observed in the 
macroeconomic data (e.g., Drazen, 2001). The paucity of empirical evidence for 
pre-election manipulation of macroeconomic variables is related to numerous levers 
available to incumbent politicians for influencing economic conditions. Although 
incumbents have the power to directly influence economic policies, they can also 
improve the likelihood of their re-election through intervening in corporate 
decisions (Bertrand et al., 2007). Therefore, within this chapter we try to refine the 
political business cycle theories, which encompass mechanisms of pre-election 
manipulation and political intervention, by bringing these theories down to the 
enterprise level. 
The theoretical and empirical studies about interconnectedness of politics and 
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economy started with the Nordhaus’ (1975) formulation of the opportunistic 
political business cycles. According to his theory, politicians engage in pre-election 
manipulation of policies as to induce economic growth and lower unemployment, 
thus increasing the likelihood of their re-election. The underlying assumption that 
voters are myopic and hence react to events preceding elections is the main model 
criticism. Moreover, a lack of conclusive empirical confirmation results in the 
waned interest for the Nordhaus model (e.g., Drazen, 2001; Golden & Poterba, 
1980; McCallum, 1978; Paldam, 1979).  
Following the criticism, rational political business cycles model is proposed 
(Cukierman & Meltzer, 1986; Rogoff, 1990; Rogoff & Sibert, 1988). The voters’ 
decision in this model is based upon the rational expectation of the future utility 
which can be provided by individual politicians. Alesina et al. (1993) substantiate 
this model by showing that elections do not engender changes in GDP and 
employment while they cause alterations in monetary and fiscal policies. But are 
there any other ways in which politicians can engage in pre-election manipulation 
as to increase their re-election chances? 
The political view of state ownership contends that politicians utilize SOEs as a 
grabbing hand for achievement of their personal and/or political objectives which 
are not coherent with enterprise value maximization (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002; 
Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). In this regard, incumbents as SOE 
shareholders can alter SOE strategic choices ensuring in that way that they are 
consistent with a certain political agenda and re-election efforts (Okhmatovskiy, 
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2010). Since SOEs objectives emerge from political processes and pressures 
(Lawson, 1994) they are transient in the context of changing governments 
(Megginson & Netter, 2001). Moreover, corporate decisions of SOEs might be used 
as an effective redistributive tool which provides politician’s supporters with 
certain perks (Musacchio et al., 2015b). Politicians influence SOEs as to create an 
upsurge in their voting support at the upcoming elections (Boycko et al., 1996; 
Stiglitz & Atkinson, 1980). Therefore, the question we try to answer in this chapter 
is whether it is possible that politicians seek political support through manipulation 
of SOEs’ corporate decisions during the run up to the elections?  
The national elections tempt the incumbent politicians to use corporate decisions of 
SOEs as benefit transfer mechanisms for their voters (Shleifer, 1998). One such 
decision that can influence the re-election outcome of the politician is employment. 
The seminal paper of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) suggests that politicians require 
SOEs to increase the level of employment since their political supporters benefit 
from such corporate decisions. Feld and Kirchgassner (2000) confirm that the level 
of unemployment curtails popularity of the politician in power. Politically 
connected enterprises create disproportionately more jobs compared to non-
politically connected counterparts (Bertrand et al., 2007; Menozzi et al., 2011). This 
result is in line with notion of Pint (1990) and Boycko et al. (1996) that SOEs are 
over employed.  
Aside from employment, decision of voters is contingent upon the level of 
investment (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Fair, 1988a; Wolfers, 2002). 
110 
 
Governments provide SOEs with better credit support to make their investments 
look more successful (Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005). For that reason, higher leverage 
levels are observed within politically connected enterprises (Boubakri et al., 2012; 
Faccio, 2010; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). On the other hand, Chen et al. (2011) explain 
that within politically connected enterprises investment efficiency is distorted. 
Enterprises might be instructed to carry out projects with negative NPV values 
when the primary goal of these projects is social stability, regional development etc. 
Through implementation of such projects politicians increase the probability of 
their re-election. Considering that investment and indebtedness decisions of SOEs 
can increase the chances of winning the elections, politicians have the incentive for 
political interventions. 
In this chapter, we attempt to provide a more direct evidence for election related 
manipulation of SOEs’ corporate decisions on employment, indebtedness and 
investment which would increase the likelihood of incumbent’s re-election. The 
main focus of the past empirical research was on politicians’ pre-election 
manipulation of macroeconomic policies and changes in SOEs’ behaviour due to 
establishment of political connections. With our study, we try to shift that focus 
towards micro level political business cycles which would ascertain the presence of 
political interventions and alteration of SOEs’ corporate decisions around election 
times.  
To be more concrete, we examine the relationship between election cycles and 
corporate decisions of SOEs using a dataset of 200 SOEs, from 2010 till 2014, in 
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six countries of the former SFRY. The idea to investigate the political manipulation 
of SOEs’ corporate decisions in six countries of the former SFRY is related to 
similar levels of SOEs’ importance as well as similar levels of political instability 
and political pressures. Four out of six countries within our sample went twice 
through the election cycles in only five years. According to the World Bank’s 
political stability indicator for 2014, all six countries are ranked between -0.05 and 
0.95 (2.5 being indicator of politically stable countries), thus indicating similar 
levels of government instability (World Bank, 2014b). Moreover, the report of 
Transparency International published in 2016 reveals that politicians in Western 
Balkan countries wield enormous influence in all economic spheres. The report 
highlights that examples of direct/indirect political manipulations and interventions 
across the country systems are abundant. As stated in the report, public resources 
are often used for election purposes, while political control of the state enterprise 
sector is widespread. Therefore, we believe that these countries provide us with a 
one of a kind set-up for analysis of election induced SOE corporate decisions.   
Our approach has three important underlying assumptions. Firstly, we focus on the 
impact of election periods since politicians have a limited leeway to engage in pre-
election manipulation of SOEs’ corporate decisions. Election periods bring the 
largest political gain, so we assume that political intervention and manipulation of 
SOEs’ corporate decisions are present in pre-election and/or election years. 
Secondly, elections are out of control of any individual enterprise being set in 
accordance with constitution or in accordance with some extraordinary 
economic/political conditions in the case of early elections. Hence, elections 
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provide us with a natural experimental framework in which we use a panel data 
fixed effects estimator without being concerned with the endogeneity and reverse 
causality issues. Thirdly, the voters are myopic and retrospective as they 
reward/punish incumbent politicians based on economic conditions in the six 
months or year before the election day (e.g., Achen & Bartels, 2004; Alesina et al., 
1993; Healy & Lenz, 2014). Healy and Lenz (2014) explain that such behaviour is 
related to the existence of “end-heuristic”. Even though voters might try to evaluate 
the politician in power on the basis of its long-term performance the fact that media 
focuses mainly on recent economic conditions makes it impossible (Healy & Lenz, 
2014).  
Our findings reveal that SOEs’ employment decisions are manipulated in pre-
election and election years since atypical increases in the number of employees are 
observed. We also find that incumbents intervene as to change SOEs’ indebtedness 
levels in pre-election years. Furthermore, weak but significant and positive upsurge 
in investment levels is noted in election and postelection years. For SOEs with 
politically dominated boards increase of leverage and number of employees is more 
pronounced than for SOEs with non-politically dominated boards. Our findings also 
suggest that SOEs governed by central governments are used for employment 
interventions, while SOEs governed by local self-governments suffer from greater 
manipulation of indebtedness and investment decisions.   
This study entails that election manipulation of SOEs’ corporate decisions exists, 
thus contributing to the literature in several important instances. First, we provide 
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empirical evidence for the existence of political interventions and enterprise level 
opportunistic business cycles. We show that previous research has misconstrued the 
ways in which incumbents increase the likelihood of their reappointment by 
implicitly suggesting that they manipulate the macroeconomic variables (e.g., 
Alesina et al., 1993; Hibbs, 1977; Nordhaus, 1975). We offer a detailed analysis 
which shows that politicians manipulate SOE decisions on employment, investment 
and indebtedness in pre-election and/or election years as to acquire greater voters 
support. Second, we uncover that politically connected boards grant election 
favours to politicians through alteration of SOE corporate decisions. Hence, our 
study enriches understanding of political embeddedness theory by pointing out to 
one of the reverse channels through which benefits are streamlined from enterprises 
to politicians (e.g., Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Third, we extend the literature on 
political interference as we demonstrate that the government control of SOEs 
engenders political influence over their decisions. More specifically, we show that 
state ownership provides the incumbents with additional tool for obtaining the 
electoral support.  
In addition to the above stated literature contributions, our findings provide 
important implications for governance policies of SOEs. They suggest that SOEs 
need to be governed by independent governance institutions as to impede political 
influence over their corporate decisions (e.g., Musacchio et al., 2015b; OECD, 
2015). Furthermore, our study implies that policymakers need to adopt four-year 
plans regarding employment, indebtedness and investment. Through adoption of 
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such plans short-term decisions with election benefits for politicians would be 
limited. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the 
literature regarding pre-election manipulation and develops hypothesis. Section 3.3 
presents data description and empirical strategy overview. Section 3.4 discusses the 
main findings. Section 3.5 provides the main conclusions and directions for future 
research.  
3.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
The first theory on political usage of economic policies for re-election purposes is 
formalized by Nordhaus in 1975. His model of opportunistic political business 
cycles assumes that politicians exploit the Phillips curve, thus manipulating the 
trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Nordhaus (1975) claims that office-
holding politicians spur employment just ahead of elections as to create positively 
distorted image of economic conditions. Consequently, myopic voters preferring 
high growth and low unemployment support these politicians as they are not able 
to recognize the pre-election manipulation.  
The theoretical and empirical criticism of the Nordhaus model appeared shortly 
after publication of his paper. The theorists assert that any voter who was part of 
the election cycle within Nordhaus model would next time recognize the 
opportunistic and manipulative behaviour of politicians (Alesina et al., 1993). After 
once observing low inflation and high employment before elections, and the vice 
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versa effect after the elections, the voter would punish rather than reward the 
incumbent politician in the next election round (Drazen, 2001). In addition, the 
empirical research does not provide rigorous, systematic and consistent support for 
the Nordhaus’ theory (Alt, 1994). There is a paucity of evidence for the increase of 
economic growth and employment prior to elections when observing the US (e.g., 
Hibbs, 1987; McCallum, 1978) and OECD data (Alesina, 1988; Alesina, Cohen, & 
Roubini, 1991; Paldam, 1979).  
Through criticism of Nordhaus, Hibbs (1977) develops the partisan political cycles 
model. He argues that pre-election manipulation is dependent upon general 
economic goals of political party. Moreover, his model implies that manipulation 
of certain macroeconomic policies is associated with relatively permanent 
economic effects and not the election related effects as proposed by Nordhaus. The 
revolution of rational expectations theory and recognition of empirical 
shortcomings led to creation of the second-generation models. 
The rational political business cycle models shift the focus from political influence 
over macroeconomic outcomes (e.g., economic growth, unemployment, inflation) 
towards pre-election manipulation of monetary and fiscal policies (e.g., Alesina, 
Cohen, & Roubini, 1992; Schultz, 1995). Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff 
and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and Persson and Tabellini (1991) entail that 
rational cycles represent a short-run manipulation of policy instruments as a ‘signal’ 
of the politicians’ ability to provide more public goods. They argue that it is much 
easier for politicians to introduce tax cuts, transfer subsidies to certain entities or 
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print money than influence the overall level of employment or economic growth 
(Alesina et al., 1993). Therefore, the rational cycle models imply that it is highly 
unlikely to observe the periodic election-year macroeconomic cycles (Alesina & 
Roubini, 1992). Moreover, voters choose the politician for whom they are going to 
vote on the basis of rationally expected utility he/she is going to deliver (Cukierman 
& Meltzer, 1986; Rogoff, 1990).  
The empirical evidence of the rational cycles is somewhat more supportive. Bizer 
and Darlauf (1990) show that a cyclical component of tax changes corresponds to 
the election shift of the political parties. Furthermore, fiscal transfers pattern around 
election times is present (Alesina, 1988; Tufte, 1978). Grier (1987) shows that there 
is a connection between monetary policy and elections in the US but only for the 
period encompassing early sixties to early eighties. Within the extended time frame 
the connection wanes and disappears when the control for fiscal policy is introduced 
(Beck, 1987). Hence, the real-life results on manipulation of monetary and fiscal 
policy instruments are mixed.  
The absence of conclusive evidence for political business cycle theories does not 
change the fact that voters keep politicians accountable for economic conditions 
(Carlsen, 2000; Fidrmuc, 2000; Gelineau, 2013; Lewis-Beck & Whitten, 2013). 
Therefore, the re-election prospects of politicians are highly dependent upon state 
of the economy (Schultz, 1995). With that in mind, we suggest that the previous 
research probably failed to recognize some informal mechanisms used by 
politicians for shaping economic conditions. Politicians can directly alter economic 
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policies, but they can also use a more sophisticated approach through influencing 
the corporate decisions of important enterprises (Bertrand et al., 2007). This 
influence can be exerted via established political connections within private 
enterprises or via state ownership.  
The political view of state ownership posits that governments and politicians utilize 
SOEs as a playground for the transfer of benefits to their cronies and politically 
like-minded individuals (e.g., Bennedsen, 1998; Megginson, 2005; Musacchio & 
Lazzarini, 2014). The primary and single most important aim of politicians is 
maintenance of the voting support as to be able to remain in power and enjoy the 
associated perquisites (Sapienza, 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). Politicians being 
eager to win the electoral support use SOEs for attainment of their personal and 
political goals which are not in line with the value maximization objective (e.g., 
Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2005; Cui & Jiang, 2012; Shleifer, 1998). Therefore, 
politicians might provide incentives for SOEs’ managers to undertake decisions 
incurring high costs while generating an upsurge of the voting support (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994; Stiglitz & Atkinson, 1980). By providing the voters with certain 
perquisites in exchange for the political support, the incumbents suppress the 
potential electoral win of the opposition (Shleifer, 1998).  
Under the political pressures operations of SOEs are distorted as they cater the 
prevailing political interests (Majumdar, 1998; Nellis, 1994). These might 
encompass creation of job placements within SOEs, introduction of projects for 
facilitation of resource transfers or similar (Shleifer, 1998). Hence, politicians 
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influence SOEs’ strategic choices and their corporate decisions to ensure that they 
are in line with a specific political agenda (Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001; 
Okhmatovskiy, 2010). The unrestrained political power enables incumbents to 
intervene and manipulate SOEs’ corporate decisions in a rather straightforward 
manner. Since politicians’ primary objective is keeping the office, they are tempted 
by the election periods to influence SOE corporate decisions (Dinc, 2005). Hence, 
SOEs might be used around election times as an informal mechanism in order to 
garner the voters support. But how these mechanisms would work and why 
politicians would use them only around election periods? 
Ensuring elevated voter satisfaction in the pre-election period is the key driving 
motivation behind the decisions and actions undertaken by politicians (Alesina & 
Tabellini, 2007). The incumbent is incentivized to use his/hers political power to 
enhance the conditions observed by the voter (Drazen & Enslava, 2010). The 
review of the literature on vote and popularity function (VP function) shows that 
around 30% of the vote change stems from a deterioration in economic conditions 
(Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000). Furthermore, due to voters’ short-sightedness the 
decision of whether to reward or punish the incumbent is dependent upon the 
economic movements in the six to twelve months prior to elections (e.g., Fair, 
1988b; Kiewiet, 1983; Kramer, 1971; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). As 
explained by Healy and Lenz (2014), myopic and retrospective behaviour of voters 
is the consequence of the “end heuristic”. This phenomenon suggests that voters 
evaluate the incumbents according to the state of election-year economy. 
Individuals have a general tendency to replace the end circumstances as being true 
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for the whole term due to the absence of long-term media coverage (Alesina & 
Rosenthal, 1995; Healy & Lenz, 2014).  
For the reasons stated above, politicians are enticed by the voters’ behaviour to 
concentrate on the election year and changes they can initiate in that period (Healy 
& Lenz, 2014). They have an inclination toward quick win actions which have 
immediate apparent benefits and delayed costs (Tufte, 1978). Musacchio et al. 
(2015b) explain that political benefits attached to SOEs make it almost impossible 
for governments not to intervene. Thus, SOEs are perfect instruments for achieving 
goals that are entwined with the re-election political agenda. The manipulation of 
SOE corporate decisions are expected to happen only around the time of elections 
as this brings the biggest benefits to the incumbent (Bertrand et al., 2007). The 
persistence of these transient decisions would distort SOE operations which in turn 
might be considered by voters as over-costly and unnecessary.  
The variation of SOE corporate decisions around election times is closely related 
to voters’ preferences for high employment and growth (Schultz, 1995). A high 
level of unemployment reduces the probability of an incumbents’ reappointment 
(Carlsen, 2000; Fair, 1978; Feld & Kirchgasser, 2000). Consequently, politicians 
seeking electoral support would prosper from positive news about job creation 
(Bertrand et al., 2007). Since labour union support is an influential factor for 
election outcomes, the increase of employment becomes the pre-electoral must. 
Hence, the politician may request from SOEs to increase the number of employees 
and maintain excess employment for a certain period of time in order to hold the 
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office for another term (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). The increase of employment 
levels is observed by voters as a positive sign of economic conditions and 
incumbent capabilities. In that way politicians secure the voters support while 
making the alteration of SOEs’ corporate decisions around election times 
completely justifiable in terms of their political goals. Having in mind all the above 
stated, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 1. SOEs’ employment decisions are manipulated as to increase the 
number of employees in pre-election and/or election years. 
Increase of economic growth is the second determinant of the voters’ decision 
whether to punish or reward the incumbent. For that reason, politicians have the 
incentive to expand investment activities of SOEs as to boost growth around the 
election periods. Considering the fact that investment of SOEs cannot be financed 
by internally generated capital due to their average poor performance, politicians 
wanting to increase their prospects of re-election are faced with a need to amend 
SOEs’ indebtedness decisions. Aivazian et al. (2005) confirm that SOEs’ 
investments are supported by loans. Therefore, it is expected from incumbents to 
streamline greater levels of subsidies towards SOEs in years prior to elections or 
provide loan guarantees. The leverage is therefore used as a vehicle for increase of 
investments that provide incumbents with a positive public image which wins over 
the election votes. To gain additional insights about the SOEs’ leverage dynamics 
in election periods, we propose: 
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Hypothesis 2. SOEs’ indebtedness decisions are altered as to increase leverage in 
pre-election years. 
Investments are one of the key determinants of the voters’ decision for whom to 
vote (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Wolfers, 2002). The importance of 
investments for the incumbents can also be seen though the findings of the research 
study by Carvalho (2014). This study showed that loans are approved by 
government banks merely to enterprises which are going to expand their investment 
activity in politically important regions. Thus, it can be concluded that incumbents 
introduce investment projects when expecting high political benefits in the form of 
electoral support. Contrary to that, election related contraction of investment 
expenditures among private enterprises is observed (Gulen & Ion, 2016; Jens, 2016; 
Julio & Yook, 2012). The contraction is the consequence of the uncertainty which 
goes hand in hand with elections. This trend happens because of the fact that the 
only consideration for private enterprises is profit maximization, unlike for SOEs 
with predominantly political considerations. Musacchio, Lazzarini, & Aguilera 
(2015a) imply that SOEs are more likely to undertake the investment projects with 
negative NPV values as long as they provide benefits to politicians or increase their 
probability of being re-elected. In line with that, SOEs announce a greater number 
of investment projects in election years when compared to non-election years (Alok 
& Ayyagari, 2015). As to further investigate the changes of SOEs’ investments 
within the timeframe of elections, we propose:  
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Hypothesis 3. SOEs’ investment decisions are altered as to increase the investment 
levels in election years. 
3.2.1 Politically dominated boards and corporate decisions of SOEs 
 
To be able to control processes within SOEs, politicians have the incentive to 
appoint loyal and obedient individuals as board members in order to put forward 
the politically motivated decisions (Hu & Leung, 2012; World Bank, 2014a). For 
that reason, it is expected that SOEs with politically dominated boards behave to a 
greater extent in line with political goals of incumbents relative to SOEs with non-
politically dominated boards. The incentive for politically dominated boards to 
support the re-election of their politician, stems from the desire to secure their board 
positions in the aftermath of elections. Thus, politically connected managers alter 
SOE employment decisions as to increase the likelihood of the politicians’ 
reappointment (Wolfers, 2002). The confirmation of this standing comes from 
Bertrand et al. (2007) who find that politically connected CEOs generate 
disproportionately larger number of job placements in election years. The previous 
research also reveals that politically connected enterprises have higher levels of 
indebtedness which reflects preferential treatment from banks and easier access to 
credit (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2012; Brandt & Zhu, 2000; Cull & Xu, 2005; Faccio, 
2010; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Saeed, Belghitar, & Clark, 2015; Yingyi & Roland, 
1996). Contrary to that, Chen et al. (2011) and Zhao, Wan and Xu (2013) explain 
that within politically connected enterprises investments are distorted. The reasons 
for such inefficiencies are twofold. On the one hand, because of the political 
pressures politically connected SOEs carry out investment projects which are in line 
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with certain government/political plans, thus missing out on profitable investment 
opportunities (Chen et al., 2011). On the other hand, SOEs faced with bad projects 
cannot terminate them as this would lead to a conflicting situation with the 
incumbent (Chen et al., 2011). Bearing in mind that politically dominated boards 
might manipulate SOEs’ corporate decisions to a greater extent than non-politically 
dominated boards, we propose:  
Hypothesis 4. Employment increase in pre-election and/or election years is higher 
for SOEs with politically dominated boards relative to SOEs with non-politically 
dominated boards. 
Hypothesis 5. Indebtedness increase in pre-election and/or election years is higher 
for SOEs with politically dominated boards relative to SOEs with non-politically 
dominated boards. 
Hypothesis 6. Investment increase in pre-election and/or election years is higher 
for SOEs with politically dominated boards relative to SOEs with non-politically 
dominated boards. 
3.2.2 Governance level and corporate decisions of SOEs 
 
To further improve identification of factors which might lead to alteration of SOE 
corporate decisions we follow the literature suggesting that decisions of SOEs 
governed by central governments and those governed by local self-governments 
might differ in election years. Li and Zhou (2005) explain that political pressures 
for local officials are much higher as their advancement on the political ladder is 
dependent upon local growth and employment levels. Hence, local governments 
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have greater incentive to use political connections within SOEs as to cater political 
interests (Wu et al., 2012). Local SOEs increase investments to boost growth and 
facilitate employment even when these projects might have higher delayed costs 
(e.g., Wu et al, 2012). Consequently, the number of investment projects in election 
years is 10% higher for locally governed SOEs relative to those that are governed 
by central governments (e.g., Allok & Ayyagari, 2015). Dahlberg and Mork (2008) 
also note that local employment level is highly visible to voters, thus being 
detrimental for politicians who are eager to keep the office. Contrary to that, the 
empirical research by Garrone et al. (2013) implies that political interests and 
political intervention has a minor role on local level. In this vein, we question the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7. Employment, indebtedness and investment decisions are altered in 
election periods to a greater extent for SOEs governed by local self-governments 
than SOEs governed by central governments due to higher political pressures at 
the local level. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
 
The data for SOEs from six countries of the former SFRY are extracted from 
Amadeus database. We define SOEs as enterprises whose ultimate owner is public 
authority, state or government with minimum 50.01% of direct or indirect 
ownership. Our definition is built upon two main literature findings. The first one 
is OECD definition for SOEs which implies that enterprises with 100% or majority 
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state ownership can be considered as state owned (OECD, 2015). The second one 
is related to level of political intervention being dependent upon level of state 
ownership. Wu et al. (2012) showed that enterprises with minority state ownership 
have lower number of political connections, thus probably facing the lower political 
pressures. The data from Table 3.1 confirm this trend for our sample. The decrease 
of state ownership and existence of significant private minority shareholder results 
in approximately 21% drop in the number of politically connected board members. 
Therefore, we have no reason to believe that inclusion of private enterprises with 
20%, 30% or 40% state ownership would be significant for our analysis.  
 
[Insert Table 3.1 about here] 
 
On the basis of country and ownership criteria 556 enterprises in the database are 
identified as state-owned. Following the previous literature, we delimit the sample 
by excluding bankrupt enterprises, enterprises from financial sector (e.g., banks, 
insurance enterprises), enterprises providing health, social and cultural services due 
to their non-commercial goals and enterprises with unavailable data.7 After 
applying all of these exclusions our final sample encompasses 200 SOEs.  
                                                          
7 We follow Goldeng et al. (2004) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) when it comes to exclusion of financial 
institutions. Following Bozec et al. (2002) we exclude enterprises with non-commercial goals. As suggested by 
Faccio (2010) for the enterprises to be included in our sample the data needs to be available.  
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We download the items from balance sheets and profit and loss statements as well 
as data on ownership, industry code, date of incorporation and number of 
employees for the period 2010-2014. Since the data in Amadeus is standardized we 
are not concerned about differences that may arise from differences in accounting 
systems of countries within our sample. The missing data was hand collected from 
annual reports of SOEs whenever the annual reports were publicly available. 
3.3.2 Variables and Measures 
 
In our study, we investigate whether the incumbent politicians manipulate SOE 
employment, indebtedness and investment decisions around election years to gain 
voters’ support. Following Menozzi et al. (2011), we use the natural logarithm of 
the number of employees to observe any upsurge or drop in the number of job 
placements within SOEs in election periods (Employees). The proxy for 
Indebtedness is the natural logarithm of account ‘creditors’ from balance sheet that 
includes all outstanding loan obligations of SOEs as well as any other types of debt 
such as subsidies, deferred payments for services or goods etc (e.g., Dewenter & 
Malatesta, 2001). The logarithm value is used and not the percentage change as we 
want to grasp the magnitude of government support and preferred treatment when 
incumbent’s future is on the line. The level of Investment is calculated as the 
difference of fixed assets at the end of the year and fixed assets at the beginning of 
the year scaled by the fixed assets at the beginning of the year (e.g., Li, Lin, & Xu, 
2016). We calculate Investment as a percentage change on the premise that only 
investment growth, and not the number per se, is going to be noticed by voters as a 
positive signal for the incumbent (e.g., Alok & Ayyagari, 2015). 
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As noted in the literature the politicians engage in pre-election manipulation when 
the benefits of such actions result in large political gains. Considering that their 
ultimate goal is winning the elections, the political manipulations and interventions 
should be more pronounced closer to the election year (Bertrand et al., 2007). For 
that reason and the fact that voters are myopic, we expect to observe adjustments 
of SOE corporate decisions in pre-election and/or election years. We employ 
Election as a dummy variable which takes value 1 in the year of parliamentary 
elections and 0 for other years.8 Furthermore, we employ Pre-election and 
Postelection variables. The Pre-election variable is a dummy variable which takes 
value 1 in a year prior to elections and 0 otherwise, while Postelection variable is a 
dummy variable which takes value 1 in a year after the elections and 0 in all other 
years.  
Additionally, we control for several enterprise and country level characteristics as 
they can influence our research results. We employ Enterprise size which is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Julio & 
Yook, 2012). We also control for the period of Enterprise existence equal to the 
natural logarithm of the difference between years under investigation and year of 
SOE incorporation (e.g., Goldeng et al., 2004; Sun et al., 2015; Tian & Lau, 2001). 
We do not include variables that represent constant or fixed enterprise 
characteristics (e.g., industry, level of state ownership) since these variables are 
omitted from fixed effects estimations as they are captured by the fixed effect term 
                                                          
8 Dummy variable for parliamentary elections takes value 1 for the following years and countries: 2010-
Bosnia and Herzegovina; 2011-Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Slovenia; 2012-Serbia, Montenegro; 2014-Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia. The dummy variable is time variant. 
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(e.g., Aivazian et al., 2005; Boubakri et al., 2012). Recognizing that certain 
development differences between the countries might exist, we control for the level 
of real country development through employment of GDP growth rate (e.g., 
Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001). 
Existence of political connections might increase the political pressure for SOEs, 
thus channelling its resources towards certain political objectives. Therefore, we 
control for Politically connected board which is calculated as the number of 
politically connected board members over the total number of board members. 
Following previous literature we define politically connected board members as: 
(1) individuals who hold or held position in central or local government, parliament 
or any other governmental body; (2) members of political party; (3) citizen 
representatives which participated in election cycles; (4) individuals who have close 
relationships (e.g., relatives, friends) with current/past government/parliament 
officials or political party representatives (e.g., Faccio, 2006, 2010; Menozzi et al., 
2011; Zheng et al., 2015).  
In the estimation of changes in number of employees we control for leverage and 
capital intensity. The previous research implies that SOEs are supported by 
governments through subsidized loans (e.g., Brandt & Zhu, 2000; Cull & Xu, 2005; 
Qian & Roland, 1996). Hence, we employ Leverage as the measure of long-term 
debt over equity (e.g., Faccio, 2010) since loans might be used to cover the increase 
in labour expenses. Capital intensity is industry proxy and labour intensity indicator 
which depicts whether the increase in number of employees is related to SOEs 
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dependence on human capital as production resource. It is calculated as fixed assets 
over total assets (e.g., Wu et al., 2012).  
For the indebtedness, the literature emphasises that existence of collateral impacts 
the enterprise ability to borrow funds. We therefore control for Tangible collateral 
which equals the sum of inventory and tangible fixed assets over total assets 
following the approach of Guedes and Opler (1996) and Boubakri et al. (2012). 
Moreover, since the past research studies imply that there is a positive relationship 
between cash flow and investment we employ Cash flow in our investment 
estimation (e.g., Bertero & Rondi, 2000). It is calculated as earnings before interest 
and tax (EBIT) over total assets (e.g., Julio & Yook, 2012). Additionally, we control 
for Leverage since borrowed funds can be used to finance certain investment 
projects. 
The ability of enterprises to raise a loan or create a new job placement is influenced 
by its Performance. Hence, we employ return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) as they reflect the realized performance and the benefits for owners (Barclay, 
Gode, & Kothari, 2005; Goldeng et al., 2004). ROA shows effectiveness of use of 
assets and it is calculated as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) over average 
total assets. As the proxy of shareholders’ return, ROE is equal to net income over 
average total equity. We compute ROA using EBIT as a proxy of current operating 
performance which is independent from tax, interest payments and depreciation. 
This is especially important when looking at performance of SOEs since some 
SOEs may be exempted from tax payments or have zero-interest loans/subsidies 
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(Bozec et al., 2002; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). Therefore, usage of net income 
for calculation of ROA in these cases would create distorted image about effective 
use of assets. Contrary to that, for calculation of ROE we use net income since 
shareholders are only interested in profits which are generated on the basis of their 
investments and can potentially be distributed to them. This approach is congruent 
with the approach undertaken in past research studies (e.g., Boardman & Vining, 
1989; Boubakri et al., 2008; Bozec et al., 2002; Ding et al., 2014; Hu & Leung, 
2012; Menozzi et al., 2011; O’Connel & Cramer, 2010). We also employ Sales as 





The method used in this chapter is fixed-effects panel data since we want to control 
for any unobserved enterprise specific characteristics as well as any differences that 
might arise among countries within our sample.9 Our method is similar to that of 
Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) and Dewenter and Malatesta 
(2001) since these two research studies investigate the impact of certain event on 
enterprise performance. We also considered using event study, but the fact that 
elections happened at different points in time and that they are not 
unpredictable/exogeneous events, creates limits in this regard. Hence, we follow 
closely the three-dummy method used by Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) in their 
investigation of the privatization-year impact on profitability, leverage and labour 
                                                          
9 Prior to our decision to employ fixed-effects, we run Durbin-Wu-Hausman test that shows better 
performance of fixed-effects model than random-effects model. 
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intensity. In order to investigate the alteration of employment, indebtedness and 
investment decisions around election years (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3) we run the 
following fixed effects models: 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑒‒ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡+ 
𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡       (3.1) 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑒‒ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽6𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡                   (3.2) 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑒‒ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡+ 
𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡       (3.3) 
where i is the SOE id, t is the year effect, α is the intercept and 𝑖,𝑡 denotes the error 
term. SOE specific fixed effects are captured by 𝑢𝑖, while time fixed effects are 
depicted by 𝛿𝑡. We use the three-dummy approach (i.e., Pre-election, Election, 
Postelection) as to alleviate any doubt that the SOE corporate decisions were 
manipulated because of election benefits for politicians and not some business 
fluctuations and/or economic circumstances. Moreover, the three-dummy approach 
provides us with a possibility to depict the exact timing of incumbent intervention 
as well as dynamics of election induced political cycles. The significant coefficients 
for Pre-election and Election variables will indicate that incumbent politicians 
manipulate SOEs as to increase their re-election chances.  
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The fact that elections are recurring events which happen in different years enables 
us to suspend any global/regional movements in employment, indebtedness and 
investment levels. Furthermore, this allows us to separate the election effect from 
the time effect (e.g., Dahlberg & Mork, 2008). The time effect in countries with no 
elections can be used as a counterfactual for the time effect that would be present 
in countries with elections if elections were not held. Additionally, since the timing 
of elections is exogenous to any individual enterprise and is determined by the 
constitutional law, or some extraordinary political/economic conditions in case of 
the early elections, we do not have to be concerned about reverse causality issues.  
We re-estimate the above stated models in two sets of sub-samples without the 
variable Politically connected board. To test Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 we divide our 
sample on the basis of the number of politically connected board members. The 
politically dominated boards have the incentive to alter corporate decisions of SOEs 
as to provide the support for re-election of the incumbent politician, thus securing 
their board membership. Therefore, SOEs with politically dominated boards suffer 
from greater political interventions which may cause significant manipulations of 
SOEs’ corporate decisions.  
The threshold for politically dominated boards is based on critical mass theory since 
the percentage should represent a considerable minority of board members. The 
theory implies that a certain number of board members with same or similar 
characteristics is needed to impact/change board decision-making processes 
(Dahlerup, 1988; Kanter, 1977). The theory at first was used for women 
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representation in corporations but it was later applied in political, academia, 
judiciary and many other contexts. Kanter (1977) explains that minority members 
with similar characteristics are potential allies that can jointly change group 
decisions. We consider boards with more than 25% of politically connected board 
members as politically dominated. In our research context with average board size 
of five individuals, 25% implies more than one politically connected board member, 
constituting in that way considerable minority.  
SOEs governed by local self-governments may suffer from greater political 
pressures. The political career of local politicians is highly dependent on their 
commitment to increase the local employment and growth as noted by Li and Zhou 
(2005). For that reason, we depict SOEs governed by government and SOEs 
governed by local self-governments as to be able to test Hypothesis 7. 
3.3.4 Sample and summary statistics  
 
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for our sample. SOEs in six countries of the 
former SFRY employ on average 667 employees and exist for 28 years. Their 
average level of Indebtedness is approximately EUR 9.8 million with long-term 
debt accounting for 28% of equity. The negative cash flows imply the mismatch 
between expenses and income. This can be a consequence of the inefficient credit 
management, while in the case of SOEs it might be the sign of over indebtedness. 
The high coefficients for Capital intensity and Tangible collateral imply that the 
tangible fixed assets dominate the SOE assets structure with 65% and 64% 
respectively. Confirmation of the standing that SOEs are politically dominated in 
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the case of our sample comes from the fact that half of the board members are 
politically connected.  
 
[Insert Table 3.2 about here] 
 
Figures 3.1 to 3.3 provide an overview of the average number of employees, level 
of indebtedness and investments by country and year. Figure 3.1 suggests that 
fluctuations in the average number of employees in each of the countries are 
present. We notice that in six out of ten election years there is an increase in the 
average number of employees. Changes in average indebtedness levels are more 
obvious as shown on Figure 3.2. The increase is observed in six election years and 
three postelection years. In Serbia and Slovenia, we observe significant increases 
of indebtedness levels in one of the election years. The average investments 
presented on Figure 3.3 fluctuate to a smaller extent, but we can still observe their 
increase in five election years. 
 
[Insert Figure 3.1 about here] 
 





[Insert Figure 3.3 about here] 
 
The correlation coefficients from Table 3.3 do not raise concerns regarding 
multicollinearity. 
 
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
 
3.4 Empirical results and discussion 
 
The results for the relationship between SOE corporate decisions and elections are 
presented in Table 3.4. They reveal that incumbent politicians use corporate 
decisions of SOEs in order to boost their re-election prospects. The results indicate 
that politicians engage in pre-election manipulation of SOEs’ employment 
decisions since the number of Employees increases between 9.7% and 12.4% in 
Pre-election years. The increase is even more profound in Election years when the 
upsurge in job placements is between 10.8% and 13.2%. The low level of 
significance and lower coefficients (between 4.2% and 7.4%) in Postelection years 
clearly indicate that increase of employment within SOEs is election driven. 
Therefore, our results support Hypothesis 1 implying the existence of political 
intervention and election induced political employment cycles within SOEs. 
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Moreover, the findings suggest that the only purpose of employment decision 
manipulation is the interim satisfaction of the voters (Alesina & Tabellini, 2007). 
The incumbents being aware of the fact that voters react positively to the news about 
job creation (Bertrand et al., 2007) use SOEs for the quick boost of employment in 
pre-election and election years with the prospect of their reappointment. After 
winning the elections, the increase of employment is significantly lower since over-
employment in the long-run might lead to numerous inefficiencies (Bertrand et al., 
2007). The results are also in line with the findings of Labonne (2016) suggesting 
that employment in municipalities increases in two pre-electoral quarters.  
 
[Insert Table 3.4 about here] 
 
Table 3.4 also reveals that there is a highly significant and positive impact of pre-
election years on Indebtedness of SOEs. In Pre-election years the level of debt, 
subsidies and differed payments increases by approximately 29%, while in Election 
and Postelection years the significant change is absent. Therefore, our results 
indicate that incumbents eager to win elections increase SOEs’ Indebtedness in Pre-
election years, thus providing support for Hypothesis 2. These findings also show 
that SOEs’ indebtedness decisions are manipulated prior to elections since their 
change does not have an instant and visible result which is recognizable by the 
voters. The change of SOEs’ indebtedness might be in anticipation of the higher 
fixed-costs related to creation of new job placements and/or a need to create 
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opportunities for new investments. The increase in number of Employees in Pre-
election and Election years generates new fixed costs which can hardly be covered 
from the regular operations of SOEs. The payments of such fixed costs would 
seriously jeopardize SOEs’ functioning. For that reason, the incumbents might be 
incentivized to amend SOEs’ indebtedness decisions in years prior to elections as 
to be able to increase employment and create conditions based on which they will 
be re-elected. On the other hand, the incumbents might decide to increase SOEs’ 
investments which cannot be financed from the internally generated capital 
(Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001) or they might have to use the debt as to rescue failing 
projects (Musacchio et al., 2015a). As found by Aivazian et al. (2005) SOEs raise 
loans as to finance investments. 
The Election and Postelection years have a low significant impact on Investment 
levels of SOEs. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3 as well as theory which 
predicts that politicians manipulate SOEs’ investment decisions as to garner voters 
support. Moreover, our results are in line with the findings of study by Alok and 
Ayyagari (2015) which entail that the likelihood of the project announcements by 
SOEs is larger in election years than in non-election years. Chattopadhyay and 
Duflo (2004) and Wolfers (2002) noted that incumbents have the incentive to 
pressurize SOEs to boost investments when it is politically relevant. As mentioned 
above, the voters’ decision for whom to vote depends on investment levels as a 
precondition for economic growth. Considering the fact that private enterprises 
reduce their investments around election years due to high levels of uncertainty 
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(Gulen & Ion, 2016; Jens, 2016; Julio & Yook, 2012), the incumbents’ only option 
for increase of investments is political manipulation of SOEs’ investment decisions.  
Some of the enterprise specific features appear to be important as well. The longer 
the Enterprise existence is, the greater is its Indebtedness as well as the Investment 
levels. Furthermore, bigger SOEs are able to employ the greater number of 
employees and their ability to raise loans, gain subsidies or differ payments because 
of their market power raises. SOE performance seems to be insignificant for 
corporate decisions, thus indirectly confirming that political intervention within 
SOEs induces election driven corporate decisions. Capital intensity seems to be 
insignificant for employment levels within SOEs, thus showing that changes in the 
number of employees are not related to SOE dependence on human capital. The 
insignificant coefficient for Tangible collateral confirms that SOEs with their 
preferential access to loans and government guarantees do not need collateral for 
securing the loans (Charumilind, Kali, & Wiwattanakantang, 2006).  
The significant negative relationship between the GDP growth and SOE’s number 
of Employees and Indebtedness confirms some of the findings of Boubakri et al. 
(2012). On the one hand, the positive change of the GDP growth rate indicates better 
market conditions and better state of the economy as a whole. Due to increased 
economic growth, SOEs are able to accumulate internally generated capital for their 
investment activities, thus lowering their need for loans, subsidies and deferred 
payments. On the other hand, in countries with low GDP growth rates job 
placements within SOEs are observed as a secure option which provides a secure 
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income relative to the private sector. The increase of GDP growth rates usually 
indicates the strengthening of the private sector which becomes more plausible 
option for employment, thus leading to decrease in number of employees within 
SOEs. This is confirmed by Wilson (2012) who showed that governments lean 
towards employment increase when serious drop in economic growth is observed. 
The percentage of Politically connected board members seems to be significant for 
all three dependent variables (Table 3.4). Ten percent increase in Politically 
connected board members results in approximately 2% increase in number of 
Employees, 5% increase in Indebtedness and 10% decrease in Investment. The 
positive association with employment and indebtedness confirms the findings of 
previous studies. Bertrand et al. (2007) and Wolfers (2002) show that politically 
connected managers have the incentive to create more jobs. Moreover, Faccio 
(2010) suggests that greater number of political connections results in higher 
leverage levels. The negative association with investments stems from the fact that 
politically connected managers distort efficiency of capital allocation within 
enterprises (Chen et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2013). In the case of SOEs this is usually 
the consequence of undertaking the politically expedient projects with negative 
values (Cavaliere & Scabrosetti, 2008; Musacchio et al, 2015a). 
To further investigate the impact of political connections we analyse whether SOEs 
with politically dominated boards behave differently in election periods relative to 
SOEs with non-politically dominated boards. The results in Table 3.5 reveal that 
only SOEs with politically dominated boards increase the number of Employees in 
140 
 
Election and Postelection years with effect being more profound in Election years, 
thus supporting Hypothesis 4. The politically connected board members increase 
employment as this helps the re-election prospects of the incumbent (Wolfers, 
2002). Contrary to that, the number of Employees within SOEs with non-politically 
dominated boards is determined by Enterprise size and Capital intensity and it is 
not altered in election periods. Politicians via their political connections exert 
significant positive impact on employment levels (Menozzi et al., 2011). 
 
[Insert Table 3.5 about here] 
 
The Indebtedness seems to increase in Pre-election and Election years for SOEs 
with politically dominated and non-politically dominated boards as presented in 
Table 3.5. The insignificance of Postelection for Indebtedness confirms election-
related manipulation of SOEs’ decisions. Furthermore, the positive significant 
upsurge in the level of loans, subsidies and deferred payments (Indebtedness) in 
Pre-election years is more profound for SOEs with politically dominated boards, 
thus providing support for Hypothesis 5. This finding is in line with previous 
research which entails that enterprises with political connections rely heavily on 
debt (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2012; Cull & Xu, 2005; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Khwaja 
& Mian, 2005). Politicians are incentivized to increase SOEs’ indebtedness as to be 
able to finance investment projects which are one of the underlying factors of the 
voters’ support. The low significant postelection increase of investments might 
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indicate that increase of SOEs’ indebtedness was used for some other political re-
election mechanisms. Thus, we acknowledge that our results do not support 
Hypothesis 6. The results for control variables are consistent with results for the 
whole sample. 
The last step of our analysis reveals discrepancies in manipulation of SOEs’ 
corporate decisions in election periods which might be dependent upon the level of 
governmental governance. Results in Table 3.6 clearly indicate that SOEs governed 
by central governments increase the number of Employees in Pre-election and 
Election years, thus disclosing the presence of election induced employment cycles. 
Contrary to that, it can be noted that for SOEs governed by local self-governments 
such adjustments of employment levels cannot be observed. Moreover, alteration 
of Indebtedness decisions in Pre-election and Election years is only present within 
SOEs governed by local self-governments. The results related to Investment levels 
indicate that only in Postelection years at the local level the positive change is 
observed. Therefore, we acknowledge that our results partially support Hypothesis 
7 and that further analysis in this regard is needed. 
 
[Insert Table 3.6 about here] 
 
The explanation for the above stated results can be related to visibility of SOEs. 
SOEs governed by the central governments are mostly large enterprises being 
142 
 
continuously in the focus of the public (O’Connel, 1995). On the one hand, increase 
in employment within these SOEs would be accompanied with news headlines, 
gaining a lot of publicity and providing incumbents with the propaganda which 
wins over the votes. On the other hand, increase of indebtedness in election periods 
for SOEs governed by central governments would raise questions about the purpose 
of those funds especially bearing in mind that change of investments is not observed 
in the same period. Additionally, the absence of increase in employment levels 
amongst SOEs governed by local self-governments can be related to election 
dynamics. Walder (1995) explains that local incumbents straightforwardly 
encounter all the benefits and/or costs of enterprise operations at the local level. 
Local politicians are exposed to the highest political pressures in years of local 
elections. Therefore, they may opt to increase employment around local elections 
instead of parliamentary elections as this provides them with the greatest political 
gains. The result for investments is contrary to findings of Allok and Ayyagari 
(2015) who show that the number of investment projects increases in election years 
and is 10% higher for locally governed SOEs relative to those that are centrally 
governed. For that reason, our results may indicate that funds raised by SOEs in 
pre-election and election years are used for other re-election mechanisms.  
In order to test the robustness of our results we re-estimate our models with several 
variables being replaced. First, we use GDP per capita growth rate instead of GDP 
growth rate as suggested by Boubakri et al. (2012). We also use total debt over 
equity as an alternative measure of leverage and fixed assets over total assets as 
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enterprise size measure. The fixed effects re-estimations provide us with consistent 
results supporting our analysis and arguments presented in this section. 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
The past research on pre-election manipulation focuses mainly on alteration of 
macroeconomic variables and economic policies despite the fact that incumbent 
politicians have numerous levers for influencing economic conditions. Our study 
shifts that focus towards micro level political business cycles which encompass 
political intervention, manipulation and alteration of SOEs’ corporate decisions 
around election times. We examine whether incumbents in pre-election and election 
years use corporate decisions of SOEs as to increase their re-election prospects.  
Our results uncover that politicians engage in pre-election manipulation of SOE 
employment decisions since the increase in number of employees is greatest in pre-
election year. We also find that SOEs’ indebtedness decisions are manipulated prior 
to elections as to create opportunities for new investments and/or cover the costs of 
new job placements. The level of SOEs’ investments increases in election and 
postelection years. Furthermore, for SOEs with politically dominated boards we 
observe more profound changes of employment and leverage levels. The 
manipulations of employment levels are present within SOEs governed by central 
governments, while political intervention regarding indebtedness and investment 
levels is more profound within SOEs governed by local self-governments. 
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Our research findings have several important implications for literature and 
policymakers. First, they reveal that SOEs’ corporate decisions are used by the 
incumbents as an informal lever for increase in the likelihood of their 
reappointment, thus implying the existence of enterprise level opportunistic 
business cycles. Second, our study shows one of the reverse channels through which 
benefits are streamlined from enterprises to politicians. These findings provide an 
important implication for political embeddedness theory as they suggest that 
politically connected boards grant election favours to politicians through 
manipulation of SOE corporate decisions. Third, policymakers should entrust 
governance of SOEs to independent institutions as to impede political influence 
over their corporate decisions. Moreover, through adoption of four-year 
government plans on employment, indebtedness and investment, policymakers 
would limit the possibilities for adoption of short-term election-driven political 
decisions.  
The research presented in this study can be extended in several ways. First, our 
research focused on the relationship between elections and SOE corporate decisions 
since the incumbent politicians have a direct channel for political intervention. 
Further research might focus on presence/absence of changes within corporate 
decisions of private enterprises around election times as to determine whether 
political influence is ownership related. Second, in our study we do not track the 
link between indebtedness and investment levels due to data limitations. Such 
analysis would provide us with a more nuanced picture of whether increase of SOE 
indebtedness is used for real investment purposes or hidden election campaign 
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goals. Third, the research could be replicated in the context of other developed, 
developing, emerging and/or transition countries as to establish whether the 
findings are more generally applicable. In that way, certain institutional or 
developmental factors might be depicted as crucial for the existence of same or 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2  
Descriptive statistics 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for key variables. The sample covers 200 state-owned enterprises from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia for the period 2010-2014. Panel A reports the  
summary statistics for state-owned enterprises’ corporate decision variables. Employees is calculated as natural logarithm of 
the total number of employees (non-logarithm value reported). Indebtedness is calculated as natural logarithm of creditors 
including all loans as well as any other type of debt such as subsidies, deferred payments of services or goods etc (non-
logarithm value reported). Investment is calculated as the difference between fixed assets at the end of year and fixed assets 
at the beginning of the year divided by fixed assets at the beginning of year. In panel B the summary statistics for election 
variables are reported. Pre-election is a dummy variable which takes value 1 in a year prior to parliamentary elections. 
Election is a dummy variable which takes value 1 in years of parliamentary elections. Postelection is a dummy variable which 
takes value 1 in a year after parliamentary elections. Panel C reports the summary statistics for control variables. GDP growth 
is the real GDP growth rate. Enterprise existence is natural logarithm of the difference between years under investigation and 
year of SOE incorporation (non-logarithm value reported). Enterprise size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Politically 
connected board is the percentage of the politically connected board members and is equal to the number of politically 
connected board members over total number of board members. Capital intensity is the industry proxy calculated as fixed 
assets over total assets. Leverage is equal to long-term debt over shareholders’ equity. Tangible collateral is equal to net 
inventory (tangible fixed assets + stock) over total assets. Cash flow is EBIT over total assets. ROA is EBIT over average 























Variable Mean Median Std Obs 
Panel A: SOE corporate decisions 
Employees 666.67 4830.00 1506.40 985 
Indebtedness 9815.30 2667.50 23638.84 840 
Investment 48.21 21.04 1214.28 635 
Panel B: Political interference measures 
Pre-election 0.27 0.00 0.45 996 
Election 0.34 0.00 0.47 996 
Postelection 0.20 0.00 0.40 996 
Panel C: Control variables 
GDP growth 0.27 0.65 1.71 996 
Enterprise existence 28.01 21.00 23.40 973 
Enterprise size 10.14 10.11 2.22 970 
Politically connected board 0.52 0.57 0.29 915 
Capital intensity 0.65 0.73 0.27 840 
Leverage 0.28 0.31 0.46 813 
Tangible collateral 0.64 0.69 0.26 808 
Cash flow -0.01 0.00 0.08 975 
ROA -0.01 0.00 0.09 970 
ROE -0.05 -0.02 0.22 953 




Average number of employees by country and year 
 
Notes: This figure shows the average number of employees employed by SOEs in each of the countries and each of the years.  
 
Figure 3.2 
Average level of indebtedness by country and year 
 
Notes: This figure shows the average level of SOE indebtedness in each of the countries observed and each of the years. The 
level of indebtedness is account ‘creditors’ from balance sheet that includes all outstanding loan obligations of SOEs as well 
as any other types of debt such as subsidies, deferred payments for services or goods etc. 
Figure 3.3 
Average level of investments by country and year 
 
Notes: This figure shows the average level of SOE investments in each of the countries observed and each of the years. The 
investment level is calculated as the difference of fixed assets at the end of the year and fixed assets at the beginning of the 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4  
The relationship between corporate decisions and elections 
Notes: The table presents the results for the relationship between SOEs’ corporate decisions on employment, indebtedness and 
investment and election cycles. Fixed effects panel data was used. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all 
regressions constant term is estimated but not reported. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In Panel 
1 the dependent variable is Employees which is calculated as natural logarithm of the total number of employees. In Panel 2, the 
dependent variable is Indebtedness which is calculated as natural logarithm of creditors including all loans as well as any other 
type of debt such as subsidies, deferred payments of services or goods etc. In Panel 3, the dependent variable is Investment which 
is calculated as the difference between fixed assets at the end of the year and fixed assets at the beginning of the year divided by 
fixed assets at the beginning of year. Pre-election is a dummy variable which takes value 1 in a year prior to parliamentary 
elections. Election is a dummy variable which takes value 1 in years of parliamentary elections. Postelection is a dummy variable 
which takes value 1 in a year after parliamentary elections. GDP growth is the real GDP growth rate. Enterprise existence is 
natural logarithm of the difference between years under investigation and year of SOE incorporation. Enterprise size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Politically connected board is the percentage of the politically connected board members and is equal 
to the number of politically connected board members over the total number of board members. Capital intensity is the industry 
proxy calculated as fixed assets over total assets. Leverage is equal to long-term debt over shareholders’ equity. Tangible 
collateral is equal to net inventory (tangible fixed assets + stock) over total assets. Cash flow is EBIT over total assets. ROA is 








 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 
 Employees Indebtedness Investment 
Pre-election  0.097** 0.124** 0.121** 0.284*** 0.292*** 0.291*** 0.090 
 (0.046) (0.062) (0.060) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.117) 
Election  0.108** 0.132** 0.127** 0.138 0.230*** 0.137 0.213* 
 (0.043) (0.059) (0.058) (0.092) (0.078) (0.093) (0.148) 
Postelection 0.042* 0.074* 0.073* 0.030 0.111 0.041 0.187* 
 (0.023) (0.038) (0.037) (0.080) (0.070) (0.081) (0.118) 
GDP growth -0.018** -0.024** -0.024** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.058*** 0.034 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.049) 
Enterprise 
existence 
0.030 0.013 -0.084 0.393 1.170*** 0.287 0.755* 
 (0.201) (0.196) (0.181) (0.665) (0.399) (0.676) (0.797) 
Enterprise size 0.211 0.217* 0.225* 0.497*** 0.439*** 0.475*** -0.874** 
 (0.137) (0.121) (0.116) (0.165) (0.154) (0.167) (0.396) 
Politically 
connected board  
(t-1) 
0.199** 0.247** 0.218** 0.632** 0.537** 0.621** -0.654* 
 (0.099) (0.121) (0.106) (0.266) (0.247) (0.267) (0.398) 
Capital intensity -0.689 -0.850 -0.837     
 (0.639) (0.793) (0.868)     
Leverage (t-1) 0.067 0.096 0.078    0.083 
 (0.075) (0.086) (0.076)    (0.064) 
Tangible collateral    -0.239 -0.193 -0.209  
    (0.468) (0.441) (0.485)  
Cash flow (t-1)       0.047 
       (0.095) 
ROA (t-1) 1.244   0.388    
 (1.017)   (0.514)    
ROE(t-1)  0.234   -0.296   
  (0.270)   (0.205)   
Sales(t-1)   0.078*   0.152  
   (0.043)   (0.118)  
No. of Obs. 533 534 533 528 513 527 346 
F 1.92 1.86 2.08 3.71 4.63 3.81 1.70 
Prob>F 0.046 0.054 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Importance of Board Members’ Professional 






Empirical research recognizes that board of directors (board) is one of the crucial 
corporate governance mechanisms that influences enterprise performance. Bertrand 
and Schoar (2003) explain that enterprise behaviour can vary due to idiosyncratic 
differences between board members. With development of upper echelons theory, 
the first to recognize this notion are Hambrick and Mason (1984). The theory states 
that strategic decisions and enterprise performance are influenced by decision 
makers’ background characteristics. Moreover, idiosyncratic experiences lead to 
different information interpretation, thus affecting decision-making processes and 
performance. The professional experience and knowledge of individual board 
members determine the role of the board as well as their ability to pinpoint financial 
and performance issues (Xiao, Dahya, & Lin, 2004). 
156 
 
Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay and Zhao (2011) suggest that heterogeneous boards in 
terms of their occupation, education, knowledge and skills provide larger number 
of viewpoints, more oversight and better monitoring. It is argued that heterogeneity 
in terms of professional, technical and social backgrounds enable managers to tap 
into a broader advice and knowledge pool (Klein, 1998; Watson, Johnson, & 
Merritt, 1998). Moreover, diverse expertise of board members enables extensive 
discussions, greater problem scrutiny and in-depth assessments of decision 
consequences (Berger, Kick, & Schaeck, 2014). Contrary to that, board 
homogeneity might result in group thinking and uniform decision deliberation 
(Janis, 1982; Ujinwa, Okoyeuzu, & Nwokoby, 2012). Furthermore, Francis, Hasan 
and Qiang (2015) explain that boards dominated by individuals with same 
qualifications inherently focus on same details, thus potentially omitting valuable 
facts. Therefore, we contend that board ability to monitor managers and provide 
resources is highly dependent upon board capacity in terms of experience, level of 
education and established connections.  
The interest for the so-called boards’ “black box” (Lawrence, 1997; Leblanc, 2004) 
triggered research about board features as to identify the optimal board structure 
with greatest positive impact on performance. Thus far, the vast majority of 
research studies has investigated board independence and certain board 
demographics. The main focus was on the performance impact of independent 
board members (e.g., Devos et al., 2009, Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988), board size 
(e.g., Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007), differences between insiders and 
outsiders (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Daily, 1995; Jensen & Zajac, 2004), board 
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gender impact (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009) and tenure (e.g., Hambrick, 
Geletkanycz, & Frederickson, 1993). The empirical evidence provided by these 
studies is ambiguous and inconclusive. Despite the fact that policymakers and 
academics considered these board characteristics as proxies of board quality, some 
recent evidence shows that specific types of board members might be more 
important. 
The capability of board members to monitor and provide credible advice is affected 
by their individual occupations as found by Bazerman and Schoorman (1983). 
CEOs or board members of other private enterprises usually possess the well-
established professional track record (Jermias & Gani, 2014). With their board 
participation practical and up-to-date information is brought to the table, thus 
reducing market scanning costs. On the other hand, government officials provide a 
direct flow of information regarding government regulation while at the same time 
increasing enterprise chances of influencing government policies (Boyd, 1990; 
Hillman, 2005; Pfeffer, 1972). Moreover, the research implies that government 
officials usually possess above average negotiating skills (Jermias & Gani, 2014). 
Contribution of university professors is related to their specialized expertise, 
profound research understanding and consulting capabilities (Francis et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, Audretsch and Lehmann (2006) suggest that participation of 
professors on boards enables knowledge-spillover absorption, thus boosting 
efficiency of certain in-house processes.  
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The presence of these three distinctive groups of professionals is likely to positively 
affect managers’ decision making and improve enterprise performance (Jermias & 
Gani, 2014). Furthermore, skills and expertise of these individuals enhance board 
monitoring, they enable establishment of links to essential resources as well as 
facilitation of board advisory function (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1994; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The primary focus of previous research studies is on private 
enterprises, board member independence and board demographics. Hence, we try 
to address this gap through examination of the relationship between board 
members’ profession and SOE performance/operating costs10.  
By disentangling work/experience heterogeneity of SOE board members we try to 
depict how individuals working within private sector, those working as professors 
and government officials affect SOE performance and operating costs. 
Furthermore, we provide a more nuanced picture on how performance and 
operating costs might be influenced by the intertwined effect of the SOE board 
members’ professional background and political connections. In our study we also 
analyse whether effects of board capital and political capital balance each other out 
or their overall effect improves/deteriorates SOE performance.  
Using panel data fixed effects, the analysis is performed on a hand-collected dataset 
of 200 SOEs, from 2010 to 2014, in six countries of the former SFRY. The decision 
to investigate these countries is related to their governments’ commitment to cut 
                                                          
10 The measure of operating costs includes the cost of goods sold. 
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public debt and ensure adoption of good corporate governance practices within 
SOEs. After global economic crisis the enhancement of SOEs’ performance became 
one of the main priorities for governments of these countries. The governments 
were faced with serious budget deficits and high levels of public debt. For example, 
the overall direct adverse effect of SOEs on public finances in Serbia, in the period 
2010-2014, reached 3% of GDP or €1 billion annually (Fiscal Council of the 
Republic of Serbia, 2014). In addition, numerous reports emphasize the importance 
of SOE board professionalisation and depoliticisation in all six countries 
irrespective of their EU status (Council of the European Union, 2014; European 
Commission, 2012; Foundation for the Advancement of Economics, 2015). 
Petrovic and Sonje (2016) in their analysis of Croatian SOEs explain that 
appointment of experienced and knowledgeable board members is a precondition 
for their successful performance. Therefore, we believe that these countries provide 
a well justified setting for examination of the relationship between board members’ 
professional background and SOE performance. 
Our results imply that board members coming from private enterprises are 
positively related to SOE operating costs, thus having negative association with 
ROE for the overall sample. Contrary to that, we observe negative relationship 
between government representatives and SOE operational efficiency. Furthermore, 
presence of professors on SOE boards is positively associated with financial 
performance. The findings also reveal that magnitude of these associations 
increases with board members being politically connected. Individuals working for 
private enterprises or as professors are positively related to operational efficiency 
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and operating costs of SOEs with minority private ownership. For SOEs with 100% 
state ownership we depict negative association between government officials and 
operating performance. We further find that profession of board members is 
insignificant for manufacturing SOEs. Finally, board and political capital exhibit 
positive relationship with SOE financial performance. 
Our study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, we 
complement the empirical research on the relationship between board 
characteristics and various aspects of enterprise performance. We point out that 
board member heterogeneity beyond independence (e.g., Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1988) and demographic characteristics (e.g., Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 
2010; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Masulis et al., 2012) has important implications for 
SOE performance. More specifically, our findings imply that board-performance 
relationship is influenced by individual board member experience, level of 
education and political connections. Second, this study enriches understanding of 
the upper echelons theory by providing evidence that board members’ background 
characteristics impact performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Third, we extend 
the research that examines how presence of specific types of individuals on boards 
affects decision-making processes, and thus performance (e.g., Litov, Sepe, & 
Whitehead, 2013; Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012). Our study uncovers that individuals 
working for private enterprises, professors and governments’ officials have 
differentiating effects on financial and operating performance of SOEs.  
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Findings of our study might also have important practical implications regarding 
SOE policies and board member structure. On a general note, governments need to 
devote greater attention to development of SOE board appointment criteria which 
would ensure the quality of individuals performing board duty. Specifically, 
findings indicate that professors and individuals from private enterprises as SOE 
board members enhance performance.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review 
of relevant literature and develops hypotheses about the impact of board members’ 
professional backgrounds on SOE performance. Section 4.3 describes our dataset 
and explains econometric approach. Main findings are discussed in Section 4.4, 
while concluding remarks and implications for future research are presented in 
Section 4.5. 
4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
Board functions and roles envisaged by theories are not performed in the same way 
by boards of different enterprises. In order to address this issue and on the premise 
of bounded rationality, Hambrick and Mason (1984) built the upper echelons 
theory. They acknowledge that individuals’ characteristics could potentially yield 
an explanation for distinct performance outcomes. The theory asserts that 
experience, values and character of individual board members creates personalized 
construal based on which they process information and evaluate strategic situations. 
Hence, board processes are a resultant of collective experiences, capabilities and 
their interactions (Hambrick, 2007). Contrary to the narrow neoclassical view of 
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homogenous managers being perfect substitutes for each other, Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) emphasize the heterogeneity of managers styles.  
A growing body of theoretical evidence suggests that board heterogeneity/diversity 
influences efficiency of board decision making, thus indirectly impacting the 
overall enterprise performance (Anderson et al., 2011; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 
2003; Gul et al., 2011). Individual board member perspectives are built on personal 
work-related experiences and knowledge (Smith et al., 1994). Thus, they enable 
wider and more thorough appraisal of alternatives resulting in the most effective 
course of action (Ujinwa et al., 2012). Diversity pushes boards away from group-
thinking and puts problems under greater scrutiny increasing in that way the quality 
of decisions made (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002; Doz & Kosonen, 2007; Zenger & 
Lawrence, 1989;). Additionally, Carter et al. (2003) show that heterogeneous 
boards increase enterprise financial value through establishment of innovation 
culture and better understanding of marketplace. Clearly, theoretical standings 
support the notion that board diversity can have positive implications for numerous 
processes which could enhance performance. Therefore, we ask: which board 
characteristics matter in this regard? 
Board diversity stems from variety of individual board member demographic and 
social attributes. Kang, Cheng and Gray (2007) explain that these attributes can be 
divided into two major groups: (1) directly observable characteristics (e.g., age, 
gender, independence); and (2) less observable characteristics (e.g., educational and 
occupational background). From this basic division we can justify the fact of having 
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numerous studies which tackle only the impact of observable characteristics on 
enterprise performance. The average board age has an effect on strategy change 
(e.g., Golden & Zajac, 2001; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) and it changes the 
environmental governance structures (e.g., Post et al., 2011). The empirical 
evidence regarding gender suggests that female board members are better at 
supervisory roles (e.g., Carter et al., 2010). Masulis et al. (2012) show that foreign 
directors are negatively associated with enterprise performance due to the lack of 
board meeting attendance.  
Another board dimension that was vastly debated is independence. The rationale is 
that enterprises should appoint board members without connections to their 
organization in order to strengthen the level of monitoring. Adams, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2010) provide literature review in this regard which reveals that effects 
of independent board members on performance are still obscure and unclear since 
majority of these studies fail to report any significant relationship.11 The reason 
stemming behind might be related to the fact that observable characteristics are 
valid proxies of board member behaviour but insufficient and incomplete 
(Hambrick, 2007). Thus, researchers need to tap into the boards’ “black-box” 
(Lawrence, 1997) as to examine how board member occupational and educational 
                                                          
11 Research studies of Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Bhagat and Black (2002), Klein (1998), Mehran 
(1995), Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996), Kren and Kerr (1997) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) fail to report 




background influences their strategic choices, decision making and performance of 
enterprises.  
Diverse occupations and educational backgrounds result in quite distinct and 
sometimes even unique mindsets of individuals. For that reason, individual board 
members observe discussions and problem-solving from their own perspectives, 
thus advancing board thinking (Waine & Green, 2009). Wang, Jin and Yang (2016) 
assert that boards comprised of professionals with appropriate knowledge and 
expertise should have greater capacity for performance enhancement. This might 
stem from the fact that occupational characteristics of board members determine 
their capabilities for monitoring and supervision (Beasley, 1996; Monks & Minow, 
1995). Moreover, experienced board members are in a better position to identify 
issues related to management misbehaviour or financial performance (Xiao et al., 
2004). Contrary to that, Simons and Pelled (1999) report that experience diversity 
of executives has negative impact on performance because of the informal 
communication between top managers.  
When it comes to occupational background, researchers primarily investigated how 
certain professions impact performance and/or financial position of enterprises. 
Bankers as directors seem to be associated with greater leverage and lower costs of 
financing (e.g., Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012). Litov et al. (2013) find that lawyers reduce 
enterprise risk-taking and increase enterprise value. Moreover, directors’ profession 
appears to exhibit positive effect on economic performance having a wider impact 
than age and gender (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011). Board members with specific 
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industry knowledge are positively associated with sales growth (e.g., Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009) while increasing likelihood of lawsuits (e.g., Kassinis & 
Vafeas, 2002).  
Almost all empirical studies about professional diversity are related to private 
enterprises even though SOEs face much greater monitoring challenges. Therefore, 
in our research we question whether differences in occupational and educational 
backgrounds of individual board members might create some distinctive effects on 
SOE performance. We distinguish professional backgrounds of SOE board 
members on the basis of classification developed by Hillman, Cannella and 
Paetzold (2000). Their classification depicts three main groups of external board 
members based on the skills and resources that these individuals possess. 
Executives (i.e., CEOs or current/former top managers of large private enterprises) 
are labelled as “business experts”. These individuals have good network of 
connections, they provide alternative solutions for problems and their expertise is 
related to competition and efficient decision making. Law, banking and public 
relation experts are “support specialists” as they provide easy access to some of the 
crucial resources (e.g., legal support, loans) and they enable strong channels of 
communication. The third group are “community influencers” (i.e., political 
leaders, university professors, leaders of community organizations) that provide 
enterprises with non-market perspectives and influence among some powerful 
society groups.  
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Building on Hillman et al. (2000) classification and findings of the previous 
theoretical and empirical works we hypothesize about the impact of three distinct 
groups of individuals which comprise SOE boards. Namely, we recognize the 
differences in skills, knowledge and expertise that government representatives, 
professors and individuals from private enterprises bring to boards. With such 
classification we try to answer the question of whether all three depicted groups 
have appropriate knowledge and expertise that contributes to creation of 
meaningful strategy and better performance (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001).  
 
4.2.1 Government representatives and SOE performance 
 
Appointment of government representatives to SOE boards is a logical extension 
of SOEs’ governance process. However, governments may observe SOE board 
membership as a perfect reward tool for the most important and loyal supporters. 
Usually, these supporters lack the appropriate knowledge and competences being 
unable to provide the added value (Vagliasindi, 2008a; World Bank, 2014a). 
Furthermore, these incompetent board members might be enticed to favour certain 
political objectives which incur high costs (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Stiglitz & 
Atkinson, 1980). Government officials might not be accustomed to open-minded 
discussions since they do not have the necessary experience which would enable 
them to function as successful peers of executives from private sector (Frederick, 
2011).  
Characteristics of individuals appointed to SOE boards and their board involvement 
can ultimately affect the functioning and performance of SOEs. Back in 1949, 
167 
 
Selznick noticed that enterprises co-opt government officials to their boards to 
establish a firm connection with government. Baysinger (1984) builds on this 
argument and explains that these practices of enterprises are in line with their 
intention to create favorable policy environment for their business operations. As 
board members, government officials can be biased in certain processes that could 
have a large positive or negative impact on enterprises.  
Key benefits of government representatives on boards are related to their day-to-
day jobs and processes they are involved in. Jermias and Gani (2014) argue that 
government officials maintain good relationships with numerous stakeholders and 
they tend to have very well-developed negotiating skills. Moreover, they usually 
enable enterprises to: (1) attain financing under privileged conditions, (2) get 
approved licenses in a shorter period of time, and (3) be assigned with a favorable 
government contracts (Pye, 1997). Their presence equals possession of exclusive 
information about state policies which would be costly and hardly obtainable in all 
other situations (Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999). For those reasons it is 
expected that enterprises with government officials on boards have better 
performance as well as lower operating costs (Hillman, 2005). To shed some light 
on government representatives’ contribution, or lack of such contribution, to the 
performance and operating costs, the hypothesis we propose is: 
Hypothesis 1: The number of government officials is positively associated with 
financial and operating performance of SOEs and operational costs. 
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4.2.2 University professors and SOE performance 
 
University professors usually have rather peculiar career path. That path is 
characterized with long tenures in academia without real professional experience in 
the private sector (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005). Von Glinow (1997) even explains that 
professors are advised to avoid enterprise employment as to be able to streamline 
their attention to academic research and rigor. Moreover, academics’ specialized 
expertise might engender their ability to properly evaluate real business conditions 
(Francis et al., 2015). Thus, professors are often seen as individuals whose 
knowledge is far-fetched and disconnected from real market experience (Ghoshal, 
2005). Monks and Minow (1995) even indicate that individuals with prior 
enterprise experience are much more efficient as board members than academics. 
Contrary to these implications, professors possess several characteristics that may 
increase the effectiveness of board, and thus the overall performance of enterprises. 
Jiang and Murphy (2007) explain that professors are critical thinkers with ability to 
defend their attitudes even in tough situations. Furthermore, they have hardly any 
prior connections with enterprise insiders, thus enabling them to be rather 
independent and have impartial opinions (Francis et al., 2015). Anderson et al. 
(2011) build on this argument suggesting that professors enhance board advisory 
role through their specialized experience and ability to introduce new ideas at board 
meetings. In addition, academics have all the necessary competences and 
intellectual capacity to process complex information (Audretsch & Lehmann, 2006; 
Audretsch & Stephan, 1996). Moreover, professors are viewed as reputation 
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enhancers (Singh, Terjesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008; White, Woidtke, Black, & 
Schweitzer, 2014) which signal enterprise quality.  
Professors are accustomed to embracing full responsibility, coping with 
unpredictable situations and recognizing favourable circumstances in a similar way 
as the executives do (Jiang & Murphy, 2007). Jermias and Gani (2014) suggest that 
boards benefit from professors’ research knowledge which broadens their 
consulting capabilities. Previous empirical research also showed that presence of 
academics lowers cost of debt (e.g., Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004) and it 
decreases cash flow sensitivity (e.g., Guner, Malmendier, & Tate, 2008). 
Furthermore, Francis et al. (2015) find that enterprises benefit from presence of 
academics in the boardroom. They reveal that professors on boards are associated 
with greater acquisition efficiency and higher CEO turnover–performance 
sensitivity. Since professors might be highly ranked members of society or very 
well-known for their consultancy work, their presence on boards might result in 
higher operating costs. Having in mind all the above stated, we present two a 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The number of professors is positively associated with financial and 
operating performance of SOEs and operational costs. 
4.2.3 Private sector representatives and SOE performance 
  
CEOs or top managers of private enterprises bring to SOE boards experiences from 
strategic decision-making processes of their mother enterprises (Hillman et al., 
2000). This enables them to provide advice on how certain internal operations 
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should look like and how these operations can become more effective (Mace, 1971). 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) contend that business experts provide 
alternative viewpoints and thorough assessments of proposals since they possess 
relevant market information. Furthermore, it is argued that they are better at 
monitoring since they can draw from past experiences (Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 
1994; Kosnik, 1987).  
Qualified business experts usually have greater motivation to effectively monitor 
managers because of their need to preserve reputation as well as gather points for 
future employments (Kaplan & Reishus, 1990). Westphal and Milton (2000) even 
noticed that board members with private enterprise backgrounds are highly valued 
since their experience spans outside the specific enterprise and sometimes even 
outside the industry. Additionally, these individuals provide boards with important 
information about their competitors and strategies of other enterprises (Jermias & 
Gani, 2014). Business experts usually build good communication channels 
(Hillman et al., 2000) and they enable managers to identify good market 
opportunities (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). On the one hand, they are expected to 
enhance decision-making processes, provide better understanding of the real market 
conditions and increase operational efficiency, thus improving the overall 
performance. On the other hand, individuals working as top managers of private 
enterprises with well-established professional backgrounds usually require higher 
compensation for their board participation, hence creating higher costs for 




Hypothesis 3: The number of professionals from private enterprises is positively 
associated with financial and operating performance of SOEs and operational 
costs. 
4.2.4 Professional backgrounds and political connections: the intertwined 
effect 
  
Based on the resource dependence theory, Hillman (2005) contends that enterprises 
with politicians on boards outperform those without. Political connections in those 
cases are invaluable links to some of the crucial resources which ease out solutions 
for certain operational issues. Moreover, Mahmood, Chung and Mitchell (2017) 
assert that political ties create strategic access to resources which can provide 
foundation for certain business activities. These benefits should in turn create 
positive effect on performance.  
Wang et al. (2016) have the opposing view implying that individuals being board 
members with political-party-connections engender enterprise performance. Their 
standing is built on the fact that board members with political connections might 
not be appointed on the basis of professional criteria but rather some non-market 
parameters. Such appointments usually signal politicians’ intention to misuse SOE 
resources for certain political objectives. The empirical evidence in this regard 
suggests that political connections result in higher indebtedness (Faccio, 2010), 
increased employment levels and inefficient investments (Saeed et al., 2015). 
Moreover, absence of board appointments on the basis of business acumen and 
professional experience implies that SOEs might be involved in “power-to-money, 
under the table” activities (Wang et al., 2016). Therefore, we believe that 
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intertwined effect of board members’ professional background and political 
connections on SOE performance might be more profound or completely different 
from the stand-alone effect of board members’ occupation.  
Probability that government representatives are appointed for political purposes as 
to facilitate certain political agenda through SOE operations increases with 
presence of political connections. Hence, it is anticipated that these individuals 
might influence board decisions as to shift SOE performance towards 
accomplishment of certain political interests (Shleifer, 1998). On the contrary, 
individuals with proven professional track record in private sector are less likely to 
get on board with the political agenda even when he/she is politically connected. 
This is due to the fact that his/hers professional career is highly dependent on 
reputation which is built on enterprise performance results. Board members with 
private enterprise backgrounds generally establish political connections as to be 
able to influence government policies and obtain up-to-date information regarding 
government policies (Frederick, 2011). In order to investigate theoretical 
implications about the potential joint effect of board members’ professional 
background and political connections, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 4: The associations between board member’s professional backgrounds 
and financial/operating performance and operating costs are quantitatively larger 




4.2.5 Political capital versus board capital  
 
Political capital which can improve or deteriorate SOE performance can be 
observed as a number of government representatives with political connections. On 
one hand, SOEs can benefit from high rank government officials with political ties 
since their presence implies certain level of preferential treatment. This treatment 
might encompass favourable financing conditions (e.g., Inoue et al., 2013), access 
to valuable resources managed by government (e.g., Xin & Pearce, 1996) and 
receiving information about government policies in advance of their public 
announcement (e.g., Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008). On the other 
hand, political capital can be used as a channel for accomplishment of certain 
political interests which might oppose performance enhancement objectives 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Some research studies even found that dominant SOE 
board members with political ties are negatively associated with SOE performance 
(e.g., Menozzi et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012). Investigating into this matter we 
introduce the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Political capital is negatively associated with financial/operating 
performance and positively associated with operating costs of SOEs. 
Certain theoretical implications contend that other individuals on SOE boards might 
outweigh potentially negative effects of political capital. Professionals working for 
private enterprises have certain distinctive characteristics when compared to 
government officials (Guo & Lu, 2012). Successful career in private sector usually 
asserts high level of knowledge and real market experience (Johnson, Schnatterly, 
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& Hill, 2013). Thus, these board members are usually the ones with a strong focus 
on performance and profits as this boosts their successful track record. However, 
several researchers point out that expert knowledge is a combination of professional 
experience and knowledge acquired through education (Chase & Simon, 1973; de 
Groot, 1978; Goodall & Pogrebna, 2015; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  
Ericsson, Krampe and Tesch-Romer (1993) and Salas, Rosen and DiazGranados 
(2010) argue that performance is a resultant of expert decision making which arises 
from both, real life experience and education. Moreover, the empirical evidence 
supports the notion that educational background has a significant positive effect on 
performance (Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & Hanuman, 2012) and enterprise value (Kim 
& Lim, 2010). Individuals who attained above-average educational degrees should 
have greater number of skills which enables them to systematically evaluate 
alternatives, recognize opportunities well in advance and be more receptive to 
change (e.g., Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; Herrmann & Datta, 2005; Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992;). Furthermore, board members with PhD degrees ensure high level of 
intellectual capacity and soundness of judgement, thus being considered as relevant 
strategic resource (Ingley & van der Walt, 2001). Hence, professionals from private 
sector who obtained MSc or PhD degrees can be observed as board capital. These 
individuals should have both, experience as well as knowledge gained through 
education. Moreover, board capital could enhance SOE performance and 
counterbalance the negative effects of political capital. We therefore propose the 
hypothesis:    
175 
 
Hypothesis 6: Board capital is positively associated with financial/operating 
performance and operating costs of SOEs. 
4.2.6 Sub-sample analysis: Private ownership and industry 
 
The minority private ownership might indicate SOE corporatization process which 
should result in board member professionalisation and commercially oriented 
performance (World Bank, 2014a). For that reason, SOEs with minority private 
ownership are expected to appoint individuals with greater level of expertise and 
knowledge (i.e., professionals working in private sector, professors) when 
compared to SOEs with 100% state-ownership. Therefore, it is anticipated that 
presence of these individuals on boards should enhance performance of SOEs with 
minority private ownership. On contrary, for SOEs with 100% state ownership 
greater presence of government representatives is anticipated, thus implying greater 
political interference which is negatively related to their performance. Individuals 
from private sector and/or professors would probably be a minority on such boards 
with the absence of real effect on SOE performance.  
The theory also suggests that manufacturing enterprises are less likely to appoint 
professors to their boards (Francis et al., 2015). Furthermore, the impact of board 
members’ professional background can be rather distinctive for manufacturing and 
service enterprises. For example, the fact that professors and/or individuals working 
in private enterprises require higher compensation is significant for operating costs 
of service enterprises. Compared to high fixed costs of production greater level of 
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compensation for one or couple of board members would not represent a major 
change of operating costs for manufacturing enterprises. 
4.3 Data and methodology 
4.3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
 
The Amadeus database is used as a starting point for sample construction. In order 
for an enterprise to be part of our sample it needs to operate in one of the six 
countries of the former SFRY. Additionally, direct or indirect state ownership needs 
to be larger than 50.01% since that conveys the effective government control. 
Moreover, this cut-off point is in line with OECD (2015) definition which states 
that SOEs are enterprises with 100% or majority state ownership. On the basis of 
these criteria 556 enterprises are identified as state-owned. In line with previous 
literature we further delimit our sample through exclusion of enterprises with non-
commercial objectives (e.g., providers of health and social services), banks and 
insurance enterprises, bankrupt enterprises and enterprises for which data are 
unavailable.12 Hence, our final sample is comprised from 200 SOEs.  
The financial statement items, date of incorporation, ownership structure and 
number of employees for the period 2010-2014 are downloaded from Amadeus. 
Any missing data is then collected from annual reports of SOEs whenever these 
reports are available. The board membership data within database is limited to last 
observed year (i.e., 2014) with rather obscure level of information on individual 
                                                          




board member characteristics. Hence, most of the board level information is 
obtained through hand-collection process. 
We define board as an enterprise body responsible for management monitoring and 
enterprise governing (OECD, 2015; World Bank, 2014a). Based on this definition 
we firstly gather data on board member names and appointment/resignation dates 
for the whole period observed. The data is obtained from annual reports of 
enterprises, enterprise profiles on stock exchanges and databases of official 
enterprise registry agencies. Overall, we were able to recognize 2,120 individuals 
that performed board member duty. Secondly, we parse through biographies of all 
board members as to gather further details about their demographic characteristics 
(e.g., age, gender, nationality) and educational/professional backgrounds (e.g., 
graduation year, highest degree obtained, area of study, domestic or foreign 
education, expertise, previous/current employer, subsequent position, political 
connectedness, number of other board memberships). As the source of information 
for individual board member characteristics we use their official curriculum vitae 
which is available on enterprise or personal websites, within minutes from 
shareholder meetings, in decisions on board member appointments or on LinkedIn 
profiles. We tried to have two sources of information confirming board member 
characteristic as to increase data reliability.  
4.3.2 Variables and measures 
 
To examine the effects of board members’ professional backgrounds we employ 
two performance measures. The profitability measure is return on equity (ROE) and 
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it is computed as net income over average total capital (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2012). 
The proxy of operating performance and productivity is Sales per employee which 
is equal to the natural logarithm of sales over the total number of employees (e.g., 
Jiang & Murphy, 2007). In addition to these two measures, we recognize that 
heterogeneity of professional backgrounds might infer higher costs (Anderson et 
al., 2011). These costs can be a consequence of individual board member interests 
(e.g., government representative being appointed as to accomplish certain political 
objective) or the need to pay higher compensation for certain board members. Thus, 
we also investigate the effect of board members’ professional backgrounds on 
operating costs. The Operating cost is equal to the natural logarithm of the 
difference between the sales and EBIT. We are not using any stock market measures 
since vast majority of SOEs from our sample is not traded on stock exchanges. 
To capture how board members with different occupational backgrounds indirectly 
impact performance though changes of board decision making we create three 
variables. Government representatives is the number of SOE board members that 
work for government. Professors is the number of SOE board members that work 
as university professors. Private representatives is the number of SOE board 
members that work for private enterprises. Moreover, as to acknowledge the 
intertwined effect of board member professional backgrounds and political 
connections we create three additional variables - Political government, Political 
professors and Political private. These three variables represent the number of 
politically connected board members working for government, university and 
private enterprises, respectively.  
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The significance of board capital and political capital for SOE performance is 
analysed through employment of two interaction terms. Board capital is an 
interaction term between Private representatives and Education, where Education 
represents the percentage of board members with MSc and PhD degrees. Our 
definition of board capital is built on the definition presented in the works of Chen 
(2008), Hillman (2005) and Jermias and Gani (2014). The difference stems from 
the fact that we narrow down their definition to professionals from private sector. 
Political capital is an interaction term between Government representatives and 
Politically connected. Politically connected is the percentage of politically 
connected board members. 
We also introduce several board characteristics that are widely used as controls in 
previous literature. The resource dependence theory asserts that board members are 
providers of important resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Thus, larger boards 
lead to greater accumulation of resources (Bordean & Borza, 2017). Contrary to 
that, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Guest (2009) suggest that larger boards are 
inefficient. We therefore control for Board size which is equal to the total number 
of board members (e.g., Jermias & Gani, 2014; Yermack, 1996). Board tenure is 
the sum of years that board members served on the board divided by the number of 
board members (e.g., Herrmann & Datta, 2005). This measure captures board 
member potential to sway board decisions (Anderson et al., 2004). Individuals with 
longer tenures have a greater potential to influence board deliberation. Male 
dominated boards usually result in single-mindedness, while women bring some 
new perspectives and handful of additional information (Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 
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1991; Hillman, Cannella, & Harris, 2002). Furthermore, Milliken and Martins 
(1996) argue that male-dominated boards are associated with lower quality 
decisions when compared to decisions of gender diverse boards. Thus, we control 
for the number of men on board, Board male. In addition, we control for Work 
experience in estimations with board/political capital since theory implies that 
length of individual board member experience can be beneficial for performance. 
Work experience is equal to natural logarithm of the difference between observed 
year and year of completion of bachelor studies or high school when high school is 
the highest degree obtained. 
Enterprise characteristics can influence performance, and we thus control for 
several enterprise features. We employ Enterprise size, which is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the number of employees as to ensure that our results are not 
driven by size effect (e.g., Cavaco, Challe, Crifo, Reberioux, & Roudaut, 2016; 
Zheng et al., 2015). Enterprise existence controls for different phases of enterprise 
life cycle and it is equal to the natural logarithm of the difference between years 
under investigation and year of SOE incorporation (e.g., Sun et al., 2015). Leverage 
is long-term debt over equity and it is a proxy of enterprise indebtedness (e.g., 
Faccio, 2010). Industry, level of state ownership and other fixed enterprise 
characteristics are captured by the fixed effects error term and for that reason they 







For examination of the relationship between board member characteristics and 
enterprise performance researchers have used the following methods: (i) cross-
sectional regression; (ii) difference-in-differences approach; (iii) fixed-effects. The 
first method is used by Anderson et al. (2004) for their investigation of the 
connection between cost of debt and board independence. Since this method 
envisages investigation of associations between dependent and independent 
variables in one point in time, this method is not suggested for our research. The 
study on how educational composition of boards impacts the portfolio risk of 
enterprises implements the second method (e.g., Berger et al., 2014). This method 
would require the existence of the treatment effect that we cannot specify in terms 
of the hypotheses that are stated within this chapter.  
The third method is applied in the research study that examines how individual 
managers characteristics influence enterprise performance (Bertrand & Schoar, 
2003). Moreover, fixed-effects models are preferred for panel data analysis since 
these models can control for unobserved heterogeneity (Greene, 2003). Thus, we 
use third method for estimations within this chapter.13  
It is important to mention that we are aware that this method does not allow us to 
estimate causal effect and that usage of IV approach would help us in that regard. 
Empirical studies that investigate the relationship between certain board 
                                                          
13 Prior to our decision to employ fixed-effects, we run Durbin-Wu-Hausman test that shows better 
performance of fixed-effects model than random-effects model. 
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characteristics and performance use as instrumental variables distance of enterprise 
headquarters from the nearest airport (e.g., Nguyen, Hagendorff, & Eshraghi, 2015; 
Fields, Fraser & Subrahmanyam, 2012) or distance of universities from enterprise 
headquarters (e.g. Francis et al., 2015). In addition, certain capital market variables 
are used as instrumental variables. However, data limitations (i.e., we are not able 
to observe capital market variables) as well as lack of reliability for instruments 
used in previous research as implied by performed tests limit our ability to use IV 
approach. Our objective in that regard, is to assess whether there is evidence of any 
associations between board member’s professional backgrounds and SOE 
performance. 
To examine theoretical implications and hypotheses stated in this chapter we run 
the following fixed effects models:  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒/𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽4𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽7𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽9𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 +  𝛿𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡                      (4.1) 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒/𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽4𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛽7𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 





𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒/𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽5𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽7𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛽8𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽10𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽12𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽13𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 
+ 𝛿𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡                                      (4.3) 
where i is the SOE id, t is the year effect, α is the intercept, 𝑢𝑖 captures SOE specific 
fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡 depicts time fixed effect and 𝑖,𝑡 denotes the error term. In all three 
models the dependent variable is Performance (represented by ROE and Sales per 
employee) and Operating cost. Furthermore, as it can be noted all enterprise level 
controls are lagged since these variables might have a non-instantaneous 
association with Performance and Operating cost.  
The 4.1 model identifies whether board members with different professional 
backgrounds have distinctive associations with SOE performance and operating 
costs (Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 3). The 4.2 fixed effects model depicts whether 
intertwined effects of political connections and board members’ professional 
backgrounds have different associations with SOE performance (Hypothesis 4). 
The 4.3 fixed effects model investigates what kind of relationship board capital and 
political capital have with SOE performance and whether one of these relationships 
outweighs the other (Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6).  
We first estimate all three models for the whole sample and then we re-estimate 
them in two sub-samples. The sub-samples are created based on literature 
184 
 
implications and empirical research findings. Firstly, we create a sample of SOEs 
with 100% state ownership and a sample of SOEs with minority private ownership, 
and we rerun all three models. In that way we distinguish whether some differences 
in associations arise because of the distinct SOE ownership structure. Secondly, we 
divide SOEs into manufacturing and services sectors and we rerun first two models. 
With this re-estimation we recognize that relationships between board members’ 
professional backgrounds and SOE performance might also depend on industry.  
4.3.4 Sample summary statistics 
 
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics. SOEs within our sample employ on average 
667 employees and they exist for 28 years. The long-term debt accounts for 33% of 
the equity. Boards on average have five board members with four members being 
male. Their average Work experience is 25.6 years, while their Board tenure is two 
years. This data implies that SOE board members are experienced and that 
replacement of board members happens prior to the end of four-year mandate. Only 
one out of five board members has obtained MSc or PhD degree. We can also 
observe that half of SOE board members are politically connected. Furthermore, on 
average two board members are Government representatives, additional two are 
Private representatives and one board member is Professor. Government 
representatives on boards are the ones with the greatest number of political 
connections, with Professors being the least politically connected.  
 




Table 4.2 reports the Pearson’s correlation matrix for all variables used within the 
scope of this study. Consistent with our hypotheses we find that relationship of 
Government representatives with financial performance is negative and significant 
(-0.06, p<0.1) and it is positive and significant when it comes to Operating cost 
(0.14, p<0.01). Presence of Professors on boards has positive and significant 
relationship with all performance measures. Contrary to that, we find significant 
and negative correlation between Private representatives and financial performance 
(-0.06, p<0.1) probably due to the positive significant correlation with operating 
costs (0.34, p<0.01). Political connections and their intertwined effect with different 
board member professions has positive and significant correlation with Operating 
costs, suggesting the presence of political interference. It is also interesting to note 
that Board tenure is significantly and negatively correlated with all board member 
professional backgrounds and that the highest significance and negative correlation 
is recorder for Government representatives (-0.17, p<0.01). Finally, correlation 
coefficients do not raise concerns regarding multicollinearity.  
 
[Insert Table 4.2 about here] 
 
Further statistics regarding SOE board members’ professional backgrounds and 
expertise are provided in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Based on these statistics we can 
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conclude that Professors attain the highest level of education, followed by Private 
representatives. On average Government representatives obtain lower levels of 
education with mostly general expertise. 
 
[Insert Table 4.3 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 4.4 about here] 
 





4.4 Empirical results  
 
Table 4.5, Panel 1 provides an overview of the findings for the effects of board 
members’ professional background on SOE performance. Presence of Government 
representatives on SOE boards is negatively related to Sales per employee. This 
result provides support for the notion that government officials usually lack 
knowledge and competencies to successfully perform board duties (Frederick, 
2011). Moreover, this finding might imply that government officials are appointed 
on political rather than market criteria (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). Thus, negative 
consequences for operational performance can be observed. Statistics from Table 
4.3 further suggest that government officials possess general expertise and they 
have lower educational levels. Moreover, this finding confirms that these board 
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members might not possess the appropriate knowledge and expertise for board 
membership. We also note that Government representatives are insignificant for 
ROE and Operating cost. Hence, we find only partial support for our Hypothesis 1 
recognizing insignificance of Government representatives for financial 
performance and operating costs. 
 
[Insert Table 4.5 about here] 
 
Professors have positive significant relationship with both, ROE and Sales per 
employee, while having positive but insignificant relation with Operating cost. Our 
findings are in line with theoretical implications about professors’ contribution to 
board decision-making processes through their critical thinking, effective 
processing of complex information and provision of advice (Anderson et al., 2004; 
Jiang & Murphy, 2007). Additionally, the results uphold the suggestion of 
Anderson et al. (2011) that professors provide advanced strategic alternatives which 
enable boards to decide on the most favourable path that needs to be undertaken. 
Furthermore, with our findings we also reconfirm the results of Francis et al. (2015). 
They investigated S&P 1,500 enterprises in the period 1998-2011 and they found 
positive association between academics and private enterprise performance. Our 
findings support Hypothesis 2 in terms of the effects of professor’s presence on 
SOE performance.  
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Results from Table 4.5 also reveal that Private representatives are positively 
associated with SOEs’ Operating cost and negatively associated with ROE. Since 
board members coming from private enterprises are usually highly valued because 
of their experience (Westphal & Milton, 2000) they often require higher board 
compensation, thus increasing operating costs. The negative association with 
financial performance might be a consequence of positive association with 
operating costs. Enterprise costs negatively affect net income leading to a decrease 
of ROE. Furthermore, the absence of positive effect on performance can be related 
to inability of private representatives to influence board dynamics. Critical mass 
theory implies that certain number of board members with same or similar 
characteristics is needed in order to change board deliberation and board processes 
(Dahlerup, 1988; Kanter, 1977). Additionally, the lack of positive relationship 
might imply that SOE boards in these countries are “rubber stamps” for government 
decisions and that real contribution of private representatives is not present 
(Frederick, 2011). Hence, we do not find support for Hypothesis 3 since results 
show negative association with financial performance probably caused by the 
positive association with operational costs. 
Panel 2 in Table 4.5 presents results for the intertwined effect of board members’ 
professional background and political connections on SOE performance. With 
introduction of political connections, the association with SOE performance 
becomes more profound when it comes to Government representatives and Private 
representatives. This result is in line with theoretical conclusion that government 
representatives are mostly appointed as to facilitate certain political agenda with the 
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negative after-effect on the overall SOE performance. Furthermore, higher positive 
association of Political private with Operating cost (0.049 versus 0.016) might 
suggest that this is another informal channel of political interference. As argued by 
Wang et al. (2016) absence of professional board appointments can entail some 
“under the table” activities which enable political benefit transfers. Additionally, 
lower significance of politically connected academics (Political professors) might 
imply that presence of political connections lowers their board independence and 
puts them under political influence. Thus, our results provide partial support for 
Hypothesis 4. 
Both panels of Table 4.5 show that several board and enterprise characteristics seem 
to be important for SOE performance. The results imply that increase in Enterprise 
size increases Operating cost. This stems from the fact that larger SOEs incur 
greater costs of operations related to maintenance of fixed assets as well as variable 
costs. Moreover, we find that Leverage has a negative impact on ROE, thus 
confirming conclusions from previous research studies (e.g., Faccio, 2010; 
Fidanoski, Simeonovski, & Mateska, 2014; Francis et al., 2015; Jermias & Gani, 
2014). The positive even though insignificant relationship between Leverage and 
Operating cost is expected. Highly indebted enterprises face financial distress 
problems which lead to decline in the enterprise value (Opler & Titman, 1994). 
Longer Board tenure has positive effect on operating SOE performance. This 
positive effect stems from greater understanding of business operations gained 
through longer period of time spent on board. Moreover, Anderson et al. (2004) 
argue that board members with greater tenure improve monitoring and they exhibit 
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positive influence on board discussions and decision making. The increase of 
operating costs because of longer tenures implies greater compensation for board 
members that spend longer period of time on boards. The results for Leverage and 
Board tenure are consistent in all our estimations. All other control variables do not 
have significant relationship with SOE performance.  
The results for our sub-samples, presented in Table 4.6, suggest that relationship 
between board members’ professional background and SOE performance depends 
on SOE ownership structure. Operating performance of SOEs with 100% state-
ownership is negatively associated with government officials and positively 
associated with presence of professors on boards. The association becomes larger 
when these categories of board members possess political connections, while 
private representatives remain insignificant. Hence, it can be argued that negative 
consequences of political interference and lack of competences of government 
representatives is counterbalanced with expertise and knowledge of professors.  
 
[Insert Table 4.6 about here] 
 
Contrary to that, for SOEs with minority private ownership Private representatives 
and Professors have strong positive association with SOE operating performance 
and operating costs. Potential explanation might be related to strong profit 
orientation of private representatives due to their cognitive mindset formed within 
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the private sector (Boyne, 2002). With such focus and mindset private 
representatives might impose profits as one of the SOE board priorities. 
Additionally, professors probably create positive effects because of their expertise, 
alternative viewpoints, analytical skills and well-grounded strategic thinking 
(Audretsch & Stephan, 1996; White et al., 2014). Moreover, appointment of such 
professionals to boards implies higher compensation levels, and thus higher 
operating costs. The insignificance of intertwined effects as well as government 
representatives further supports the notion that operating costs within SOEs with 
minority private ownership do not increase due to some political reasons. Hence, 
our results potentially signal that in SOEs with minority private ownership 
professionalization of board membership and cost management is present.  
Within the second set of sub-samples we find that for manufacturing SOEs 
professional background of board members is irrelevant (Table 4.7). The only 
significance we find is related to Professors’ positive association with ROE. 
Absence of any other association might also be related to the fact that management 
and other operating expenses (e.g., board member compensation, salaries of 
administrative personnel, offices etc.) are negligible when compared to the higher 
magnitude of production costs. Thus, hiring of high profile expert with high board 
compensation is going to result in an insignificant change of the overall operating 
costs.  
  




For SOEs providing services, we find that Professors and Private representatives 
have positive association with both, ROE and Sales per employee. The association 
is lost when these board members possess political connections. Political professors 
and Political private have positive association with Operating cost. On one hand, 
this result backs up the view that for SOE service providers compensation of 
individuals with professional backgrounds and expertise is significant for 
operational costs due to non-existence of large production costs. On the other hand, 
this might imply that governments through political connections of non-government 
representatives create some hidden costs (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). The negative 
association between Political government and Sales per employee upholds the 
proposition regarding negative consequences of political interference.  
Estimation results from Table 4.8 show that Board capital is positively associated 
with SOE financial performance (ROE), thus providing partial support for 
Hypothesis 5. This is consistent with results of previous research studies despite 
different samples and board capital definitions (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Certo, & 
Roengpitya, 2003; Hillman et al., 1999). Using a sample of US enterprises listed on 
Compustat S&P 500, Jermias and Gani (2014) show that board capital14 has positive 
effect on performance. Moreover, our results are consistent with resource 
dependence proposition that expert boards enhance enterprise performance by 
providing advice, alternative strategies and better external connections (Pfeffer & 
                                                          
14 In the research study of Jermias and Gani (2014) the board capital is represented by outsiders’ ability to 
use their skills, expertise and knowledge to monitor management. 
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Salancik, 1978). Our results also suggest that board members working for private 
enterprises with MSc and PhD degrees have greater value for performance than 
board members without such expertise and knowledge. 
 
[Insert Table 4.8 about here] 
 
Significant negative association of Government representatives with financial 
performance for the whole sample further supports the claim that appointment of 
these board members is related to some political objectives (Chong & Lopez-de-
Silanes, 2005). Additionally, positive association of Politically connected with 
Operating cost upholds the notion that political interference within SOEs has some 
hidden levers for “under the table” activities (Wang et al., 2016). Interestingly, we 
find that Political capital is positively associated with ROE. Therefore, our results 
provide partial support for Hypothesis 6. Politically connected government officials 
can improve SOE financial performance through enabling certain resources such as 
lower costs of financing (e.g., Chen et al., 2014) or even easier access to subsidies 
(e.g., Wu & Cheng, 2011). Hence, we can conclude that combination of private 
representatives with MSc and PhD degrees and government representatives with 
political connections enhances SOE performance.  
When we take ownership structure into consideration further differences arise, as 
seen in Panel 2 and Panel 3 of Table 4.8. For SOEs with 100% state ownership 
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Board capital and Political capital are insignificant for performance. The only 
significant positive association is between Politically connected and Operating cost 
for both sub-samples, confirming negative consequences of political interference. 
On contrary, estimation results for SOEs with minority private ownership provide 
completely different picture of the board–performance relationship when compared 
to SOEs with 100% state ownership. Private representatives, Working experience 
and individuals with MSc and PhD degrees are positively associated with Sales per 
employee and Operating cost. On one hand, these results confirm literature 
implications that private representatives bring market know-how to SOEs, thus 
improving the overall organizational performance (Johnson et al., 1996). They are 
also in line with previous research which shows that well-educated boards improve 
enterprise performance and increase value (Fidanoski et al., 2014; Kim & Lim, 
2010). On the other hand, individuals with greater working experience, higher 
levels of education and proven track record are expected to require higher 
compensations (Medoff & Abraham, 1980) for board membership thus increasing 
operating costs. This is further confirmed through positive association of board 
capital and operating cost. Positive association between board/political capital and 
financial performance has the same implications as explained above.  
4.5 Conclusions 
The upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) suggests that expertise and 
personal interpretation of information affects the way in which top level decision 
makers decide on strategic and organizational matters. However, the prior empirical 
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studies focused mainly on the effects of board demographics and board 
independence on behaviour of private enterprises in developed countries. Only 
recently researchers recognized the need to tap into the boards’ “black-box” as to 
examine whether and in what way board member’s professional background might 
influence their decision making and enterprise performance. Thus far, the attention 
was mainly streamlined towards the effects of certain industry specific background 
(e.g., bankers, lawyers). With our research we try to investigate whether 
professional and educational backgrounds of SOE board members and their 
political connections affect performance and operating costs.  
The results of our panel data fixed effects estimation for 200 SOEs from six 
countries of the former SFRY imply that presence of professors on SOE boards is 
positively related to financial performance. Moreover, the findings suggest that 
government representatives have negative association with operating performance, 
while private sector representatives increase operating costs, thus adversely 
affecting financial performance. With presence of political interference in the form 
of individual board members’ political connections the stated associations become 
quantitatively larger. For SOEs with minority private ownership and those 
operating in the service sector, individuals working in the private sector positively 
influence their operating performance. Furthermore, we observe that private sector 
representatives with MSc and PhD degrees as well as government representatives 




This chapter has several important implications for the existing literature and policy 
makers. The findings reveal that board members’ professional backgrounds and 
experiences influence SOE performance, thus providing us with a better 
understanding and new perspectives regarding board–performance relationship. We 
acknowledge that private enterprise representatives, professors and government 
officials create differentiating effects for performance. Furthermore, we address the 
potential issue of political interference by looking at the intertwined effects of board 
members’ professional backgrounds and political connections. Thus, our findings 
suggest that governments should adopt clearly defined criteria for board 
memberships. The criteria should recognize the importance of knowledge, 
expertise, prior experience in making strategic and organizational decisions and 
ability to observe problems from several angles. Such criteria would lead to 
professionalisation of SOE boards with greater number of professors and 
individuals from private enterprises performing board membership duty. 
Limited availability of data regarding SOE board members’ professional careers 
leaves a number of areas for future research. First, in our study we only have 
information about the full-time position that an individual performs while being 
SOE board member. Greater details about career path in terms of the time spent in 
certain positions would enable greater differentiating amongst board members’ 
professional backgrounds. For example, someone who spent twenty years in private 
sector and last two years in government probably has qualities of a private sector 
representative. Furthermore, the data regarding the exact position and 
successfulness would contribute to better understanding of whether board member 
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has the required knowledge and expertise. Second, our dataset contains information 
about the number of other board positions. However, the information is available 
only for the year of appointment of board member. If data would be available for 
the whole period, other board memberships could be used as a parameter of 
successfulness by observing the performance of those enterprises throughout the 
time in which board membership is obtained. Third, we define board capital in 
accordance with previous literature, but we recognize that this is an indirect proxy 
which might not grasp the true quality of how individuals perform their board 
duties. Information about board meeting discussions, their length, presence of board 

















Table 4.1  
Descriptive statistics 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for all variables used in our estimations. The sample covers 200 state-owned 
enterprises from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia for the period 2010-
2014. Please note that for the variables that are used in logarithm form within our estimations in this table we report non-
logarithm values. Panel A reports the summary statistics for state-owned enterprise performance variables. ROE is the ratio 
of net income to average total equity. Sales per employee is the natural logarithm of sales over the total number of employees. 
Operating cost is equal to the natural logarithm of the difference between the sales and EBIT. In panel B the summary 
statistics for board level variables are reported. Government representatives is the number of SOE board members that work 
for government. Professors is the number of SOE board members that work as university professors. Private representatives 
is the number of SOE board members that work for private enterprises. Political government is the number of SOE board 
members that work for government and are politically connected. Political professors is the number of SOE board members 
that work as university professors and are politically connected. Political private is the number of SOE board members that 
work for private enterprises and are politically connected. Board size is the total number of board members. Board tenure is 
the average time that board members spent on the board. Board male is the percentage of men on board. Education is the 
percentage of board members with MSc and PhD degrees. Work experience is equal to natural logarithm of the difference 
between observed year and year of completion of bachelor studies or high school when high school is the highest degree 
obtained. Politically connected is the percentage of politically connected board members. In Panel C the summary statistics 
for enterprise control variables are reported. Enterprise size is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees. 
Existence is the natural logarithm of the difference between years under investigation and year of SOE incorporation. 









Variable Mean Median Std Obs 
Panel A: Performance measures 
ROE -0.05 -0.02 0.22 957 
Sales per employee 190.72 96.26 919.24 971 
Operating cost 56971.27 2484.00 166953.1 973 
Panel B: Board level measures 
Government representatives 1.67 1.00 1.66 1,000 
Professors 0.35 0.00 0.69 1,000 
Private representatives 1.95 2.00 1.86 1,000 
Political government 1.49 1.00 1.55 1,000 
Political professors 0.16 0.00 0.44 1,000 
Political private 0.71 1.00 1.01 1,000 
Board size 5.38 6.00 3.10 1,000 
Board tenure 2.12 2.75 1.21 919 
Male board 4.38 6.00 2.72 1,000 
Education 0.21 0.17 0.22 919 
Work experience 25.61 23.67 18.93 919 
Politically connected 0.52 0.57 0.29 919 
Panel C: Enterprise level measures 
Enterprise size 675.53 488.00 1517.72 989 
Enterprise existence 28.12 21.00 23.99 977 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3  
Board structure by professional background and level of education 
Notes: This table reports board structure by professional background and level of education of SOE board members. The 
data presented show how many SOE board members are government representatives, private representatives and 
professors as well as what is the highest level of education obtained by individuals from each of the three groups. 
Government representatives are SOE board members that work for government. Professors are SOE board members that 
work as university professors. Private representatives are SOE board members that work for private enterprises. PhD is 
the number of individuals among SOE board members that obtained Doctor of Philosophy degree. MSc is the number 
of individuals among SOE board members with master’s degree that represents the highest level of education they 
obtained. BSc is the number of individuals that obtained bachelor’s degree that represents the highest level of education 
they obtained. High school or higher school is the number of individuals that finished high school or higher school as 





Table 4.4  
Board structure by professional background and expertise 
Notes: This table reports board structure by professional background and expertise of SOE board members. The data 
presented distinguishes between specialists and generalists among government representatives, private 
representatives and professors. Government representatives are SOE board members that work for government. 
Professors are SOE board members that work as university professors. Private representatives are SOE board 
members that work for private enterprises. Specialists are SOE board members that possess a specific expertise 
related to the SOE business operations and they are not economists or general engineers. Generalists are SOE board 
members with a general expertise in economics or engineering.  
 
Government representatives 
Total number: 741 
PhD = 40 MSc = 107 BSc = 434 High school or higher school = 156 
Private representatives  
Total number: 865 
PhD = 43 MSc = 165 BSc = 522 High school or higher school = 135 
Professors 
Total number: 151 
PhD = 119 MSc = 14 BSc = 18 High school or higher school = 0 
Government representatives 
Specialists = 346 Generalists = 307 
Private representatives 
Specialists = 470 Generalists = 294 
Professors 
Specialists = 94 Generalists = 56 
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Table 4.5  
Board members’ professional backgrounds and SOE performance: Whole 
sample 
Notes: The table presents the results regarding relationship between board members’ professional background and SOE 
performance. Fixed effects panel data was used. Panel 1 presents results for estimation of board members’ professional 
background and SOE performance. Panel 2 presents results for the intertwined effect of board members’ professional 
background and political connections with SOE performance. In columns (1) and (4) performance measure is ROE. In 
columns (2) and (5) performance measure is Sales per employee. In columns (3) and (6) performance measure is Operating 
cost. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant term is estimated but not reported. 
***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. ROE is the ratio of net income to average total equity. 
Sales per employee is the natural logarithm of sales over the total number of employees. Operating cost is equal to the 
natural logarithm of the difference between the sales and EBIT. Government representatives is the number of SOE board 
members that work for government. Professors is the number of SOE board members that work as university professors. 
Private representatives is the number of SOE board members that work for private enterprises. Political government is the 
number of SOE board members that work for government and are politically connected. Political professors is the number 
of SOE board members that work as university professors and are politically connected. Political private is the number of 
SOE board members that work for private enterprises and are politically connected. Board size is the total number of board 
members. Board tenure is the average time that board members spent on the board. Board male is the percentage of men 
on board. Enterprise size is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees. Existence is the natural logarithm of 
the difference between years under investigation and year of SOE incorporation. Leverage is equal to long-term debt over 
shareholders’ equity.  
 
 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 




Operating      
cost 




     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)     (5)         (6) 
Government 
representatives 
-0.019 -0.030* -0.017    
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)    
Professors     0.046** 0.001* 0.000    
                (0.022) (0.030) (0.030)    
Private representatives -0.006* 0.013 0.016**    
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)    
Political government    -0.018 -0.035** -0.007 
    (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) 
Political professors              0.056* -0.039 0.068 
                   (0.033) (0.042) (0.048) 
Political private    0.002 0.023 0.049* 
    (0.015) (0.023) (0.027) 
Board size       -0.012 0.022 0.003 -0.013 0.025 -0.002 
                (0.011) (0.019) (0.018) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) 
Board tenure          0.015 0.039** 0.034*** 0.010 0.040** 0.035*** 
                (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) 
Board male 0.001 -0.022 0.011 0.002 -0.021 0.007 
                (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) 
Enterprise size (lagged) -0.023 0.102 0.211* -0.020 0.102 0.209* 
                (0.043) (0.171) (0.114) (0.041) (0.170) (0.111) 
Enterprise existence 
(lagged) 
0.041 0.068 -0.041 0.051 0.062 -0.036 
 (0.108) (0.114) (0.121) (0.109) (0.111) (0.117) 
Leverage (lagged) -0.106*** -0.026 0.026 -0.105*** -0.031 0.025 
 (0.040) (0.048) (0.036) (0.039) (0.046) (0.034) 
       
No. of Obs.  655 651 650 655 651 650 
Mean VIF 2.61 2.59 2.59 2.28 2.27 2.27 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This thesis investigates how political interference influences board dynamics and 
decision-making processes, thus impacting SOEs’ behaviour and performance. For 
the purpose of our analysis we use hand-collected sample of 200 SOEs from six 
countries of the former SFRY with financial and board membership data for the 
period 2010-2014. The selected countries provide us with a unique set-up having 
similar state enterprise sectors where direct/indirect political pressures are 
abundant. Furthermore, the enhancement of SOEs’ performance and curtailment of 
political interference is one of the main priorities for governments of these 
countries. Therefore, the three empirical chapters of this thesis analyse distinct 
political interference mechanisms in an attempt to provide a more nuanced picture 
of how politicians use SOEs for personal or political objectives.  
Chapter 2 reveals that board member changes within SOEs are politically motivated 
rather than performance induced. More specifically, the results show a significant 
positive impact of parliamentary elections on board member changes with 
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 performance being insignificant for board replacements. Furthermore, the findings 
suggest negative relationship between politically induced board member changes 
and financial/operating performance of SOEs. This confirms that change of the 
critical number of board members causes inconsistent decision making which 
results in poor enterprise performance. We also find the adverse association of 
politically induced board member changes with performance of small and medium 
SOEs and no association with large SOEs. Such results suggest that government 
officials avoid using large SOEs for political objectives due to their visibility and 
negative publicity that this might cause. Furthermore, our findings uncover 
insignificant political board replacements–performance relationship when SOEs 
are governed by independent government body, thus providing support for literature 
implication that centralized ownership model limits political interference.  
Chapter 3 implies that politicians engage in pre-election manipulation of SOEs’ 
corporate decisions. We observe that increase of SOEs’ employment is the highest 
in pre-election and election years. The results imply that leverage changes in pre-
election and election years probably because of the need to start new investments 
or cover costs of new employment. Moreover, upsurge of SOE investments is 
present in election and postelection years. Hence, our findings suggest that 
politicians take advantage of voters’ preferences for high employment/investment 
and the fact that they are short-sighted in order to increase their re-election 
prospects. In addition, for SOEs with politically dominated boards we find that 
employment and indebtedness levels change to a greater extent. We also reveal that 
politicians use SOEs governed by central governments as to increase employment 
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since these enterprises are most likely to generate headlines due to their size and 
economic importance.    
Chapter 4 shows that different board member professional backgrounds influence 
SOE performance. The findings imply that government representatives are 
negatively related to operating performance probably due to their inadequate 
competencies and expertise. However, results show positive relationship between 
professors and ROE, while individuals coming from private enterprises increase 
SOE operating costs, thus creating negative association with ROE. The significance 
and magnitude of these associations increases with presence of political 
connections. Board composition in terms of professional backgrounds seems to be 
unimportant for manufacturing SOEs. The presence of professors and private sector 
representatives is positively associated with operating performance of service sector 
SOEs and SOEs with minority private ownership. Lastly, our results suggest that 
the relationship between board/political capital and ROE is positive. 
The analyses presented within this thesis imply that politicians influence SOEs’ 
behaviour and performance through different political interference mechanisms 
which encompass boards and their decision making. Hence, this thesis makes 
several contributions to the existing literature and provides practical implications 
for government policies related to SOEs. First, we fill in the existing literature gap 
about the nature and drivers of SOEs’ board turnover contributing to a more 
nuanced picture of political tie heterogeneity. Second, we demonstrate that political 
interference via unstable board membership hinders SOE performance, thus 
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complementing the research about the factors that influence SOE performance. 
Third, we extend the literature on political interference by showing that state 
ownership provides incumbents with an informal channel for obtaining electoral 
support. Moreover, our findings enrich understanding of political embeddedness 
theory by showing a reverse channel through which benefits are streamlined from 
SOE board members to politicians. Fourth, we contribute to upper echelons theory 
and we complement the empirical research on board characteristics‒performance 
relationship since we demonstrate that board members’ background characteristics 
influence SOE performance. Fifth, our results imply that centralized ownership 
model and adoption of board appointment criteria that is based on business acumen 
could potentially shield SOEs from political interference. Furthermore, 
governments should adopt four-year plans regarding SOEs’ employment, 
indebtedness and investment levels as to decrease possibilities for short-term 
decisions with election benefits. However, we acknowledge that our study has 
several limitations which suggest possible directions for future research.  
First, we carried out a kind of natural experiment since six countries of the former 
SFRY share a lot of similarities in terms of their development path and state 
enterprise sectors. However, replication of this research in the context of developed, 
developing, emerging and/or transition countries would determine general 
applicability of our findings. Furthermore, it would allow for recognition of some 
institutional and/or developmental factors which co-create certain patterns when it 
comes to political interference and SOEs.  
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Second, the dataset used in this thesis covers a five-year period. Although sample 
with 1,000 enterprise-year observations is comparable to sample sizes of similar 
studies and is sufficient for examination of the political interference effects, a 
dataset with longer period of time would add to robustness of the research. 
Additionally, prolonged time frame implies greater number of local/parliamentary 
elections, thus enabling differentiation between their effects and allowing for a 
better structured analysis using DID approach in Chapter 2.  
Third, findings of Chapter 3 show some differences between pre-election 
manipulation of SOE corporate decisions for SOEs with 100% state ownership and 
SOEs with minority private ownership. The extension of this research to majority 
privately owned enterprises would allow a clear-cut conclusion of whether pre-
election manipulation is related to presence of state ownership. Furthermore, due to 
the lack of available data we are unable to track the link between pre-election 
manipulation of indebtedness and investment decisions. Information about purpose 
of approved subsidies and loans on the one hand, and list of investment projects on 
the other hand, would answer the question of whether funds are used for real 
investment activities or some election campaign goals.  
Fourth, our hand-collected dataset comprises of rather detailed demographic and 
professional information about SOE board members, thus being unique for 
countries analysed in this thesis. Recognizing that due to scarcity of available 
information we were not able to perform certain analysis in Chapter 2 and Chapter 
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4, here we outline several directions for future research in case such data becomes 
available at certain point in time.  
The analysis in Chapter 2 does not consider the fact that board member changes in 
election years might also depend on the type of political tie. Middle level 
government officers might be less likely to be replaced than individuals connected 
directly to a high-level government or parliament official when a change of a ruling 
party happens. Hence, such analysis would provide a more nuanced picture of 
politically induced board member changes in election years. In Chapter 2, we also 
note that political ties create certain costs and benefits as implied by political 
embededdness theory. Therefore, examination of costs and benefits of individual 
board member replacements in election years would provide further explanation of 
the negative association between politically induced board member changes and 
SOE performance.  
The categorization of board members’ professional backgrounds in Chapter 4 is 
based on the full-time positions which individuals perform aside of their board 
membership. However, such categorization might omit the fact that certain board 
members spent majority of their careers as professors even though their current 
position is in the government. Therefore, more detailed categorization or even 
diversity of positions obtained, would provide some additional insight on how 
board members’ professional backgrounds influence SOE performance. Moreover, 
a more direct proxy of board capital could be created by observing board member 
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